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Re´sume´
Cette the`se mode´lise des me´canismes d’allocation de biens indivisibles dans des situations
ou` pre´valent des externalite´s dans les pre´fe´rences. Ces externalite´s conduisent a` de´finir les
re´sultats des me´canismes comme des combinaisons complexes d’alternatives. Cette complexite´
rend difficile la collecte de pre´fe´rences sur les re´sultats, ce qui pose proble`me pour l’e´tude
normative des me´canismes tels que le me´cxanisme concurrentiel ou le coeur. Une solution
possible est de se limiter a` une information partielle sur les pre´fe´rences, et a` conditionner
l’analyse normative a` des hypothe`ses pre´cisant comment cette information partielle peut eˆtre
e´tendue a` une information comple`te sur les pre´fe´rences. Ces hypothe`ses revenant a` conside´rer
un domaine restreint de pre´fe´rence, une telle approche s’apperente a` un mode d’analyse
courant dans la the´orie du Choix Social.
La the`se est organise´e en quatre chapitres inde´pendants. Les trois premiers chapitres
portent sur l’extension du mode`le de Shapley-Scarf aux situations d’e´changes entre coalitions,
chaque membre d’une coalition e´tant sensible au bien-eˆtre des autres membres de la coalition.
Les chapitres 1 et 2 sont consacre´s a` l’e´tude des domaines de pre´fe´rences garantissant l’exis-
tence de diffe´rents types d’e´quilibre concurrentiel. Dans le chapitre 3, l’ensemble des biens
est muni d’une structure ge´ographique. La distribution des biens en diffe´rentes localisations
permet de prendre en compte la distance entre partenaires comme source d’externalite´ dans
les pre´fe´rences. Nous identifions les domaines de pre´fe´rences qui garantissent la non-vacuite´
du coeur, celui-ci pouvant eˆtre de´fini de diffe´rentes manie`res. Le chapitre 4 se de´marque du
mode`le de Shapley-Scarf en conside´rant le cas de biens indivisibles publics. Nous montrons
que cette situation s’apparente naturellement au proble`me du choix d’un comite´ forme´ de
plusieurs membres, chacun e´tant choisi parmi des candidats a` un poste spe´cifique. Nous ca-
racte´risons le domaine de pre´fe´rences sur les comite´s pour lesquels le choix des membres poste
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par poste est cohe´rent avec le choix direct d’un comite´. Les me´thodes de choix conside´re´es
sont base´es sur la me´thode du vote majoritaire.
Mots cle´s : biens indivisibles - Shapley-Scarf - externalite´s - coalitions - couples - dis-
tance - comite´s - vote majoritaire - restrictions de pre´fe´rences
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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the allocation of indivisible goods involving outcomes that are
complex combinations of basic alternatives, complexity mainly arising from externality in
preference. This complexity creates a difficulty with fully collecting the relevant information
over preferences, and therefore creates also a difficulty when conducting a normative analysis
of the different allocation mechanisms that may be implemented, such as the competitive
mechanism or the core mechanism. A way to overcome the difficulty is collecting preferences
over basic alternatives, and deriving normative conclusions are conditional to assumptions
on how reported preferences are extended to preferences over outcomes. This route should
be regarded as a specific approach to preference domain restriction which is well-known in
Social Choice theory.
The thesis is organized in four independent chapters. The first three chapters focus on
extensions of Shapley-Scarf or housing markets to the case where trades take place between
coalitions, and where partners in coalition are sensitive to the well-being of all coalition mem-
bers. Chapters 1 and 2 mainly investigate the domain restriction ensuring the existence of
various types of competitive equilibrium. Chapter 3 endows the set of goods with a geogra-
phical structure. Distributing goods among several locations allow for considering distance to
partners as a source of externality in preference. We identify domains of preference extensions
which ensure the existence of various types of core allocations. Chapter 4 departs from the
standard housing market by considering goods are pure public goods. We argue that this case
naturally relates to the choice of a committee formed by several members, each selected from
a specific set. We characterize preference domains over committees for which a well-defined
seat-wise choice procedure based on majority voting is consistent with choosing a committee
at once from majority voting, where consistency is given several possible meanings.
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Re´sume´ en franc¸ais
Proble´matique ge´ne´rale
De nombreux proble`mes de de´cision collective sont re´solus au moyen d’une proce´dure
de´centralise´e dans laquelle les individus annoncent leurs pre´fe´rences quant aux re´sultats pos-
sibles, ces pre´fe´rences e´tant agre´ge´es en un re´sultat collectif. Une litte´rature importante est
consacre´e a` l’analyse positive et a` l’e´valuation normative des proce´dures centralise´es de de´-
cision collective. Les pre´fe´rences individuelles e´tant fondamentales dans la mise en oeuvre
de ces proce´dures, une question essentielle est l’organisation pratique de la collecte de ces
pre´fe´rences. Une difficulte´ majeure de cette collecte peut re´sulter de la cardinalite´ de l’en-
semble des choix possibles. Ceci est en particulier vrai dans le cas ou` cet ensemble est muni
d’une structure spe´cifique par laquelle les choix peuvent eˆtre de´finis comme combinaisons
d’alternatives, ou de de´cisions e´le´mentaires.
Par exemple, conside´rons le cas ou` les choix sont des classements d’objets, de de´cisions ou
de candidats. le premier cas est parfaitement illustre´ par le concours de l’eurovision. Dans ce
concours, la position relative d’un pays, ainsi que la qualite´ perc¸ue des prestations des pays
ayant un rang similaire, importent pour les spectateurs inte´resse´s par l’enjeu. En d’autres
termes, les individus s’interessent autant au rang de leur champion qu’au classement de tous
les candidats. Rien n’exclut a priori de collecter les pre´fe´rencves portant sur tous les classe-
ments. Cependant, bien que possible en the´orie, cette option soule`ve une e´vidente difficulte´
logistique. En 2018, le concours rassemblait 26 pays, permettant ainsi 26 ! classements pos-
sibles (sans compter les ex-aequos possibles). La solution retenue en pratique est de collecter
une information partielle sur les pre´fe´rences : les individus doivent attribuer 12, puis 10, 8, ...,
1 points a` leur dix chansons pre´fe´re´es dans l’ordre de´croissant de pre´fe´rence. Les chansos sont
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alors classe´es selon le nombre total de points qu’elles recueillent. Cependant, la ve´rification
de toute proprie´te´ normative d’une proce´dure de de´cision collective pose proble`me si l’infor-
mation sur les pre´fe´rences individuelles n’est pas comple`te. Un exemple parmi d’autres est
la proprie´te´ de non-manipulation. Les the´ore`mes bien connus de Gibbard (1973) et Satterth-
waite (1975), qui concernent les fonctions de choix social univarie´es, impliquent de connaˆıtre
les pre´fe´rences individuelles sur les choix possibles, et ne peuvent eˆtre naturellement ge´ne´ra-
lise´es aux situations ou` ces pre´fe´rences ne sont que partiellement identifie´es. Conside´rons a`
nouveau le cas ou` les re´sultats sont des classements. Si les individus annoncent uniquement
leur classement pre´fe´re´, une proce´dure de de´cision collective est formellement de´finie comme
une re`gle d’agre´gation arrowienne, qui associe a` tout ensemble de classement individuels, ou
profil, un classement collectif. Etablir la non-manipulation d’une re`gle arrowienne requiert de
formuler des hypothe`ses sur la manie`re ou` un classement peut eˆtre e´tendu a` un classement
de tous les classements. En d’autres termes, on doit au pre´alable choisir une re`gle d’exten-
sion des pre´fe´rences, qui de´crit comment le re´sultat pre´fe´re´ de´finit une pre´fe´rence sur tous
les re´sultats. Ainsi, la proprie´te´ de non-manipulation est de´finie conditionnellement au choix
d’une re`gle d’extension spe´cifique. 1
Un classement peut donc eˆtre conc¸u comme une combinaisons complexe de de´cision, ou
alternatives, simples. De fac¸on similaire, choisir un ensemble d’objets consiste a` choisir une
combinaison complexe d’alternatives e´le´mentaires, la notion de complexite´ e´tant associe´e a`
la difficulte´ de collecter une information comple`te sur les pre´fe´rences. La question logistique
pose´e dans le cas ou` les re´sultats sont des classements pre´vaut tout autant lorsque les re´sultats
sont des ensembles. Ainsi, la non-manipulation de fonctions de choix multivarie´es requiert
des hypothe`ses sur la manie`res de ge´ne´rer une pre´fe´rence sur les ensembles a` partir d’une
pre´fe´rences sur les e´le´ments de ces ensembles. 2
Il existe de nombreuses situations dans lesquelles la collecte d’une information comple`te
sur les pre´fe´rences est trop couˆteuse pour eˆtre concevable en pratique. Dans le cas d’un
1. Voir Bossert and Storcken (1992), Bossert et Sprumont (2014), Athanassoglu (2016) pour une analyse
de la manipulation des re`gles d’agre´gation arrowienne. D’autres proprie´te´s normatives conditionnelles a` une
re`gle d’extension des pre´fe´rences sont e´tudie´es par Laffond and Laine´ (2000), Laine´ (2015), and Laine´, O¨zkes
et Sanver (2016).
2. Voir Sprumont (1995) et Barbera` (2011) pour une revue des re´sultats sur la manipulation des corres-
pondances de choix social. Un cas particulier de choix multivarie´ est celui de l’e´lection d’une assemble´e lorsque
les e´lecteurs de´clarent leurs pre´fe´rences sur les candidats (Benoˆıt et Kornhauser (1994)).
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re´fe´rendum multiple, un re´sultat est de´fini comme un vecteur de coordonne´es e´gales a` ze´ro
(non) ou un (oui), chaque e´lecteur de´clarant sa position sur chaque question plutoˆt que
sur toutes les combinaisons de re´ponses aux diffe´rentes questions. La` encore, de nombreux
travaux ont montre´ les proble`mes re´sultant de cette absence d’information comple`te sur les
pre´fe´rences. Un sous-ensemble de ces proble`mes est connu sous le vocable de paradoxes de la
majorite´ compose´e. 3 Un autre proble`me est la violation possible de la proprie´te´ d’efficacite´
au sens de Pareto. 4 Tout comme pour la non-manipulation, la ve´rification de cette proprie´te´
requiert au pre´alable le choix d’une re`gle d’extension des pre´fe´rences.
Cette the`se a pour objet l’e´tude de proble`mes de choix collectifs ayant des re´sultats com-
plexes et concernant l’allocation de biens purement indivisibles, la complexite´ des re´sultats
re´sultant de l’existence d’une inter-de´pendance entre les pre´fe´rences. Une illustration e´clai-
rante est donne´e par le cas d’une campagne de mobilite´ professionnelle, dont les e´lements
constitutifs sont les suivants. Il existe un ensemble fini d’individus, chacun pourvu d’une po-
sition professionnelle et classant l’ensemble des positions ou emplois selon un ordre line´aire.
Tout individu est susceptible de changer d’emploi, et donc tout emploi est susceptible de
devenir vacant. De plus, chaque individu ne peut occuper qu’un emploi, et tout emploi doit
eˆtre pourvu a` l’isue de la campagne. Toute situation de ce type est un cas d’application du
mode`le de Shapley-Scarf (1974). Une re´allocation des emplois peut eˆtre conside´re´e comme un
re´sultat simple dans le cas ou` les individus ne porte d’inte´reˆt qu’a` leur propre situation. En
effet, le classement des emplois de´finit naturellement celui des allocations. Mais cette simplicie´
disparaˆıt si les individus sont affecte´s par les emplois donne´s a` d’autres. ceci est le cas lorsque
certains individus vivent en couple. De fac¸on plus ge´ne´rale, on peut conside´rer l’existence
d’une structure exoge`ne de coalitions d’individus, la satisfaction d’un membre d’une coalition
de´pendant de celle de tous les autres membres de la coalition.
Dans ce cas comme dans ceux de´crits plus haut, il paraˆıt impossible en pratique de
demander a` chaque individu de classer l’ensemble des allocations d’emplois. Et si les individus
annoncent seulement un classement des emplois, l’analyse de proprie´te´s telles que l’efficacite´
au sens de Pareto, la stabilite´ au sens du Coeur, ou la non-manipulation requiert la de´finition
3. Voir Nurmi (1999), Lacy et Niou (2000), Laffond et Laine´ (2006), (2009), (2012), (2013).
4. Voir Kadane (1972), O¨zkal-Sanver et Sanver (2006), Cuhadarog˘lu et Laine´ (2012), Benoˆıt et Kornhauser
(2010).
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d’une re`gle e´tendant ce classement en une pre´fe´rences sur l’ensemble des allocations. Dans la
situation de mobilite´ professionnelle impliquant des couples, on pourrait concevoir l’ide´e d’une
annonce de pre´fe´rences jointes. Cependant cette possibilite´ est souvent exclue en pratique
(notamment dans le cas des campagnes de mobilite´ des enseignants franc¸ais). 5
Le roˆle joue´ par l’existence de pre´fe´rences interde´pendantes dans le mode`le de Shapley-
Scarf n’a pas a` ce jour rec¸u une attention importante. Par contre, les proble`mes pose´s par
cette interde´pendance ont e´te´ largement e´tudie´s dans le cas des marche´s d’appariement. En
particulier, l’instabilite´ potentiellement cre´e´e par la pre´sence de couples est bien documente´e.
Le lecteur pourra se re´fe´rer a` Sasaki et Toda (1996), Dutta et Masso (1997), Roth et Peranson
(1999), Cantala (2004), Klaus et Klijn (2005), Echenique et Yenmez (2007), Klaus, Klijn et
Masso (2007), Hafalir (2008), Mumcu et Saglam (2010), Bando (2012), Bando (2014), Fisher
et Hafalir (2016). 6
La the`se conside`re e´galement un autre type de re´sultat complexe qui concerne de fac¸on
naturelle la question de la mobilite´ professionnelle des couples. Supposons que les emplois sont
distribue´s entre diffe´rentes localite´s. Au-dela` de la qualite´ donne´e aux emplois potentiels, les
individus comparent deux situations e´galement selon la distance entre leur emploi et celui du
partenaire. Nous proposons une mode´lisation de cette situation, dans laquelle les classement
des emplois et le crite`re de la distance concourent a` la construction d’une pre´fe´rence sur les
re´sultats (allocations). E nous montrons la sensibilite´ de cretaines proprie´te´s normatives au
choix des proprie´te´s portant sur ces pre´fe´rences.
Une troisie`me situation de choix collectif d’un re´sultat complexe est e´tudie´e. Supposons
qu’il existe deux types de biens indivisibles, chacun ayant la qualite´ d’un bien public pur.
La question est de choisir collectivement un bien de chaque type. Les individus vivent en
couple, chacun ayant des pre´fe´rences sur un type spe´cifique de bien. A titre d’illustration, on
peut conside´rer qu’un type de bien correspond a` une discipline d’enseignement, et que chaque
couple est forme´ par deux enseignants dans une meˆme e´cole (chacun en charge d’une des deux
disciplines). Par ailleurs, deux couples diffe´rents enseignent dans deux e´coles diffe´rentes. Dans
un tel contexte, un bien repre´sente par exemple un manuel d’enseignement qui, une fois choisi,
5. On peut observer que l’annonce de pre´fe´rences jointes ne suffit pas a` garantir l’existence d’une solution
dans le Coeur, comme l’ont montre´ Dog˘an, Laffond, and Laine´ (2011).
6. Voir Bando et al. (2016) pour une revue re´cente de la litte´rature.
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sera impose´ a` toutes les e´coles. L’autorite´ centrale, en charge de la de´cision, tient a` prendre
en conside´ration le niveau de satisfaction des e´coles, et demande a` chaque enseignant (par
discipline) d’annoncer sa pre´fe´rence sur les manuels propose´s. Ainsi, un re´sultat est une paire
de manuels d’enseignement, et la proce´dure ne collecte pas directement l’information portant
sur la pre´fe´rence des e´coles. D’un point de vue formel, ce proble`me est e´quivalent a` celui
consistant un choisir un comite´ forme´ par deux personnes, chacune en charge d’une fonction
particulie`re. Par exemple, conside´rons une universite´ offrant deux positions, chacune dans un
de´partement spe´cifique. Les e´lecteurs sont les enseignants-chercheurs des deux de´partement,
chacune e´tant invite´ a` se prononcer sur les candidats a` la position dans ce de´partement. Afin
d’e´valuer la qualite´ du recrutement du point de vue de l’universite´, on doit alors formuler des
hypothe`ses sur la manie`res d’e´tendre les pre´fe´rences exprime´es dans chaque de´partement en
une pre´fe´rence collective (des deux de´partements agre´ge´s) sur les paires de candidats e´ligibles.
En de´finitive, l’analyse normative de ces trois classes de proble`me de choix collectif (mo-
bilite´ professionnelle des couples, avec ou sans structure ge´ographique, choix de biens publics
de types multiples) requiert la de´finition d’une re`gle d’extension des pre´fe´rences portant sur
des parties de re´sulatts en pre´fe´rences sur les re´sultats eux-meˆmes. L’attention e´tant essen-
tiellement porte´e sur le choix de cette re`gle d’extension, la proble´matique retenue dans cette
the`se est
- pour le mode`le de Shapley-Scarf, d’identifier les domaines de re`gles d’extension qui
garantissent le respect de proprie´te´s souhaitables (existence de solutions concurrentielles,
existence de solutions stables au sens du Coeur),
- pour le mode`le de choix d’un comite´ (biens publics multi-types), d’identifier les domaines
de re`gles d’extension pour lesquelles le re´sultat peut eˆtre obtenu comme combinaison des choix
par type de candidat.
Organisation de la the`se et re´sultats principaux
La the`se est organise´e en quatre chapitres, chacun e´tant re´dige´ de sorte qu’il puisse eˆtre lu
se´pare´ment. Les trois premires chapitres portent sur le mode`le de Shapley-Scarf avec structure
de coalitions, et la quatrie`me chapitre est consacre´ au proble`me du choix d’un comite´.
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Le chapitre 1 formalise un marche´ de Shapley-Scarf avec e´changes entre coalitions. Le
mode`le originel de Shapley-Scarf (1974) est caracte´rise´ par les e´le´ments suivants. Il existe un
ensemble d’individus et un ensemble de biens purement indivisibles, les deux ensembles ayant
la meˆme cardinalite´ finie. Chaque individu posse`de initialement un bien unique, et tous les
biens sont initialement de´tenus, et les e´changes sont organise´s de sorte que chaque individu
de´teint un et un seul bien spe´cifique. Les pre´fe´rences individuelles sur les biens sont repre´sen-
te´es par un ordre line´aire. Un re´sultat bien connu est l’existence d’allocations dans le Coeur.
De plus une allocation d’e´quilibre concurrentiel existe, et s’obtient comme le re´sultat d’un
algorithme appele´ top-trading-cycle (TTC), cet algorithme e´tant attribue´ a` David Gale. Roth
et Postlewaite (1977) montrent que cette allocation concurrentielle est unique, et qu’elle est
e´galement l’unique e´lement du Coeur strict (de´fini par domination faible). Nous supposons
dans le chapitre 1 que l’ensemble des individus est partitionne´ en coalitions, cette partition
e´tant exoge`ne. Par ailleurs, chaque membre d’une coalition est indiffe´rent entre deux alloca-
tions assignat les meˆmes biens aux membres de cette coalition. Par contre, les biens assigne´s a`
ses partenaires importe. Dans une telle situation, il n’existe pas un concept naturel d’e´quilibre
concurrentiel. En premier lieu, on peut interdire ou autoriser la transfe´rabilite´ du revenu entre
membres d’une meˆme coalition. Et par ailleurs, on peut envisager diffe´rents modes de coope´-
ration au sein des coalitions. Nous distinguons trois types d’e´quilibre. A un e´quilibre e´goiste,
chaque individu maximise son utilite´ dans l’ensemble budge´taire de sa coalition. A un e´qui-
libre coope´ratif, a` chaque coalition est assigne´ un vecteur de biens budge´tairement re´alisable
et efficace au sens de Pareto. Enfin, a` un e´quilibre coordonne´, chaque membre d’une coalition
maximise dans l’ensemble budge´tairement possible sa satisfaction e´tant donne´e l’allocation
choisie pour ses partenaires. En conside´rant ces trois types d’e´quilibre et pour chacun en
conside´rant la possibilite´ ou non d’un transfert de revenus entre membres d’une meˆme coali-
tion, on obtient en de´finitive six notions d’e´quilibre. Les e´quilibres forts (e´goistes, coope´ratifs,
coordonne´s) sont associe´s a` la non-transfe´rabilite´ des revenus individuels, et les e´quilibres
faibles (e´goistes, coope´ratifs, coordonne´s) sont associe´s a` la transfe´rabilite´ des revenus indi-
viduels. Nous offrons une e´tude comple`te des relations logiques entre ces diffe´rents concepts
d’e´quilibre. De plus, nous montrons la possibilite´ d’absence de chaque type d’e´quilibre en
l’abence de restriction sur les pre´fe´rences. Enfin, nous introduisons deux restrictions de pre´-
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fe´rence et nous montrons que chacune de´finit un domaine maximal pour un type spe´cifique
d’e´quilibre. Le domaine des pre´fe´rence coalition-monotones est maximal pour l’existence d’un
e´quilibre e´goiste fort, et le domaine de pre´fe´rences faiblement lexicographiques est maximal
pour l’existence d’un e´quilibre coope´ratif faible.
La proprie´te´ de coalition-monotonie est satisfaite si chaque membre d’une coalition a un
ordre de pre´fe´rence sur les biens et si ses pre´fe´rences sur les allocations sont se´parables par
rapport aux ordres sur les biens de ses partenaires. Ainsi, en pre´sence de coalition-monotonie,
la collecte des ordres sur les biens fournit toute l’information ne´cessaire sur les pre´fe´rences
portant sur les allocations. De plus, cette proprie´te´ assure que le re´sultat de l’algorithme TTC
est une allocation d’e´quilibre e´goiste fort. cependant, et contrairement au mode`le originel,
l’algorithm TTC devient manipulable. La proprie´te´ lexicographique faible pre´vaut si, e´tant
donne´ un sous-emsemble quelconque de biens, chaque individu identifie un bien prioritaire
qu’il souhaite voir assigne´ a` sa coalition, le membre de cette coalition recevant ce bien pouvant
changer selon l’allocation re´siduelle des biens attribue´s a` la coalition. Nous montrons que
sous l’hypothe`se de pre´fe´rences faiblement lexicographiques, il existe toujours un e´quilibre
coope´ratif faible, obtenu comme re´sultat d’un algorithme TTC modifie´ (et manipulable).
Le chapitre 2 comple`te le chapitre 1 en e´tablissant certains re´sultats supple´mentaires
concernant le´quilibre e´goiste fort. Nous montrons tout d’abord qu’il existe des allocations
d’e´quilibre qui ne peuvent eˆtre obtenues comme re´sultat de l’algorithme TTC. ceci est une
diffe´rence majeure entre notre mode`le et le mode`le originel de Shapley-Scarf. Cependant, il
est facile de montrer que la structure de l’ensemble des allocations permet de de´finir toute
allocation comme le re´sultat de la formation de cycles d’e´changes successifs. Nous carac-
te´risons les suites de cycles d’e´changes conduisant a` une allocation d’e´quilibre e´goiste fort,
et nous montrons que chaque suite est en fait de´finie au moyen de de´viations le´ge`res des
top-trading-cycles.
Le chapitre 3 reconside`re le mode`le de Shapley-Scarf avec coalitions en munissant l’en-
semble des biens d’une structure ge´ographique. Le chapitre se limite au cas ou` les coalitions
sont des couples. Les biens sont distribue´s de fac¸on exoge`ne entre diffe´rentes localite´s, et on
retient la distance discre`te (deux localisations quelqconques e´tant donne´es a` distance e´gale a`
l’unite´ si et seulement si elles sont diffe´rentes). Ayant a` l’esprit les situations de mobilite´ pro-
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fessionnelle, nous construisons un mode`le permettant de capturer l’ide´e selon laquelle chaque
membre d’un couple souhaitent travailler le plus pre`s possible de son partenaire. La valori-
sation individuelle d’une situation incorpore la distance au partenaire ainsi que la qualite´ du
bien attribue´ (notons que celle du bien attribue´ au partenaire n’est pas prise en compte).
La prise en compte de la distance introduit une forme d’externalite´ dans les pre´fe´rences.
L’agre´gation des deux crite`res est mode´lise´e au moyen d’une re`gle d’extension se´parable :
entre deux allocations plac¸ant les conjoints a` une meˆme distance, un individu pre´fe`re celle lui
attribuant le meilleur bien, et entre deux allocations lui attribuant un meˆme bien, il pre´fe`re
celle le plac¸ant a` la plus petite distance du conjoint.
Nous e´tudions l’existence d’allocation stables au sens du Coeur, ainsi que la possibilite´
d’atteindre ces allocations au moyen d’un algorithme de type TTC. De plus, nous nous
limitons a` des concepts de Coeur dans lequels aucune coalition bloquante ne peut impliquer
un individu sans son conjoint. Dans la mesure ou` deux conjoints peuvent avoir des inte´reˆts
divergents, la de´finition d’une coalition bloquante requiert de pre´ciser comment ils peuvent
s’entendre sur la comparaison entre allocations. Pour ce faire, nous introduisons la notion
d’agre´ment de couple, qui consiste a` e´tendre toute paire de pre´fe´rences sur les allocations a`
un pre´ordre commun sur les allocations. A chaque type d’agre´ment de couple est associe´ un
concept spe´cifique de Coeur.
Nous montrons tout d’abord que lorsqu’aucune restriction ne pre´vaut sur les pre´fe´rences, le
Coeur peut eˆtre vide pour tout agre´ment de couple. Nous conside´rons alors deux restrictions,
chacune correspondant a` un cas polaire : les pre´fe´rences avec priorite´ aux biens (”mon bien
importe le plus, et pour tout bien qui m’est attribue´, je pre´fe`re eˆtre proche de mon conjoint”),
et les pre´fe´rences avec priorite´ a` la distance (”ˆetre proche de mon conjoint est ce qui m’importe
le plus, et a` distance donne´e, je pre´fe`re recevoir un meilleur bien”). Nous e´tudions l’existence
de chaque concept de Coeur pour chacune de ces deux classes de pre´fe´rence et, pour chaque
concept, nous construisons un algorithme spe´cifique qui conduit a` une allocation du Coeur.
Le chapitre 4 est consacre´ au proble`me du choix d’un comite´, de´ja` mentionne´ plus haut.
Une socie´te´ doit choisir un comite´ forme´ de deux membres, chacun occupant un poste par-
ticulier. I existe un ensemble distinct de candidats pour chaque poste. Nous supposons que
chaque e´lecteur a des pre´fe´rences pour les candidats de chaque type, repre´sente´es par un ordre
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line´aire. Ainsi, chaque e´lecteur est caracte´rise´ par deux ordres line´aires. Clairement, annoncer
un ordre pour chaque type est insuffisant pour pleinement de´crire les pre´fe´rences sur les co-
mite´s (meˆme sous l’hypothe`se de se´parabilite´). Et demander a` chaque e´lecteur ses pre´fe´rences
en matie`re de comite´ est proble´matqiue, compte-tenu de la taille des messages a` transmettre.
Par exemple, s’il existe dix candidats par type, il existe cent comite´s possibles, qu’il s’agirait
de classer. Nous examinons la propension d’une me´thode de se´lection par type a` choisir un
re´sultat (comite´) cohe´rent avec celui qui pre´vaudrait en cas d’information comple`te sur les
pre´fe´rences sur les comite´s. Dans la mesure ou` une me´thode de vote apparaˆıt comme naturelle
dans ce contexte, nous nous limitons aux proce´dures fonde´es sur la pre´fe´rence majoritaire.
Notre analyse suit ainsi une route tre`s similaire a` celle choisie pour la ge´ne´ralisation du
mode`le de Shapley-Scarf. Un candidat pour un poste peut eˆtre conc¸u comme une alternative
simple, et un comite´ est une combinaison ”complexe” (ici un vecteur) d’alternatives simples.
De plus, les pre´fe´rences sur les alternatives simples sont e´tendues a` des pre´fe´rences sur les
re´sultats. ici, une re`gle d’extension associe a` toute paire d’ordres line´aires un ordre sur les
comite´s. Le sujet de ce chapitre est de caracte´riser les classes de re`gles d’extension garantissant
la cohe´rence entre deux me´thodes de vote majoritaire. La premie`re, note´e Maj, consiste a`
choisir le comite´ forme´ par les deux candidats choisis se´pare´ment selon la re`gle majoritaire,
et la seconde consiste a` choisir directement le comite´.
Il est bien connu que Maj ne permet pas toujours d’identifier un vainqueur naturel (dit
de Condorcet) s’il existe plus de deux candidats par type. Nous contournons cette difficulte´
en nous limitant aux seules pre´fe´rences par type qui garantissent l’existence d’un vainqueur
de Condorcet. Nous conside´rons alors deux types d’incohe´rence potentielle entre le choix
direct du comite´ et le choix par type. Le premier, que nous appelons paradoxe du comite´
majoritaire, pre´vaut lorsque qu’un comite´ vainqueur de Condorcet existe (parmi tous les
comite´s) mais n’est pas se´lectionne´ par Maj. Le second, appele´ paradoxe faible du comite´
majoritaire, pre´vaut lorsque l’une des deux situations suivantes est observe´e : le paradoxe du
comite´ majoritaire existe, ou bien il n’existe pas de comite´ vainqueur de Condorcet. Nous
montrons que sous l’hypothe`se de neutralite´ (selon laquelle le nom des candidats ne joue
aucun roˆle dans la re`gle d’extension), la se´parabilite´ de cette re`gle est ne´cessaire et suffisante
a` l’absence du paradoxe du comite´ majoritaire. Une re`gle d’extension est dite se´parable si
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pour tout type de sie`ge sur lequel candidatent a et b, un e´lecteur classe a devant b, alors
il classe le comite´ (a, x) devant le comite´ (b, x) pour tout candidat x a` l’autre sie`ge. Par
ailleurs, nous montrons qu’une condition ne´cessaire et suffisante (a` nouveau sous l’hypothe`se
de neutralite´) pour e´viter le paradoxe faible est que tous les e´lecteurs ont recours a` la meˆme
re`gle d’extension, qui consiste a` de´signer un sie`ge juge´ prioritaire, et a` classer les comite´s
selon la pre´fe´rence lexicographique de´finie en rapport avec cette priorite´.
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Chapitre 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Many collective decision problems are resolved by using a centralized procedure in which
individuals report their preferences over the possible outcomes, and these preferences are
aggregated into a collective outcome. A huge literature has been devoted to the analysis of
positive and normative criteria for evaluating centralized procedures. As full preferences are
the key inputs for collective choice, a legitimate question is whether collecting preferences
over outcomes is achievable in practice. One obvious difficulty stems from the cardinality of
the choice set. This is especially true if outcomes are endowed with a specific structure, which
leads to conceiving outcomes as combinations of basic alternatives.
For instance, suppose outcomes are rankings of objects, decisions, or contestants. A well-
known example is the Eurovision song contest. Clearly, the relative ranking of each of the
contestants, as well as the perceived quality of contestants similarly ranked matters for many
citizens. In other words, voters are interested in not only the final rank of their champion but
also the full ranking of contestants. Nothing prevents, in theory, asking all voters to report
their preferences overall rankings. However, while possible in principle, this creates an obvious
logistical problem. In 2018, 26 countries were competing, and this would imply that voters
have to rank the 26 ! possible outcomes. The way out retained in the rules of the song contest
is collecting only partial information about individual preferences : jury members are asked
to give 12, 10, 8, . . . , 1 point to their 10 favorite songs ranked in decreasing preference order.
However, checking whether some normative property is satisfied may be problematic if only
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partial information is collected about preferences. A relevant example is strategy-proofness.
The seminal papers of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) focus on single-valued social
choice functions, and there is no natural way to extend their results to situations where voters
do not report complete preferences over alternatives. Consider the case of rankings again as
outcomes. Suppose voters report their preferred ranking only. Thus, the collective procedure
is defined as an Arrovian aggregation rule. Establishing strategy-proofness for an aggregation
rule requires making assumptions about how this ranking can be used to generate a ranking
of all rankings. Hence, an extension rule has to be chosen to generate from a single best
outcome a preference over all outcomes. Therefore, strategy-proofness becomes conditional
to the choice of a specific preference extension. 1
Rankings can be defined as complex combinations of basic alternatives. Similarly, out-
comes defined as sets of alternatives are complex, where complexity should be defined as
the difficulty of reporting complete preferences. Again, strategy-proofness for multi-valued
collective choice functions requires assumptions on how preferences over single alternatives
are extended to preferences over sets of alternatives. 2 Many other examples can be chosen
where outcomes are too complex to make possible a full reporting of preferences. In multiple
referenda, outcomes are defined as vectors with coordinates yes or no, and voters report issue-
wise their preferred position instead of their preferences over all vectors. A large literature has
been devoted to problems that may arise from the lack of information about preferences. One
relates to compound-majority paradoxes. 3 Another may be the failure of Pareto optimality. 4
As for strategy-proofness, checking Pareto optimality or the existence of a paradox requires
specifying how issue-wise preferences are extended to preferences over outcomes.
This thesis analyses collective choice problems with complex outcomes in the context
of the allocation of purely indivisible goods, where complexity is created by externality in
preferences. An illustrating example which will be extensively used in the sequel is given by
1. See Bossert and Storcken (1992), Bossert and Sprumont (2014), Athanassoglu (2016) for the analysis of
strategy-proof Arrovian aggregation rules. Other properties for aggregation rules which explicitly use preference
extensions for are considered in Laffond and Laine´ (2000), Laine´ (2015), and Laine´, O¨zkes and Sanver (2016).
2. See Sprumont (1995) and Barbera` (2011) for surveys on strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
A specific case with sets as outcomes is the choice of an assembly, where voters express preferences over one
single candidate (Benoˆıt and Kornhauser (1994)).
3. See Nurmi (1999), Lacy and Niou (2000), Laffond and Laine´ (2006), (2009), (2011).
4. See Kadane (1972), O¨zkal-Sanver and Sanver (2006), C¸uhadarog˘lu and Laine´ (2012), Benoˆıt and Korn-
hauser (2010).
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the problem of designing a centralized procedure organizing job mobility. Consider a finite
set of individuals, each one being assigned a current job. Individuals rank all jobs according
to some preference ordering, and we assume that individuals are entitled to change their job,
that is getting a job initially assigned to somebody else. Relevant modeling of such a situation
is the housing market introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). A reallocation of jobs among
individuals can be considered as a simple outcome provided no individual pays attention
to jobs assigned to other individuals. Indeed, individual rankings of goods coincide in that
case with individual rankings of allocations. This is no longer true when externality prevails,
that is when individuals derive utility from what is assigned to others. A typical situation
with externality in preference is when individuals live in couples. More generally, externalities
prevail when there is a coalition structure, all members of a coalition being sensitive to the
well-being of all coalition members.
As for all other problems described above, it seems hardly possible in practice to ask
individuals to report preferences overall job assignments. If individuals only report a ran-
king of jobs, establishing standard properties such as Pareto optimality, core stability or
strategy-proofness requires assumptions about how these rankings over simple alternatives
are extended to the complex outcomes defined as overall allocations. In the case of couples,
one may promote the idea of submitting joint rankings of pairs of jobs, which can be seen
as tractable. However, many real-life job mobility campaigns, such as those involving school
teachers in France, do not allow for submitting joint preferences. 5
The role played by preference externality in housing markets has not received much atten-
tion in the literature. This contrasts with the literature on two-sided markets. In particular,
the potential instability created by couples is well-documented. The reader may refer to Sa-
saki and Toda (1996), Dutta and Masso (1997), Roth and Peranson (1999), Cantala (2004),
Klaus and Klijn (2005), Echenique and Yenmez (2007), Klaus, Klijn and Masso (2007), Ha-
falir (2008), Mumcu and Saglam (2010), Bando (2012), Bando (2014), Fisher and Hafalir
(2016). 6
The thesis also considers a different type of complex outcome which fits with job mobility
5. Note that allowing for joint preferences do not ensure the existence of core stable allocations, as shown
in Dog˘an, Laffond, and Laine´ (2011).
6. See Bando et al. (2016) for a recent survey.
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involving couples. Suppose current jobs are distributed across different locations. Beyond the
intrinsic quality, individuals assign to jobs, the distance between jobs assigned to a couple is
often a critical criterion in the comparison of allocations. How to incorporate this criterion
in the analysis of housing markets is a question addressed in this thesis. When individuals
only submit a ranking of jobs, assessing an allocation with respect to any normative property
requires assumption on how individuals combine two criteria, job quality, and distance, in
their preference over outcomes.
The third type of complex outcome arising from externality in preference is also conside-
red. It departs from the classical housing market. Suppose there exist two types of indivisible
goods, each good of each type being a pure public good. Moreover, suppose that all indivi-
duals are in a couple, and must collectively decide which good will be produced type-wise. For
an illustration, consider a situation where each type relates to a topic taught in all secondary
schools, and that each couple involves two teachers in the same school, each being in charge
of one topic. In that context, a good of some type is a textbook that can be chosen for the
relevant topic. Once chosen, a textbook will be used in all schools. Assume that what matters
for the central authority is the well-being of schools. Quite naturally, teachers are asked to
report their preference over textbooks for their own topic. In this setting, an outcome is thus
a pair of textbooks, whereas the procedure does not collect all relevant information about
school preferences over outcomes. Interestingly enough, this problem is equivalent to choosing
a committee formed by two members, each belonging to one specific category. For instance,
consider a university offering one position in two departments. Voters are staff members, each
being asked to report preferences over candidates applying to her department. Assessing the
quality of the recruitment for the university requires assumptions on how department-wise
preferences can be extended to university preferences.
Hence, a normative analysis of each of these three collective decision-making problems (job
mobility with couples, with or without a distance structure, multiple-type indivisible public
goods) requires modeling a preference extension, which describes how reported preferences
over elements of outcomes are extended to preferences over outcomes.
Focusing on preference extension as the primary object of investigation, the problematic
chosen in the thesis is
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- for the housing market with coalitions, identifying domains of preference extensions
which ensure the fulfillment of appealing properties, such as the existence of competitive
equilibrium solutions or core stable solutions,
- for the committee choice problem, identifying domains of preference extensions for which
a well-defined choice procedure can be obtained as a combination of well-defined type-wise
choice procedures.
1.2 Organization of the thesis and main results
The thesis is organized into four chapters. Each chapter is written so as to be self-
contained. The first three chapters deal with housing markets with couples, while the fourth
is devoted to the committee choice problem.
Chapter 1 introduce coalitional trade in housing or Shapley-Scarf markets. In standard
Shapley-Scarf markets, there are as finitely many individuals as purely indivisible goods, and
each is endowed with one indivisible good. Individual preferences over goods are linear orders.
Trades can be organized so as to assign exactly one good to everybody. The pioneering result
of Shapley and Scarf (1974) is the existence of allocations in the core. Moreover, a competitive
equilibrium always exists and can be obtained as an outcome of a specific algorithm, named
the Top-Trading-Cycles algorithm of David Gale. Furthermore, Roth and Postlewaite (1977)
show that if indifference is ruled out, this algorithm yields a unique competitive allocation,
which is also the unique strict core allocation. We assume that the set of individuals is parti-
tioned into couples, each of the two partners having preferences defined over allocations (two
allocations assigning the same bundle to the couple being indifferent). Thus, each individual
pays attention to her partner’s assigned good. In such a setting, there is no natural way to
define a competitive equilibrium. First, we may allow or not income transfer among partners.
Second, several types of cooperation may prevail in couples. We distinguish three types, each
defining an equilibrium concept : at a selfish equilibria, each individual maximizes her uti-
lity within her coalition budget set ; at a cooperative equilibria, a budget constrained Pareto
optimal bundle of goods is assigned to each couple ; at a coordinated equilibria, each part-
ner maximizes her well-being over budget feasible allocations, given her partner’s assigned
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good. Mixing the type of cooperation with the type of budget set, one gets six notions of
equilibrium. Strong (selfish, cooperative, coordinated) equilibria refer to the non-transferable
income case, while weak (selfish, cooperative, coordinated) equilibria refer to the transferable
income case. We provide a set-comparison of all equilibrium types. Moreover, we show that all
types of competitive equilibrium may fail to exist if preferences over allocations are not res-
tricted. Two preference domains are introduced and show that each is maximal for a specific
equilibrium type : the domain of coalition responsive preferences is maximal for the existence
of strong selfish equilibrium, while the domain of weakly lexicographic preferences is maximal
for the existence of weak cooperative equilibrium.
Coalitional responsiveness holds if each partner has a ranking of goods, and its ranking
over allocations is separable with respect to the two partners’ rankings of goods. It follows
that under coalition responsiveness, all the relevant information need to achieve a (strong
selfish) equilibrium is reporting individual rankings over goods. Moreover, coalition respon-
siveness allows obtaining an equilibrium allocation as an outcome of the Top-Trading-Cycles
algorithm. However, in contrast with standard Shapley-Scarf markets, this algorithm does
not define a strategy-proof mechanism.
Weak lexicographic preferences mean that within any subset of (available) goods, each
partner can identify a priority good assigned to the couple rather than having that good
assigned to none. Moreover, who in the couple should receive the priority good may depend
on the other good assigned to the couple. Clearly, weak lexicographic preferences cannot
be identified by reporting individual rankings of goods. However, we prove that it allows
obtaining an equilibrium as an outcome of a modification of the Top-Trading-Cycle algorithm
(which also fails strategy-proofness).
Chapter 2 completes Chapter 1 with further results about strong equilibria. While the Top-
Trading-Cycles algorithm always finds an equilibrium allocation under coalition responsive
preferences, this allocation is not necessarily unique. As a consequence, and in contrast with
standard Shapley-Scarf markets, there exist equilibrium allocations that do not arise from
successive Top-Trading-Cycles. Nonetheless, the mere structure of Shapley-Scarf markets,
even with a coalition structure in couples, ensures that every allocation can be defined as the
outcome of a sequence of trading cycles. We characterize the set of those sequences associated
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with each type of strong equilibrium allocation. Each of these sets is defined by making slight
alterations of the properties of Top-Trading-Cycles.
Chapter 3 considers another extension of Shapley-Scarf markets where the set of indi-
viduals is partitioned into couples and goods are distributed among several locations. As
in the first chapter, job mobility is a natural interpretation of our model, which aims at
capturing the preference for living close to partners. Individuals’ valuation of allocations in-
corporates the quality of their assigned job together with its distance to the partner’s one.
Hence, externality in preferences stems from distance rather than from partners’ well-being.
How preferences over allocation aggregate the two criteria is formalized by a preference ex-
tension, which is assumed to be separable : between two allocations placing the two goods
at the same distance, individuals prefer the one with the better good for herself, and among
two allocations assigning her the same good, she will prefer the one with a lower distance to
partner.
The chapter investigates the existence of core allocations, and the possibility to achieve
core allocations as outcomes of an algorithm similar to the Top-Trading-Cycles algorithm.
We focus on notions of Core which do not break coalitions : no blocking coalition can involve
one individual and not her partner. Moreover, since partners may have conflicting interests,
defining a blocking coalition requires assumptions on how partners agree on how to compare
allocations. We define the notion of couple agreement, which extends pairs of preferences to
a quasi-ordering over allocations. We introduce several notions of core, each being related to
a specific type of couple agreement.
In the case where no restriction prevails upon individual preferences, we show that the core
may be empty for all types of couple agreement. Two domain restrictions are considered, each
describing a polar type of individual preferences over allocations : priority-to-good preferences
(my good matters first, and being given a good, I always prefer to be close to my partner)
and priority-to-distance preferences (being close to my partner matters first and being at a
given distance, I prefer to get a better good). We analyze the existence of each concept of
core under these two types of preferences over allocation and, for specific types of couple
agreements, we provide different modifications of Top-Trading-Cycles which always find a
core allocation.
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Chapter 4 is devoted to the committee choice problem. A society has to choose a committee
formed by two members each belonging to a specific finite set of candidates. As already
mentioned, this problem can also be described as a situation where the production of a pair
of indivisible public goods (with different types) has to be collectively decided. We assume
that each member of the society has preferences over candidates of each type. However,
reporting type-wise preferences does not fully describes preferences over committees (even
under the assumption of separability). Moreover, asking individuals to report preferences
over committees is problematic. Indeed, if 10 candidates apply on each seat, individuals
should rank 100 possible outcomes, which does not seem to be easily applicable. The chapter
questions the capacity of a seat-wise choice procedure to select a committee that would also
be chosen with full knowledge of preferences over committees. As voting is a natural choice
method in this context, we focus on choice procedures based on majority voting.
The analysis follows a route very similar to the one chosen for analyzing Shapley-Scarf
markets. Each candidate for a seat is conceived as a simple alternative, while a committee
is a ”complex” combination (here a vector) of simple alternatives. Preferences over simple
alternatives are extended to preferences over outcomes by means of a preference extension.
Here, a preference extension associates with type-wise preferences a ranking of all committees.
The purpose of the chapter is characterizing the class of preference extensions for which no
inconsistency arises between seat-wise majority voting (Maj) and direct majority voting.
It is well-known that Maj may not lead to a well-defined outcome if there are more than
two candidates per seat. This difficulty is overcome by assuming the existence of a Condorcet
winning candidate for each seat. Then two types of inconsistency are considered. The first
one is defined as the majority committee paradox : A Condorcet winning committee exists
and is not selected by Maj. The second one which is called the majority committee weak
paradox : Either the majority committee paradox holds, or a Condorcet winner committee
fails to exist.
We show that separability is a necessary and sufficient condition for a neutral preference
extension (i.e., candidates’ names play no role) to avoid the majority committee paradox.
Separable preference extension means that if a and b are the two candidates for a seat,
and if a voter ranks a above b, she will rank (a, x) above (b, x) for any candidate x for the
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other seat. Moreover, we show that the domain of neutral preference extensions avoiding the
majority committee weak paradox contains only one separable preference extension, namely
the lexicographic preference extension. According to this extension, all voters agree on a seat
as priority seat and compare committees according to their ranking of candidates for that
priority seat whenever they differ and if both committees have the same candidate on the
priority seat, compares them according to the ranking of candidates for the other seat.
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Chapitre 2
Competitive Equilibria in
Shapley-Scarf Markets with
Coalitional Trade
Abstract : We investigate the existence and properties of several types of competitive equi-
librium in generalized Shapley-Scarf markets where trades are organized among exogeneous
coalitions. Coalitional trade generates externalities in individual valuations of allocations.
Equilibrium concepts differ according to the definition of the budget constraint of coalitions,
and to the type of cooperation prevailing among partners. We show that both existence and
properties of equilibria crucially depend on the properties of individual preferences. We also
derive maximal preference domains for the existence of two specific types of equilibrium. 1
Keywords: Shapley Scarf markets - Competitive equilibrium - Coalition - Externalities
2.1 Introduction
Shapley and Scarf (1974) consider a market where purely indivisible goods are traded
without money. There are finitely many individuals, each being endowed with an indivisible
good. All agents have preferences over goods and can trade them in such a way that everyone
ends up with exactly one good. Shapley and Scarf (1974) show that the core of such a market
is non-empty and contains the set of competitive allocations. Moreover, they show that the set
of allocations that are reached by means of the so-called Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) algorithm
1. This is a joint work with Jean Laine´ of CNAM-LIRSA, Paris, France
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(introduced by David Gale) coincides with the set of competitive allocations. Individuals being
single in a Shapley-Scarf market, they compare allocations according to the utility derived
from their assigned good. However, there are many situations where trades are organized
between group of agents, and where members of any group pay interest to the goods that are
allocated to their partners as well as themselves. In this paper, we analyze a generalization
of Shapley-Scarf markets to situations where trades are organized among coalitions.
Shapley-Scarf markets with coalitional trade provide a relevant framework for the analysis
of job mobility, through which employees move from their current job to another one made
available by their employer or by the market. Certain job mobility campaigns are organized
as a centralized procedure, in which individuals report their preferences over available jobs,
and jobs are reallocated in such a way that each individual ends up with one job, and no
job is assigned to different individuals. Real-life centralized job mobility campaigns follow a
”point procedure” : each available job is given a specific number of points, and each applicant
to a job must be initially endowed with at least the number of points given to the job for her
application to be admissible. 2 In a point procedure, points may be conceived as prices, which
gather all the information relevant to a satisfactory allocation of jobs. Individual incomes are
defined by the number of points given to their current job. This creates standard individual
budget constraints, under which agents seek to maximize their satisfaction by being given
their most preferred affordable job. An equilibrium situation is thus defined as a competitive
price equilibrium of a Shapley-Scarf market. However, an important real-life aspect of job
mobility results from the fact that some individuals live in couple. This obviously makes
claims about job mobility much more complex to handle. Claiming for new jobs involves a
bargaining process within couples : individual valuation of a job offer becomes conditional
to the partner’s situation. With this externality, individual valuations of allocations cannot
reduce to individual valuations of individually offered jobs. As a consequence, defining a
competitive equilibrium requires assumptions on how preferences over single jobs are extended
2. Such is the case for French teachers in primary and secondary schools. The assignment of points to a
job may take into account many different features such as the level of demand pressure for the job, or the wish
by the central authority to avoid offer shortages in some region. The number of points given to applicants
may result from their own professional history, their current job, as well as their private data (marital status,
number of children, ...). Nonetheless, a major feature explaining how many points are given to applicants is
the nature of their current position.
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to preferences over allocations. 3
The aim of the paper is to investigate the existence and the properties of several types of
competitive equilibrium in Shapley-Scarf market involving trades among coalitions. Equili-
brium concepts differ according to the underlying definition of the budget constraint of coali-
tions, and to the type of cooperation prevailing among partners. A strong budget constraint
relates to the impossibility to transfer income, or points, among partners, while a weak bud-
get constraint allows for transferable income. In this case, an allocation is budget-feasible
if the sum of prices of goods assigned to the coalition does not exceed the sum of prices of
initially owned goods. Regarding the type of cooperation between partners, we retain three
approaches. In the first one, individuals pay attention only to her own well-being given what
is affordable by the coalition, leading to the concept of selfish equilibrium. The second consi-
ders an unspecified bargaining procedure among partners ending up at a budget-constrained
Pareto optimum. This leads to the concept of cooperative equilibrium. The third formalizes
a tacit collusion of Nash type in coalitions, where each partner maximizes her well-being over
budget feasible allocations, given her partners’ assigned goods. This leads to the concept of
coordinated equilibrium. Mixing the two types of budget constraint with the three types of
cooperation allows to define six types of competitive equilibrium.
We provide a set-comparison between all types of equilibrium. Moreover, we investigate
their properties (individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, Core stability), and derive sufficient
conditions for existence.
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that when indifferences are ruled out, the TTC algo-
rithm yields a unique competitive allocation, which is also the unique strict core allocation. 4
A major difficulty regarding existence is that this is no longer true with coalitional trade.
The same difficulty prevails in markets which multiple or multiple types of indivisible goods.
Konishi, Quint and Wako (2001) show that even the core in such markets may be empty
3. This type of externalities has been mainly studied in two-sided markets. The reader may refer to Sasaki
and Toda (1996), Dutta and Masso (1997), Roth and Peranson (1999), Cantala (2004), Klaus and Klijn (2005),
Echenique and Yenmez (2007), Klaus, Klijn and Masso (2007), Hafalir (2008), Mumcu and Saglam (2010),
Bando (2012), Bando (2014), Fisher and Hafalir (2016). See also Bando et al. (2016) for a recent survey.
4. When indifferences are allowed on preferences of agents, there are results that are more general. Wako
(1984) shows that strict core is included in the set of competitive allocations. Wako (1991) shows that every
non-competitive allocation is weakly dominated by some competitive allocation and the non-empty strict core
is unique von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. Further properties of Shapley-Scarf markets may be found in
Roth (1982), Roth (1984), Ma (1994), Bird (1994), So¨nmez (1996), Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999).
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and competitive equilibrium allocations may fail to exist. 5 Dog˘an et al. (2011) show that a
Shapley-Scarf market with couples may have an empty Core and provide a sufficient condi-
tion about preferences for Core existence. One major difference between their model and the
present one is that they consider couple preferences rather than individual preferences.
Our main results may be summarized as follows :
- The domain of coalition responsive preferences over allocations is maximal for the exis-
tence of strong selfish equilibria. Coalition responsiveness holds if all individuals have a linear
order over goods, and if any unilateral improvement of one partner’s well-being benefits to
all members of the coalition. Moreover, we show that with coalition responsive preferences,
the TTC algorithm always ends up at a strong selfish equilibrium, and that this equilibrium
allocation is also a strong cooperative and coordinated equilibrium allocation.
- Under transferable income, the domain of weak lexicographic preferences over allocations
is maximal for the existence of weak cooperative equilibria. A preference is weak lexicographic
if given any subset of available goods, there exists a unique good which should be assigned
to the coalition, whom receiving it depending on the other goods allocated to the coalition.
Moreover, we provide a constructive proof of existence based on a modification of the TTC
algorithm. Furthermore, since weak cooperative equilibrium allocations belong to the coali-
tional Core, this result generalizes the main result of Dog˘an et al. (2011).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 is devoted to the formal model of Shapley-
Scarf markets with coalitional trade. Alternative concepts of competitive equilibrium are
defined in Section 2.2. Alternative preference domains are introduced in Section 2.3. All results
are stated in section 3. In Section 3.1, we conduct a set-comparison analysis of equilibrium
allocations. In Section 3.2 we investigate properties of competitive equilibria. Existence results
are given in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we derive maximal preference domain for the existence
of strong selfish and weak cooperative equilibria. Further comments conclude the paper.
5. See Papai (2003), Wako (2005), Papai (2007) and Klaus (2008) for generalizations of Shapley- Scarf
Market with multiple or multiple types of indivisible goods. Mumcu and Saglam (2007) shows that the core
of Shapley-Scarf market may be empty when preferences of agents are interdependent.
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2.2 Coalitional trade in Shapley-Scarf Markets
2.2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a market without money, where a finite set I = {1, 2, ..., N} of individuals
collectively decide on how to trade purely indivisible goods in a finite set G = {1, 2, ..., N}.
Individuals (resp. goods) are denoted by i, j, k (resp. x, y, z). An allocation σ is a bijection
from I to G where σ(i) is the good allocated to i. The set of allocations is denoted by Σ.
There exists an initial allocation σ0 ∈ Σ. Without loss of generality, σ0 is defined by σ0(i) = i
for all i. Under this assumption, allocations are permutations of I.
There exists an exogenous coalition structure, defined as a partition C = {C1, C2, ..., CM}
of I into non-empty sets. We define C(i) as the element C of C such that i ∈ C. For coalition
C = {i1, ..., iK} with i1 < i2 < ... < iK , we denote by σ(C) = (σ(i1), ..., σ(iK)) the vector
of goods σ assigns to the members of C. Moreover, given any non-empty subset J of G with
|C| ≤ |J |, we define Σ(C |J) = {σ ∈ Σ : ∪i∈C{σ(i)} ⊆ J} as the set of allocations assigning
to each member of C a good in J .
Individuals have preferences over allocations represented by weak orders. For any fi-
nite set X, W(X) (resp. L(X)) denotes the set of weak (resp. linear) orders over X. We
denote the preferences of individual i by Ri ∈ W(Σ), with asymmetric part Pi. Given
σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, σRiσ′ means that σ is at least as good as σ′ for i. An N -tuple π = (Ri)i∈I
is called a profile, and Π stands for the set of profiles. We impose one property to pre-
ferences, called coalition selfishness. It states that members of each coalition pay atten-
tion only to the goods allocated to the coalition. Formally, coalition selfishness holds if
∀C ∈ C, ∀i ∈ C, ∀ σ1, σ2, σ′1, σ′2 ∈ Σ, σ1(C) = σ′1(C) and σ2(C) = σ′2(C) implies that
σ1Riσ2 if and only if ⇔ σ′1Riσ′2. Using coalition selfishness, for coalition C = {i1, ..., iK}
with i1 < i2 < ... < iK , we sometimes write (σ(i1), ..., σ(iK))Ri(σ′(i1), ..., σ′(iK)) if i ranks
any allocation σ with σ(C(i)) = (σ(i1), ..., σ(iK)) no lower than any other allocation σ′ with
σ′(C(i)) = (σ′(i1), ..., σ′(iK)).
Given a profile π, an allocation σ is individually rational if ∀i ∈ C, σ(C(i))Riσ0(C(i)).
The set of individually rational allocations is denoted by Σ(σ0, π).
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Definition 2.2.1 A Shapley-Scarf market with coalitional trade is a triple E =< N, C, π >
where N is the number of goods and individuals, C is a coalition structure, and π is a profile
satisfying coalition selfishness.
Note that the original Shapley-Scarf market is a Shapley-Scarf market with coalitional
trade where C = {{1}, {2}, ..., {N}}.
2.2.2 Alternative concepts of competitive equilibrium
There is no natural notion of competitive equilibrium when externalities prevail in in-
dividual valuations. Different concepts of budget constraint, as well as different types of
cooperation within coalitions, lead to different definitions of equilibrium.
We first introduce two notions of budget set. Define a price vector as an element p =
(px)x∈G of RN+ .
Definition 2.2.2 Let p be a price vector. The strong budget set of i for p is the subset of
allocations BSi (p) = {σ ∈ Σ : ∀j ∈ C(i), pσ(j) ≤ pj}. The weak budget set of i for p is the
subset of allocations BWi (p) = {σ ∈ Σ :
∑
j∈C
pσ(j) ≤
∑
j∈C
pj}.
Strong and weak budget sets are natural extensions of the standard Shapley-Scarf budget
constraint. Each individual is endowed with a single good, and her income is the price of
her initial endowment. Hence a good is affordable if its price is not greater than income. In
case of coalitional trade, we may allow or not for income transfer among partners. If income
transfers are not permitted, each member must be given a good priced lower than her initial
good, as stated by the strong budget set. When income transfers are permitted, an allocation
is affordable if the sum of prices of all goods allocated to the coalition does not exceed the
total coalition income, as prescribed by the weak budget set. Observe that BSi (p) = BSj (p)
and BWi (p) = BWj (p) for all i, j ∈ C ∈ C. Therefore, we can write BSi (p) = BSC(p) and
BWi (p) = BWC (p) for all i ∈ C. Furthermore, it is obvious that BSj (p) ⊆ BWj (p) for all j ∈ I
and all p ∈ RN+ .
We introduce three alternative equilibrium concepts. Loosely speaking, an equilibrium
allocation σ is such that partners cannot be better off with some other affordable allocation σ′.
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However, in the case of coalitional trade, σ′ may be identified either individually or collectively.
Each equilibrium concept relates to a different approach to this issue. Given a price vector p
together with a coalition C, we define a budget set BC(p) as an element of {BWC (p), BSC(p)}.
Definition 2.2.3 A selfish equilibrium for E is a 2-tuple (σ, p) ∈ Σ × RN+ such that ∀i ∈ I,
σ ∈ argmax
BC(i)(p)
Ri where argmax
BC(i)(p)
Ri = {σ ∈ BC(i)(p) : σRiσ′,∀σ′ ∈ BC(i)(p)}. If BC(i)(p) =
BWC(i)(p), (σ, p) is a weak selfish equilibrium, and if BC(i)(p) = BSC(i)(p), (σ, p) is a strong
selfish equilibrium.
We denote respectively by ESself (E) and EWself (E) the sets of strong and weak selfish equi-
libria for E , and we denote respectively by ESself (E) and EWself (E) the sets of strong and weak
equilibrium allocations (i.e. allocations σ such that (σ, p) is a selfish equilibrium for some price
vector p). A selfish equilibria relates to the lowest degree of collusion within coalitions : each
individual pays interest only to her own well-being given what is affordable by the coalition.
Given a price vector p and a coalition C, a p-optimum for C is an allocation σ ∈ BC(p)
such that there is no σ′ ∈ BC(p) which verifies σ′Riσ for all i ∈ C and σ′Pjσ for some
j ∈ C. If BC(p) = BWC (p), σ is a weak p-optimum for C, and if BC(p) = BSC(p), σ is a strong
p-optimum for C. We denote by OSC(p) (resp. OWC (p)) the set of strong (resp. weak) p-optima
for C.
Definition 2.2.4 A strong (resp. weak) cooperative equilibrium for E is a 2-tuple (σ, p) ∈
Σ× RN+ such that σ ∈ OSC(p) (resp. OWC (p)) for all C ∈ C.
A cooperative equilibrium allocation results from some unspecified bargaining procedure
among partners, which ends up at a budget-constrained Pareto optimal situation. We denote
respectively by EScoop(E) and EWcoop(E) the sets of strong and weak cooperative equilibria, and
we denote respectively by EScoop(E) and EWcoop(E) the sets of strong and weak cooperative
equilibrium allocations.
Pick an allocation σ, a price vector p, and an individual i. The (σ, p)-restricted budget
set for i is the set of allocations Bi(σ, p) = {σ′ ∈ BC(i)(p) : ∀j ∈ C\{i}, σ′(j) = σ(j)}. A
(σ, p)-restricted budget set for i contains all allocations which endow her partners with the
same good as in σ and which give i a good making the coalition bundle budget-feasible.
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If BC(i)(p) = BSC(i)(p), we write Bi(σ, p) = BSi (σ, p), and if BC(i)(p) = BWC(i)(p), we write
Bi(σ, p) = BWi (σ, p). The best response of i to (σ, p) is the set Φi(σ, p) = argmaxBi(σ,p)Ri. If
Bi(σ, p) = BSi (σ, p), we obtain the strong best-response ΦSi (σ, p), and if Bi(σ, p) = BWi (σ, p),
we obtain the weak best-response ΦWi (σ, p).
Definition 2.2.5 A strong (resp. weak) coordinated equilibrium for E is a 2-tuple (σ, p) ∈
Σ× RN+ such that ∀i ∈ I, σ ∈ ΦSi (σ, p) (resp. σ ∈ ΦWi (σ, p) ).
Coordinated equilibria relate to a tacit Nash-type collusion scheme in coalitions. Given her
partners’ current goods, each individual maximizes her satisfaction under budget constraint.
We denote respectively by EScoor(E) and EWcoor(E) the sets of strong and weak coordinated
equilibria. We denote respectively by EScoor(E) and EWcoor(E) the associated sets of equilibrium
allocations.
Observe that, as in standard Shapley-Scarf markets, the market clearing condition is
embedded in the definition of allocations. The following examples illustrate the three types
of equilibrium.
Example 2.2.1 Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and π =
(P1, ..., P4} is a profile having the form below : 6⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(3, 4) (1, 3) (1, 2) (1, 2)
(3, 2) (1, 4) (1, 3) (3, 2)
(3, 1) (1, 2) (1, 4) (4, 2)
... (3, 4) ... ...
(3, 2)
(3, 1)
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Consider allocation σ = (3, 4, 1, 2) and price vector p = (1, ..., 1). Obviously, BSC(p) =
BWC (p) = Σ for all C. Moreover, there is no σ′ ̸= σ in BSi (p) such that σ′Riσ for all i =
1, 3, 4. Observe that σ ∈ OSC1(p)∩ OSC2(p). Hence σ ∈ EScoop(E) ∩ EWcoop(E). Furthermore,
6. The individual’s name appears in the first row. For each column labeled i ∈ I represents agent i’s
preferences Ri over allocations. Allocations that are more preferred are listed above less preferred allocations.
Note that for all i = 1, 2, we write (σ(1), σ(2))Ri(σ′(1), σ′(2)) if i ranks any allocation σ with σ(C1) =
(σ(1), σ(2)) no lower than any other allocation σ′ with σ′(C1) = (σ′(1), σ′(2)) and for all i = 3, 4, we write
(σ(3), σ(4))Ri(σ′(3), σ′(4)) if i ranks any allocation σ with σ(C1) = (σ(3), σ(4)) no lower than any other
allocation σ′ with σ′(C2) = (σ′(3), σ′(4)).
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(σ, p) /∈ ESself (E) ∪ EWself (E). Indeed, p3 ≤ p2 while (1, 3)P2(3, 4). Finally, let σ′′ = (3, 2, 1, 4).
Then (σ′′, p) /∈ EScoor(E) ∪ EWcoor(E). Indeed, (σ′′, p) ∈ EWcoor(E) only if p1 + p2 < p3 + p4
(otherwise, every σ˜ with σ˜(C2) = (3, 4) is weakly budget feasible, while σ˜P3σ′′). Similarly,
(σ′′, p) ∈ EScoor(E) only if p2 < p4.
Example 2.2.2 Consider E =< 8, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6}, C4 =
{7, 8}, and where π has the form below :
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(3, 2) (5, 4) (7, 6) (1, 8)
(4, 3) (6, 5) (8, 7) (2, 1)
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Pick allocation σ = (4, 3, 6, 5, 8, 7, 2, 1) and price vector p = (1, ..., 1). As above, BSC(p) =
BWC (p) = Σ for all C. Note that σR1σ′ for all σ′ ∈ BSC1(σ, p) where σ′(2) = 3. Therefore
σ ∈ ΦS1 (σ, p). Similarly, σP2σ′ for all σ′ with σ′(1) = 4. Thus, σ ∈ ΦS2 (σ, p). One also
checks that σ ∈ ΦSi (σ, p) for all i = 3, ..., 8. Therefore (σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E) ∩ EWcoor(E). Finally,
(σ, p) /∈ EScoop(E) ∪ EWcoop(E) ∪ ESself (E) ∪ EWself , since σ′ = (3, 2, 5, 4, 7, 6, 1, 8) Pi σ for all i
while being budget feasible for all coalitions.
2.2.3 Restrictions upon preferences
We show below that both existence properties of equilibria are sensitive to the structure
of preferences. Attention will be paid to three preference domains.
Definition 2.2.6 A profile π = (Ri)i∈I is responsive if and only if for all C and all i ∈ C,
there exists (≻ij)j∈C ∈ L(G)|C| such that ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ with σ(C) ̸= σ′(C), we have
σPiσ
′ if for all j ∈ C, either σ(j) ≻ij σ′(j) or σ(j) = σ′(j).
We denote byΠR ⊆ Π the set of responsive profiles. Responsiveness holds if each individual
has a linear order over goods for each of all her partners (including herself), and gets better
off with a Pareto improving change according to these linear orders. Responsiveness relates
the welfare of the coalition to that of its members. Observe that in definition 6, ≻ij may not
coincide with ≻jj : i may endow j with a ranking of goods that is not the one that j assigns to
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herself. On the contrary, if each individual rank goods allocated to any partner as this partner
does, any unilateral improvement of one partner’s well-being will benefit to all members of
the coalition. This special case is called coalition responsiveness.
Definition 2.2.7 A profile π = (Ri)i∈I is coalition responsive if and only if it is responsive
and ∀C, ∀i, j, k ∈ C, ≻ji= ≻ki .
Under coalition responsiveness, we write ≻i=≻ji for all j ∈ C. We denote by ΠCR ⊆ ΠR
the set of all coalition-based-responsive preferences profiles. 7
Preferences are called joint if for all C and for all i, j ∈ C, we have Ri = Rj . Clearly, if
preferences are joint and responsive, they are coalition responsive.
We now introduce lexicographic and weak lexicographic preferences. Denote by J (resp.
Jz with cardinality z > 0) the set of all non-empty subsets of G (resp. with cardinality z).
Definition 2.2.8 An individual i has lexicographic preferences if there exists a good-priority
mapping γi : J → G and a partner- priority mapping : µi : J → C(i) such that
(1) γi(J) ∈ J for all non-empty J ⊆ J
(2) ∀J ∈ J and ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ(C(i) |J) such that σ(µi(J)) = γi(J) and σ′(µi(J)) ̸= γi(J),
we have σPiσ
′.
An individual i has lexicographic preferences if when facing any subset of goods J avai-
lable for trade, there exists a unique good x (i.e., γi(J) = x) and a unique member j ∈ C(i)
(i.e., µi(J) = j) such that i ranks any matching σ where j is given x (i.e., σ(j) = x)) above
any other allocation σ′ that allocates j some other good (i.e., σ(j) ̸= x)). A profile is cal-
led lexicographic if it involves lexicographic preferences. As responsiveness, the lexicography
property qualifies the link between the one-dimensional thinking that individuals frequently
employ with the multi-dimensional nature of the coalitional allocations. Individuals with
lexicographic preferences prioritize goods, and tieing each group J of goods to a member of
the coalition, and they are better off when a higher priority good has been assigned to the
7. Klaus and Klijn (2005) show that coalition responsiveness (which they call responsiveness) plays an
important role in the existence of stable matchings in two-sided markets with couples. See also Klaus, Klijn
and Masso` (2007).
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appropriate member of their coalition. Once again, we allow partners in a coalition to have
different ways to prioritize goods and partners. ΠL will stand for the set of all lexicographic
preferences. 8
Definition 2.2.9 An individual i has weak lexicographic preferences if there exists a good-
priority mapping γi : J → G and a contingent partner-priority mapping λi : J × J |C(i)| →
C(i) such that
(1) γi(J) ∈ J for all non-empty J ⊆ J
(2) ∀J ∈ J , ∀J ′ ∈ J|C(i)| with J ′ ⊆ J , ∀σ ∈ Σ(C(i) |J ′) with σ(λi(J × J ′)) = γi(J),
∀σ′ ∈ Σ(C(i) |J), we have σ′Riσ only if σ′(λi(J × J ′′)) = γi(J) for some J ′′ ∈ J|C(i)|\{J ′}
and J ′′ ⊆ J
Pick any subset J of goods. An individual with weak lexicographic preference always
strictly prefers having a priority good in J assigned to a specific partner rather than having
that good assigned to none. Moreover, who should receive the priority good may depend
on the other goods assigned to the coalition. In contrast with lexicographic preference, weak
lexicographic preferences rest upon a contingent partner-priority mapping. For an illustration
where C(i) is a couple, and where there are 4 goods, a lexicographic preference Ri may look
like (1, 4) Ri (2, 4) Ri (3, 4) Pi (2, 1) Ri (2, 3) Pi ..., while a weak lexicographic preference
R′i may look like (1, 4) R′i (4, 2) R′i (3, 4) P ′i .... Observe that we may have (3, 2) R′i (4, 1) .
Indeed, good 4 is the priority good for i in G, but the second partner is the priority partner
contingent to the fact that goods 1 and 4 are assigned to the couple. Hence, assigning good
4 to the first partner may bring a situation less preferred than another where good 4 is not
assigned to the couple. ΠWL will stand for the set of weak lexicographic preference profiles.
Clearly, ΠL ⊂ ΠWL.
8. Dog˘an et al. (2011) show that lexicographic preferences ensure the non-emptiness of the Core in a setting
similar to the present one, the main difference being that all partners are assumed to share the same preference.
We comment this result below.
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2.3 Results
Results are organized in four sections. The first deals with set-comparison among equili-
brium allocations. Properties of equilibrium allocations are stated in the second. Existence
results are gathered in the third. While stated and proved for the specific case where coalitions
are couples, these results can be extended to any coalition structure against some notational
cost. Finally, we investigate in the fourth section the maximality of preference domains that
ensure existence.
2.3.1 Set-comparison of equilibria
We begin with results comparing sets of equilibrium allocations for both strong and weak
budget constraints.
Proposition 2.3.1 For all E =< N, C, π >,
1. ESself (E) ⊆ EScoop(E), and EWself (E) ⊆ EWcoop(E)
2. ESself (E) ⊆ EScoor(E), and EWself (E) ⊆ EWcoor(E)
3. If π ∈ ΠCR, then EScoop(E) ⊆ EScoor(E), and EWcoop(E) ⊆ EWcoor(E)
Proof 2.3.1 Let (σ, p) ∈ ESself (E). By definition, σ ∈ argmaxBS
C(i)(p)
Ri for all i, then σ ∈
OSC(p) for all C. Therefore, σ ∈ EScoop(E). The same argument applies to show that EWself (E) ⊆
EWcoop(E). This proves assertion 1.
If (σ, p) ∈ ESself (E), then argmaxBS
C(i)(p)
Ri for all i. For all p, we have B
S
i (σ, p) ⊆ BSC(i)(p)
for all i. Thus σ ∈ ∩i∈IΦSi (σ, p) for all i, and thus (σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E). The same argument holds
for weak budget sets. This proves assertion 2.
Finally, suppose that π ∈ ΠCR, and let (σ, p) ∈ EScoop(E). If σ ̸∈ EScoor(E), then (σ, p) /∈
EScoor(E). It follows that there exist i and σ′ ∈ BSC(i)(σ, p) such that σ′Piσ and σ′(j) = σ(j)
for all j ∈ C\{i}. Moreover, π ∈ ΠCR implies that σ′(i) ≻i σ(i). Moreover, coalitional
responsiveness implies σ′Pjσ for all j ∈ C(i), in contradiction with (σ, p) ∈ EScoop(E). Since
the same argument holds for weak budget sets, this shows assertion 3.
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Inclusions in Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 may be strict, even under preference restrictions,
while those in Proposition 1.3 may no longer prevail if preferences are not coalition responsive.
Proposition 2.3.2 There exists E =< N, C, π > such that,
1. π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL, ESself (E) ̸= EScoop(E), and ESself (E) ̸= EScoor(E)
2. π ∈ ΠCR and ESself (E) ̸= EScoop(E)
3. π ∈ ΠCR and EScoop(E) ̸= EScoor(E)
4. π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL and EScoop(E) ⊈ EScoor(E)
Proof 2.3.2 Consider the profile π given in example 1. Clearly, π can be completed so as
to be responsive and lexicographic. We know that σ = (3, 4, 1, 2) ∈ EScoop(E). However, σ /∈
ESself (E). Indeed, σ′P2σ if σ′ is any allocation such that σ(C1) ∈ {(1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 2)}. Since
σ0 ∈ BSC1(p′) for all p′, then σ /∈ ESself (E). Take p = (1, ..., 1). Observe that σP1σ′ for all
σ′ ∈ BSC1(σ, p) with σ′(2) = 4. Similarly, σP2σ′ for all σ′ ∈ BSC2(σ, p) with σ′(1) = 3. Thus,
σ ∈ ΦS1 (σ, p) ∩ ΦS2 (σ, p). The reader will easily check that σ ∈ ΦSi (σ, p), ∀i = 3, 4. Therefore
(σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E). This shows assertion 1.
Pick E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and where π has the form⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(4, 2) (2, 4) (1, 3) (3, 1)
(2, 4) ... ... (1, 3)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
which can be completed to ensure π ∈ ΠCR, with 4 ≻i 2 ≻i ... for i = 1, 2, and 1 ≻i 3 ≻3 ...,
for i = 3, 4. Let σ = (2, 4, 1, 3) and p = (1, 1, 1, 1). Obviously, σ ∈ OSC1(p)∩ OSC2(p). Since
σ ∈ BSC(i)(p) for all i, then σ ∈ EScoop(E). Now suppose that (σ, p′) ∈ ESself (E). Since σ ∈
argmaxBSC1 (p)
R1, p′4 > p′1. Similarly, σ ∈ argmaxBSC2 (p)R4 requires p
′
1 > p
′
4, a contradiction.
This proves assertion 2.
Pick E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and π has the form⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(3, 1) (3, 1) (1, 4) (1, 4)
(3, 2) (3, 2) (2, 1) (2, 1)
(3, 4) (4, 3) (1, 3) (2, 4)
(4, 3) ... ... ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
43
2.3. RESULTS
which can, as above, be completed in order to ensure π ∈ ΠCR, with 3 ≻1 4 ≻1 1 ≻1 2,
3 ≻2 1 ≻2 2 ≻2 4, 1 ≻3 2 ≻3 3 ≻3 4, and 1 ≻4 4 ≻4 3 ≻4 2. Consider σ = (4, 3, 2, 1)
and p = (1, 1, 1, 1). Clearly, σ ∈ BSC(i)(σ, p) for all i. Since σP1σ′ for all σ′ ∈ BS1 (σ, p) with
σ′(2) = 3, then σ ∈ ΦS1 (σ, p). Furthermore, σ ∈ ΦS2 (σ, p) since σP2σ′ for all σ′ ∈ BS2 (σ, p)
with σ′(1) = 4. Similarly, we check that σ ∈ ΦSi (σ, p) for i = 3, 4. Therefore, (σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E).
Now suppose that (σ, p′) ∈ EScoop(E) for some p′. Then σ ∈ OSC1(p′) requires p′3 > p′1 (since
(3, 2) P1 (4, 3) and (3, 2) P2 (4, 3)). Similarly, since (1, 4)) P3 (2, 1) and (1, 4) P4 (2, 1), then
σ ∈ OSC2(p′) implies p′1 > p′3, which is impossible. Thus, σ /∈ EScoop(E). This proves assertion
3.
To prove assertion 4, pick E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and
where π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL has the form⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3, 4
(1, 3) (1, 2) (2, 4)
... (1, 3) ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
It is obvious that (σ, p) ∈ EScoop(E), where σ = (1, 3, 2, 4) and p = (1, 1, 1, 1). Since σ0 ∈
BSC1(p
′) for all p′ and σ0P2σ, then σ /∈ ΦS2 (σ, p′) for all p′. Thus σ /∈ EScoor(E), which proves
assertion 4.
Proposition 3 is the analog of Proposition 2 for weak equilibria.
Proposition 2.3.3 There exists E =< N, C, π > such that,
1. π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL, EWself (E) ̸= EWcoop(E), and EWself (E) ̸= EWcoor(E),
2. π ∈ ΠCR and EWself (E) ̸= EWcoop(E),
3. π ∈ ΠCR and EWcoop(E) ̸= EWcoor(E)
4. π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL and EWcoop(E) ⊈ EWcoor(E)
Proof 2.3.3 Consider again the responsive and lexicographic profile in example 1. We al-
ready know that (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E), where σ = (3, 4, 1, 2), and p = (1, 1, 1, 1). The same
argument as in the proof of proposition 2.1 ensures that (σ, p) ∈ EWcoor(E). Since any alloca-
tion such that σ(C1) = (1, 2) is weak budget feasible and (1, 2)P2(3, 4), there exists no p′ such
that (σ, p′) ∈ EWself (E). Therefore, σ /∈ EWself (E) , hence assertion 1.
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In order to prove assertion 2, consider the preference profile used in the proof of Propo-
sition 2.2. Clearly, (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E), where σ = (2, 4, 1, 3), and p = (1, 1, 1, 1). Now sup-
pose that (σ, p′) ∈ EWself (E) for some p′. Since σ ∈ argmaxBWC1 (p′)R1, then one must have
p′4+ p′2 > p′1+ p′2. Moreover weak budget feasibility of σ implies that p′1+ p′2 ≥ p′2+ p′4, clearly
a contradiction. Therefore σ /∈ EWself (E), hence assertion 2.
Take the preference profile in the proof of Proposition 2.3. Consider σ = (4, 3, 2, 1) and
p = (1, 1, 1, 1). We know that (σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E). Since BWi (σ, p) = BSi (σ, p) for all i, (σ, p) ∈
EWcoor(E). Suppose that (σ, p′) ∈ EWcoop(E) for some p′. Since σ ∈ OWC1(p′), then we must have
p′3+p′2 > p′1+p′2. Similarly, σ ∈ OWC2(p′) implies p′1+p′4 > p′3+p′4, which is impossible. Thus,
σ /∈ EWcoop(E), which shows assertion 3.
Finally, the proof of assertion 4 is identical to the proof of Proposition 2.4.
We turn now to the comparison between strong and weak equilibria.
Proposition 2.3.4 There exists E =< N, C, π > such that
1. π ∈ ΠCR, EWself (E) ⊈ ESself (E), and EWcoop(E) ⊈ EScoop(E)
2. π ∈ ΠCR, ESself (E) ⊈ EWself (E), and EScoop(E) ⊈ EWcoop(E)
3. π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL, EWcoop(E) ⊈ EScoop(E), and EWself (E) ⊈ ESself (E)
4. π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL, EScoop(E) ⊈ EWcoop(E), and ESself (E) ⊈ EWself (E)
Proof 2.3.4 Pick E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and π ∈ ΠCR has
the form below.
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(3, 4) (3, 4) (3, 2) (3, 2)
... ... (1, 2) (3, 1)
... (1, 2)
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Let σ = (3, 4, 1, 2) and p = (2, 2, 3, 1). Since p1 + p2 = p3 + p4, then σ ∈ BWC(i)(p) for
all i. Since p2 + p3 > p3 + p4 and p1 + p3 > p3 + p4, individuals 3 and 4 get with σ their
first best in their weak budget set. Thus (σ, p) ∈ EWself (E). Now, strong budget feasibility of
σ w.r.t. p′ requires p′1 = p′3 and p′2 = p′4. Moreover, (σ, p′) ∈ ESself (E) implies that p′2 > p′4
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(otherwise σ /∈ argmaxBSC2 (p′)R3), in contradiction with budget feasibility. This shows that
EWself (E) ⊈ ESself (E). A similar argument shows that σ ∈ EWcoop(E)\EScoop(E). This proves
assertion 1.
Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and π ∈ ΠCR has the
form below. ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(2, 1) (2, 1) (4, 3) (4, 3)
(1, 2) (1, 2) (3, 4) (3, 4)
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Let p = (3, 1, 3, 1). It is easily checked that (σ0, p) ∈ ESself (E). Moreover, (σ0, p′) ∈ EWself (E)
for no price vector p′, since this would require p′2 + p′1 > p′1 + p′2. By Proposition 1.1, σ0 ∈
EScoop(E), while, similarly to above, (σ0, p′) ∈ EWcoop(E) implies p′2 + p′1 > p′1 + p′2. This proves
assertion 2.
Consider E =< 6, C, π >, where C = {C1, C2, C3} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}}, and where
π ∈ ΠR ∩ΠL such as below ⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6
(3, 4) (1, 6) (1, 2)
(3, 2) (5, 6) (5, 2)
(3, 5) (3, 6) (4, 2)
(3, 6) (4, 6) (3, 2)
(3, 1) (2, 6) (6, 2)
(1, 4) (1, 4) (1, 6)
(1, 2) (5, 4) (5, 6)
... (3, 4) ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Let σ = (3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2) and p = (2, 2, 32 ,
5
2 , 1, 3). Since p3 + p4 = p1 + p2 = p5 + p6, then
σ ∈ BWC(i)(p) for all i. Moreover, since p3 + p4 < p1 + p6 while each i ∈ C1 ∪ C3 gets a
first-best allocation, then (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E). If (σ, p′) ∈ EScoop(E) for some p′, one must have
by strong budget feasibility p′1 = p′3 = p′5 and p′2 = p′4 = p′6. Moreover, σ ∈ OSC2(p′) implies
p′1 > p′3, in contradiction with budget feasibility. Thus σ ∈ EWcoop(E)\EScoop(E). Finally, it is
easily seen that, since p3 + p4 < p1 + p6, (σ, p) ∈ EWself (E). Since strong budget feasibility for
any p′ requires p′1 = p′3 = p′5 and p′2 = p′4 = p′6, then any σ′ with σ′(C2) = (1, 6) belongs to
BSC2(p
′). It follows from σ′P3σ that σ ∈ EWself (E)\ESself (E). This proves assertion 3.
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Finally, pick E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and π ∈ ΠR∩ΠL such
as below
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4
(2, 1) (4, 3)
(2, 3) (4, 2)
(2, 4) (4, 1)
(1, 2) (3, 4)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
It is easy to check that (σ0, p) ∈ ESself (E) where p = (1, 2, 1, 2). By Proposition 1.1, (σ0, p) ∈
EScoop(E). Since σ = (2, 1, 4, 3) ∈ ∩i∈IBWC(i)(p′) for all price vectors p′, and since σPiσ0 for
all i, then σ0 /∈ EWcoop(E). Moreover, we clearly have EWself (E) = EWcoop(E) = {σ}. Therefore,
again by Proposition 1.1, σ0 /∈ EWself (E). This shows assertion 4.
We end up this section with the comparison between weak and strong coordinated equi-
libria.
Proposition 2.3.5 1. EScoor(E) ⊆ EWcoor(E) for any E
2. There exists E =< N, C, π > with π ∈ ΠCRL such that EScoor(E) ̸= EWcoor(E)
Proof 2.3.5 Given any allocation σ, I admits a partition {N1, ..., NK} into K non-empty
sets such that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, Nk = {ik1, ..., ikZ(k)} and σ(ik1) = ik2, ... , σ(ikz) = ikz+1, ... ,
σ(ikZ(k)−1) = ikZ(k), and σ(ikZ(k)) = ik1 . Clearly, if σ ∈ ∩i∈IBSC(i)(p) for some price vector p,
then for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K and all 1 ≤ z ≤ Z(k), pikz = pσ(ikz ). If (σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E), strong budget
feasibility implies pi = pσ(i) for all i ∈ I. Then for all i, for all σ′ such that σ′(j) = σ(j) for
all j ∈ C(i)\{i}, σ′Piσ implies pσ′(i) > pi (*). Now suppose that (σ, p) /∈ EWcoor(E). Note first
that σ ∈ ∩i∈IBWC(i)(p). By definition of a weak coordinated equilibrium, there exists i∗ ∈ I
and σ′ ∈ Σ with σ′(i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ C(i∗)\{i∗}, such that σ′Pi∗σ, and ∑i∈C(i) pσ′(i) ≤∑
i∈C(i) pi. Since pi = pσ(i) for all i ∈ C(i∗)\{i∗}, we get that pσ′(i∗) ≤ pi∗, in contradiction
with (*). This proves assertion 1.
Pick E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and where π ∈ ΠCRL has the
form below
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⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4
(4, 3) (4, 1)
(2, 3) ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Consider σ = (2, 3, 4, 1) and p = (3, 1, 3, 2). Since p1 + p4 ≤ p3 + p4 and p2 + p3 ≤ p1 + p2,
then σ ∈ ∩i∈IBWC(i)(p). Moreover, σ is a first-best allocation for both 3 and 4, and thus
σ ∈ ΦW3 (σ, p)∩ΦW4 (σ, p). Furthermore, p3+p4 > p1+p2 ensures that σ ∈ ΦW1 (σ, p)∩ΦW2 (σ, p).
Therefore, (σ, p) ∈ EWcoor(E). However, σ /∈ EScoor(E). Indeed, if σ ∈ ∩i∈IBSC(i)(p′) for some
p′, then p′4 ≤ p′3 ≤ p′2 ≤ p′1 ≤ p′4, and thus p′4 = p′3 = p′2 = p′1. This implies that σ′ =
(4, 3, ., .) ∈ BSC1(σ, p′). Since σ′P1σ, then σ /∈ ΦW1 (σ, p′). Thus, σ ∈ EWcoor(E)\EScoor(E), which
proves assertion 2.
2.3.2 Properties of equilibria
Next, we consider three properties for equilibrium allocations, namely individual rationa-
lity, Core stability, and Pareto optimality.
2.3.2.1 Individual rationality
Proposition 2.3.6 1. There exists E such that π ∈ ΠCR and σ ∈ EScoop(E)∩ EScoor(E) ∩
EWcoop(E) ∩ EWcoor(E) is not individually rational.
2. In any E, ESself (E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π) and EWself (E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π).
Proof 2.3.6 Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and where π is
any coalition responsive profile having the form⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(2, 1) (1, 2) (4, 3) (3, 4)
(1, 2) (2, 1) (3, 4) (4, 3)
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Then (σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E)∩ EScoop(E) ∩ EWcoop(E) ∩ EWcoor(E) where σ = (2, 1, 4, 3) and p =
(1, 1, 1, 1). Clearly, σ0Piσ for i = 2, 4, hence assertion 1.
Pick any E, and any (σ, p) ∈ ESself (E)∩EWself (E). By definition, either σ ∈ argmaxBS
C(i)(p)
Ri
or σ ∈ argmaxBW
C(i)(p)
Ri, while σ
0 ∈ BSC(i)(p)∩ BWC(i)(p) for all i. This directly implies that
σRiσ
0 for all i, hence assertion 2.
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The possibility of partners having different preferences over allocations plays a crucial role
in Proposition 6.1, as pointed by
Proposition 2.3.7 1. In any E =< N, C, π > where π is a profile of joint preferences,
EScoop(E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π) and EWcoop(E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π).
2. There exists E =< N, C, π > where π is a profile of joint preferences, such that EScoor(E) ⊈
Σ(σ0, π) and EWcoor(E) ⊈ Σ(σ0, π).
Proof 2.3.7 Let (σ, p) ∈ EScoop(E). If there exists i ∈ C such that σ0(C)Piσ(C), then σ0(C)Pjσ(C)
for all j ∈ C. Since σ0 ∈ BSC(p), we contradict σ ∈ OC(p), hence assertion 1.
In order to prove assertion 2, consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}},
and π is as below
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4
(4, 1) (2, 3)
(1, 2) (3, 4)
(2, 3) (4, 1)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Let σ = (2, 3, 4, 1) and p = (1, 1, 1, 1). Clearly, σ ∈ BSC(i)(p)∩BWC(i)(p), σ ∈ ∩i∈IΦSi (σ, p), and
σ ∈ ∩i∈IΦWi (σ, p). Hence σ ∈ EScoor(E) ∩ EWcoor(E). Since σ0Piσ for all i ∈ I, the conclusion
follows.
2.3.2.2 Core stability
Pick any E =< N, C, π >. Given σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, we define a (σ′, σ)−blocking group as a
non-empty subset S of I such that ∀i ∈ S, σ′Piσ and σ′(i) ∈ S.
We define theCoalitional Core of E as the subset ΩCoal(E) of Σ containing all allocations
σ for which there is no (σ′, σ)−blocking group S for σ with ∀i ∈ I, i ∈ S ⇒ C(i) ⊆ S. Hence,
ΩCoal does not allow to blocking group to break coalitions.
Whenever breaking coalition can prevail, several concepts of Core can be considered. We
focus here on two specific ones.
The Core of E is the subset Ω(E) of Σ containing all allocations σ for which there is no
(σ′, σ)−blocking group S such that ∀i /∈ S, σ′(i) = σ0(i).
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The Conservative Core of E is the subset Ωcons(E) of Σ containing all σ such that if S
is a (σ′, σ)− blocking coalition, then S is not a (σ′′, σ)−blocking coalition for some σ′′ with
∀i ∈ S, σ′(i) = σ′′(i).
Hence, Ω(E) refers to the standard concept of Core, in which all individuals not involved
in a blocking group receive their initial good. Since individual preferences over allocations
depend on what partners are endowed with, blocking may no longer be appealing in case
partners outside of the blocking group are endowed with some other good. What Ωcons(E)
suggests is that a blocking group will form only if all its members can be better off regardless
what individuals outside the group are endowed with. Observe that for any E , Ω(E) ⊆ Ωcoal(E)
and Ω(E) ⊆ Ωcons(E).
Proposition 2.3.8 There exists E with π ∈ ΠCR such that ESself (E) ⊈ Ωcoal(E) and ESself (E) ⊈
Ωcons(E).
Proof 2.3.8 Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and π is any coalition
responsive profile having the form
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4
(2, 1) (4, 3)
(1, 2) (3, 4)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Then (σ0, p) ∈ ESself (E) where p = (2, 1, 2, 1). Since I is a (σ′, σ0)−blocking group, with
σ′ = (2, 1, 4, 3), then σ0 /∈ Ωcoal(E) ∪ Ωcons(E).
As an immediate corollary, we get that a strong selfish equilibrium allocation may not
be in the Core. Since ESself (E) ⊆ EScoop(E) by Proposition 1, then EScoop(E) ⊈ Ωcoal(E) and
EScoop(E) ⊈ Ωcons(E). Another consequence of Proposition 8 combined with Proposition 1 is
that strong coordinated equilibrium allocations may be neither in the conservative Core, nor
in the coalitional Core. Since Ω(E) ⊆ Ωcoal(E), this conclusion also holds for Core stability.
Proposition 2.3.9 1. EWcoop(E) ⊆ Ωcoal(E) for all E.
2. There exists E such that EWcoop(E) ⊈ Ωcons(E).
3. EWself (E) ⊆ Ω(E) for all E.
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4. There exists E such that π ∈ ΠCR and neither EWcoor(E) ⊆ Ωcoal(E) nor EWcoor(E) ⊆
Ωcons(E).
Proof 2.3.9 Pick (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E), and suppose that σ /∈ Ωcoal(E). Thus, there exists S ⊆ N
and σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ′(i) ∈ S for all i ∈ S, and σ′Piσ for all i with C(i) ⊆ S. Then,
for any C ⊆ S we have ∑i∈C pσ′(i) > ∑i∈C pi. This implies that ∑i∈S pσ′(i) > ∑i∈S pi, in
contradiction with σ′(i) ∈ S for all i ∈ S. Hence assertion 1.
Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and π be such that
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(3, 2) (3, 1) (1, 4) (2, 4)
(3, 4) ... (1, 2) ...
(3, 1) (2, 4)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Then (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E) where σ = (3, 1, 2, 4) and p = (1, 1, 1, 1). Check that S = {1, 3} is
a (σ′, σ)−blocking coalition for any σ′ ∈ {(3, 2, 1, 4), (3, 4, 1, 2)}. Thus σ /∈ Ωcons(E). This
proves assertion 2.
Suppose (σ, p) ∈ EWself (E) and σ /∈ Ω(E). Let S ⊆ I and let σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ′(i) ∈ S
for all i ∈ S and σ′(i) = i for all i ∈ I\S. By construction, ∪i∈Sσ′(i) = ∪i∈S{i} (*).
Now, if σ′Piσ for all i ∈ S, it follows that ∑j∈C(i) pσ′(j) > ∑j∈C(i) pi for all i ∈ S. Hence∑
i∈S
∑
j∈C(i) pσ′(j) >
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈C(i) pi , in contradiction with (*). This proves assertion 3.
For assertion 4, consider the market introduced in the proof of Proposition 8, and observe
that (σ0, p) ∈ EWcoor(E), σ0 /∈ Ωcoal(E) and σ0 /∈ Ωcons(E).
As a corollary of Proposition 9, we get that EWself (E) ⊆ Ωcoal(E)∪Ωcons(E) for all E , while
we may have EWcoop(E) ⊈ Ω(E) (resp. EWcoor(E) ⊈ Ω(E)) in some E .
2.3.2.3 Pareto optimality
An allocation σ is Pareto optimal in E =< N, C, π > if there is no σ′ ∈ Σ such that
σ′Riσ for all i with σ′Pjσ for some j. Since preferences are (coalition selfish) weak orders, we
allow individuals to be indifferent between two different bundles assigned to their coalition.
Observe that this is compatible with responsiveness. Indeed, the weak order (1, 2) P (1, 3) P
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(2, 3) I (3, 2) P (3, 1) can be associated with linear orders 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 for the 1st coordinate,
and 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1 for the second. We show that the existence of indifference plays an important
role for the Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations. 9
Say that an individual preference Ri is discriminatory if ∀σ, σ′ with σ(C(i)) ̸= σ′(C(i)),
either σPiσ
′ or σ′Piσ.
Proposition 2.3.10 In any E =< N, C, π > where π is discriminatory, every σ ∈ EWcoop(E)
is Pareto optimal.
Proof 2.3.10 Let (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E) and suppose σ is not Pareto optimal. Thus, there exist
σ′ and S ⊆ I such that σ′Piσ for all i ∈ S, while all i ∈ I\S are indifferent between σ and
σ′. Since π is discriminatory, σ′(i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ I\S. Moreover, by definition of a weak
cooperative equilibrium,
∑
j∈C(i) pσ′(j) >
∑
j∈C(i) pj for all i ∈ S. By weak budget feasibility,∑
j∈C(i) pj ≥
∑
j∈C(i) pσ(j). Hence,
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈C(i) pσ′(j) >
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈C(i) pσ(j). Since σ′(i) =
σ(i) for all i ∈ I\S, ∑i/∈S∑j∈C(i) pσ′(j) = ∑i/∈S∑j∈C(i) pσ(j). Thus, ∑i∈I pσ′(i) > ∑i∈I pσ(i)
, which contradicts the fact that σ′ is an allocation.
Since by proposition 1, EWself (E) ⊆ EWcoop(E) for all E , we get as immediate consequence of
proposition 10 that in any E =< N, C, π > where π is discriminatory, σ ∈ EWself (E) only if σ
is Pareto optimal. A weak cooperative equilibrium allocation may be Pareto dominated with
non-discriminatory preferences, even under coalition responsiveness, as illustrated in example
3.
Example 2.3.1 E =< 4, C, π > where C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and such that π is as below :
9. It is already known that in standard Shapley-Scarf markets with indifference, an equilibrium allocation
may be Pareto dominated. See Emmerson (1972), and Roth and Postlewaite (1977).
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⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4
(1, 4), (4, 3) (1, 2)
(2, 4) (3, 2)
(3, 4) (3, 4)
(1, 3) (3, 1)
(2, 3) (3, 4)
(4, 2) (2, 4)
(1, 2) (2, 1)
(3, 2) (2, 3)
(4, 1) (4, 2))
(2, 1) (4, 3)
(3, 1) (1, 4)
(1, 3)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
It is easily checked that π is coalition responsive w.r.t. the following preferences over
goods :
- Individual 1 : 4 ≻1 1 ≻1 2 ≻1 3
- Individual 2 : 4 ≻2 3 ≻2 2 ≻2 1
- Individual 3 : 1 ≻3 3 ≻3 2 ≻3 4
- Individual 4 : 2 ≻4 4 ≻4 1 ≻4 3
Let p = (3, 4, 2, 4). Since p1 + p2 = p1 + p4 and p3 + p4 = p3 + p2, σ = (1, 4, 3, 2) is
weak budget feasible for both couples. Moreover, no allocation σ′ with σ′(C2) = (1, 2) is weak
budget feasible for C2, since p1 + p2 > p3 + p4. Thus σ is a first-best affordable allocation
for C2. Since σ is a first-best allocation for C1, then (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E). However, σ is Pareto
dominated by σ′ = (4, 3, 1, 2).
To conclude this section, observe that in contrast with Proposition 10, a strong co-
operative equilibrium allocation may be Pareto dominated even with discriminatory pre-
ferences. To see why, consider the market E defined in the proof of Proposition 8. We have
(σ0, p) ∈ ESself (E) while I is a (σ′, σ0)−blocking coalition, with σ′ = (2, 1, 4, 3). Therefore, σ0
is Pareto-dominated. Finally, since (σ0, p) ∈ EScoor(E)∩EWcoor(E), a weak or strong coordinated
equilibrium allocation can also be Pareto dominated with discriminatory preferences.
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We can summarize the results in the following tables.
Set-comparison of equilibria
For both Strong and Weak Cooperative Coordinated
Selfish ⊆ (⊊ even under CR and RL) ⊆ (⊊ even under RL)
Cooperative ⊊ under CR, ⊈ under RL
Strong Selfish ⊈, ⊉ even under CR Weak Selfish
Strong Cooperative ⊈, ⊉ even under CR Weak Cooperative
Strong Coordinated ⊆ (⊊ even under CR and RL) Weak Coordinated
Properties of equilibria : Core Stability
Core Coalitional Core Conservative Core
Selfish
Strong : NO
Weak : YES
Strong : NO
Weak : YES
Strong : NO
Weak : YES
Cooperative
Strong : NO
Weak : NO
Strong : NO
Weak : YES
Strong : NO
Weak : NO
Coordinated
Strong : NO
Weak : NO
Strong : NO
Weak : NO
Strong : NO
Weak : NO
Properties of equilibria : Individual rationality (IR), Pareto optimality
(PO)
IR PO
Selfish YES Strong : NO & Weak : YES if preferences are strict
Cooperative
NO
YES if preferences are joint
Strong : NO & Weak : YES if preferences are strict
Coordinated NO NO
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2.3.3 Existence of equilibria
2.3.3.1 Strong equilibria
We start with observing that a Shapley-Scarf market may not have a strong coope-
rative (resp. coordinated) equilibrium.
Example 2.3.2 Consider E =< 8, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6},
C4 = {7, 8}, and where π is such as below :
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(5, 2) (3, 2) (4, 6) (5, 8)
(1, 4) (3, 7) (1, 6) (7, 8)
(1, 2) (3, 4) (5, 6) ...
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
By Proposition 7, EScoop(E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π). It is easily checked that Σ(σ0, π) contains
the 4 allocations σ0, σ1 = (1, 4, 3, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8), σ2 = (5, 2, 3, 4, 1, 6, 7, 8), and σ3 =
(1, 2, 3, 7, 4, 6, 5, 8). Suppose that (σ0, p) ∈ EScoop(E). Then σ0 ∈ OSC2(p) requires p7 > p4,
while σ0 ∈ OSC3(p) ∩ OSC4(p) implies p4 > p5 and p5 > p7. Hence p7 > p4 > p5 > p7,
clearly a contradiction. Similarly,
- if (σ1, p) ∈ EScoop(E), then σ1 ∈ OSC1(p) ∩ OSC3(p) implies p5 > p1 > p5, which is
impossible.
- if (σ2, p) ∈ EScoop(E), then σ2 ∈ OSC2(p) ∩ OSC3(p) ∩ OSC4 implies p7 > p4 > p5 > p7,
which is impossible
- if (σ3, p) ∈ EScoop(E), then σ3 ∈ OSC1(p) ∩ OSC2(p) implies p4 > p2 > p4, again an
impossibility.
Therefore, EScoop(E) = ∅.
Example 2.3.3 Define E =< 4, C, π > such that C = {C1, C2}, C1 = {1, 2}, C2 =
{3, 4}, and π satisfies
- (3, 1)R1(4, 1)R1(2, 1), (3, 2)R1(4, 2)R1(1, 2), (1, 3)R1(2, 3)R1(4, 3) and (1, 4)R1(2, 4)R1(3, 4)
- (1, 3)R2(1, 2)R2(1, 4), (2, 3)R2(2, 4)R2(2, 1), (3, 4)R2(3, 1)R2(3, 2) and (4, 3)R2(4, 2)R2(4, 1)
- (3, x)R3(y, x) , ∀x ∈ {2, 4}, ∀y ∈ G\{3} and (2, 1)R3(x, 1) , ∀x ∈ G\{2}.
- (x, 1)R4(x, y), ∀x ∈ {2, 3, 4}, ∀y ∈ G\{1} and (1, 4)R4(1, x),∀x ∈ G\{1, 4}.
Suppose that (σ, p) ∈ EScoor(E), and consider the following cases :
Case 1 : σ(1) = 1
If σ(2) = 3, then 3 /∈ {σ(3), σ(4)}. Pick σ′ such that σ′(3) = 3 and σ′(4) = σ(4).
Since (σ′, p) ∈ BS3 (σ, p) and σ′R3σ, we contradict σ ∈ ΦS3 (σ, p). If σ(2) = 2, then the
definition of a coordinated equilibrium implies p3 > p1 and p4 > p1. We know that
1 /∈ {σ(3), σ(4)}. Pick σ′ with σ′(4) = 1 and σ′(3) = σ(3). Since (σ′, p) ∈ BS4 (σ, p) and
σ′R4σ, then σ /∈ ΦS4 (σ, p), a contradiction. Finally, if σ(2) = 4, pick σ′ with σ′(2) = 2
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and σ′(1) = σ(1). Since (σ′, p) ∈ BS2 (σ, p) and σ′R2σ, we get σ /∈ ΦS2 (σ, p), again a
contradiction. Therefore, Case 1 is impossible.
Case 2 : σ(1) = 2
If σ(2) = 3, then σ ∈ BS1 (σ, p) ensures that σ′ ∈ BS1 (σ, p) where σ′ is any allocation
with σ′(1) = 1 and σ′(2) = σ(2) = 3. Since σ′P1σ, we contradict σ ∈ ΦS1 (σ, p). If
σ(2) = 4, pick σ′ with σ′(1) = 1 and σ′(2) = σ(2) = 4. Again, σ′ ∈ BS1 (σ, p) and
σ′R1σ, in contradicts with σ ∈ ΦS1 (σ, p). If σ(2) = 1, the equilibrium property imposes
that p4 > p1 and p3 > p1. Moreover, 1 /∈ {σ(3), σ(4)} while any allocation σ′ with
σ′(4) = 1 and σ′(3) = σ(3) is strong budget feasible for agent 4. Since σ′R4σ, we
contradict σ ∈ ΦS4 (σ, p). Therefore, Case 2 is impossible.
Case 3 : σ(1) = 3
Then 3 /∈ {σ(3), σ(4)} while p1 ≥ p3 . If σ(4) ̸= 1, then pick σ′ with σ′(3) = 3
and σ′(4) = σ(4). Since σ′ ∈ BS3 (σ, p) and σ′R3σ, we contradict σ ∈ ΦS3 (σ, p). Suppose
σ(4) = 1. If σ(3) = 4, then σ(2) = 2. Moreover, σ ∈ ΦS3 (σ, p) requires p2 > p3 and
σ ∈ ΦS2 (σ, p) requires p4 > p2. Thus p4 > p3, in contradiction with σ ∈ BS3 (σ, p).
If σ(3) = 2, then σ(2) = 4. Pick σ′ with σ′(1) = 1 and σ′(2) = σ(2) = 4. Since
σ′ ∈ BS1 (σ, p) and σ′R1σ, we contradict σ ∈ ΦS1 (σ, p). Therefore, Case 3 is impossible.
Case 4 : σ(1) = 4
Budget feasibility implies p1 ≥ p4. Suppose p1 = p4. Then σ ∈ ΦS4 (σ, p) implies
σ(4) = 1. If σ(2) = 3 and σ(3) = 2 then any σ′ with σ′(1) = 1 and σ′(2) = σ(2) = 3
belongs to BS1 (σ, p), and σ′R1σ contradicts σ ∈ ΦS1 (σ, p). If σ(2) = 2 and σ(3) = 2, then
σ ∈ ΦS2 (σ, p) implies p3 > p2. Thus good 2 is affordable for individual 3, and this is not
compatible with σ ∈ ΦS3 (σ, p). This shows that p1 > p4, which implies that σ(4) ̸= 1.
This in turn implies that σ(3) = 3 and σ(2) = 1, in contradiction with σ ∈ ΦS2 (σ, p).
Thus, Case 4 is impossible. This shows that EScoor(E) = ∅.
Example 4 involves non-responsive preferences. We show that under coalition res-
ponsiveness, the well-known top-trading cycle algorithm always ends up at a strong
selfish equilibrium allocation. We briefly recall how the algorithm works. A top-trading
cycle (hereafter ttc) sequence T ttc is a collection of sets {T k}k=1,...,K where
- for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}, T k = {ik1, ..., ikM(k)} satisfies ikm+1 ≻ikm i and ik1 ≻ikM(k) i for all
m = 1, ...,M(k) and for all i ∈ Gk = G\⋃1≤k′<k T k′
- GK+1 = ∅
A ttc allocation σttc assigns goods to individuals consistently with a top-trading
sequence. Hence, σttc(ikm) = ikm+1 and σttc(ikM(k)) = ik1 for all k ∈ {1, ..., K} and all
m ∈ {1, ...,M(k)}. A ttc allocation results from a multi-stage trade procedure where
each agent is involved in one and only one stage, and is assigned her most preferred good
among the goods available at that stage. It is well-known that standard Shapley-Scarf
markets without indifference admit a unique ttc allocation.
Proposition 2.3.11 ESself (E), EScoop(E) and EScoor(E) are not empty in any E =<
N, C, π > where π ∈ ΠCR.
56
2.3. RESULTS
Proof 2.3.11 By definition of ΠCR, each individual i has a linear order ≻i over goods.
Pick one ttc sequence T = {T k}k=1,...,K, and consider the associated ttc allocation
σttc. By construction, either σttc(i) = i or σttc(i) ≻i i for all i ∈ I. By coalition
responsiveness, σttc ∈ Σ(σ0, π). Define for i ∈ I the number k(i) = {k ∈ {1, ..., K} :
i ∈ T k}. Moreover, define p ∈ RN+ by ∀i ∈ I, pi = 1k(i) . Suppose that (σttc, p) /∈
ESself (E). Let H = {i ∈ I : σttc /∈ argmaxBS
C(i)(p)
Ri}, and let i∗ ∈ H with k(i∗) ≤ k(i)
for all i ∈ H. Since there exists σ ∈ BSC(i∗)(p) such that σPi∗σttc while π ∈ ΠCR,
either σ(i∗) ≻i∗ σttc(i∗) or σ(j∗) ≻j∗ σttc(j∗) where j∗ ∈ C(i∗). If σ(i∗) ≻i∗ σttc(i∗)
then σ(i∗) /∈ Gk(i∗). This implies that pσ(i∗) > 1k(i∗) = pi∗, and thus σ /∈ BSiC(i∗)(p), a
contradiction. Similarly, if σ(j∗) ≻j∗ σ(j∗), then σ(j∗) /∈ Gk(j∗), so that pσ(j∗) > 1k(j∗) =
pj∗, which contradicts σ ∈ BSC(i∗)(p). Therefore, (σttc, p) ∈ ESself (E). By Proposition 1,
we deduce that EScoop(E) ̸= ∅ and EScoor(E) ̸= ∅.
Observe that responsiveness does not ensure the existence of strong selfish equilibria.
For instance, consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and π is a responsive
profile such as below
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3, 4
(3, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4)
(1, 3) (1, 2) (3, 4)
(1, 2) ... ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Note that Σ(σ0, p) = {σ0}, while (σ0, p) ∈ ESself (E) implies p1 > p3 > p1, which is
impossible. By Proposition 6.2, we get ESself (E) = ∅.
It is well-known that standard Shapley-Scarf market without indifference have a
unique competitive equilibrium allocation, which is the outcome of a top-trading se-
quence. This is no longer true with coalitional trade, as shown by the following example.
Example 2.3.4 Define E =< 6, C, π > by C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}}, and
π =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6
(2, 3) (4, 5) (6, 1)
(3, 2) (5, 4) (1, 6)
(1, 3) (3, 5) (5, 1)
(1, 2) (3, 4) (5, 6)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where π can be made coalition responsive w.r.t. linear orders over goods
- i = 1, 2 : 3 ≻i 2 ≻i 1 ≻i ...
- i = 3, 4 : 5 ≻i 4 ≻i 3 ≻i ...
- i = 5, 6 : 1 ≻i 6 ≻i 5 ≻i ...
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The ttc allocation is σttc = (3, 2, 5, 4, 1, 6), and (σttc, p) ∈ ESself (E) with p = (2, 1, 2, 1).
Now (σ, p) ∈ ESself (E) with σ = (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1) and p = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Observe that σttc
is not Pareto optimal, since σPiσ
ttc for all i.
2.3.3.2 Weak equilibria
Under weak budget feasibility, coalition responsiveness no longer ensures the exis-
tence of selfish equilibria, as shown in the following example.
Example 2.3.5 Consider E =< 8, C, π > where C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, {7, 8}}, π
is the joint and responsive (hence coalition responsive) profile below :
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(7, 2) (2, 4) (3, 6) (7, 4)
(7, 3) (2, 1) (8, 6) (7, 5)
(1, 2) (5, 4) (3, 8) (8, 4)
... (3, 4) (5, 6) (7, 8)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
By Proposition 6, EWself (E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π). Moreover, Σ(σ0, π) contains the 4 allocations
σ0, σ1 = (7, 3, 2, 1, 5, 6, 8, 4), σ2 = (1, 2, 5, 4, 3, 6, 7, 8), and σ3 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 6, 7, 5). If
(σ1, p) ∈ EWself (E), then one must have p8 + p6 > p5 + p6 and p7 + p5 > p7 + p8, which
is impossible. Similarly,
- if (σ2, p) ∈ EWself (E), one must have p8+p4 > p7+p8 and p3+p7 > p1+p2 > p3+p4
- if (σ3, p) ∈ EWself (E), then p5 > p3 > p5
- if (σ0, p) ∈ EWself (E), then p3 > p5 > p3
All situations being impossible, we conclude that EWself (E) = ∅.
We show the existence of weak cooperative equilibria under the assumption of weak
lexicographic preferences. Since weak cooperative equilibrium allocations belong to the
coalitional Core (by proposition 9.1), we strengthen the main result of Dog˘an et al.
(2011), which prove the non-emptiness of the coalitional Core under lexicographic joint
preferences. The proof is given for a coalition structure involving couples, and, at the
cost of additional notations, it can be adapted to any coalition structure. It is based on a
modified version of the ttc algorithm. Given any i, we denote C(i) = {i, c(i)}. Pick any
weak lexicographic profile π together with any non-empty subset J of goods. We define
a J-ttc w.r.t. allocation σ as an ordered subset of individuals T (J, σ) = {ik}1≤k≤K such
that :
— For all 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, σ(ik+1) = γik(J), and γiK (J) ∈ {σ(i1), σ(c(i1))}
— For all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, C(ik) ∩ T (J, σ) = {ik}
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A J-ttc T (J, σ) involves at most one partner in each couple. Individual in T (J, σ)
point to the individual endowed by σ with the (necessarily unique) priority good in J
she wishes either for herself or for her partner. Moreover, the last individual iK points
either to i1 or to c(i1). Clearly, one can always find a path i1 → i2 → ... → iK such
that either i1 or c(i1) has priority good for individual iK , and such that the priority
good for each individual ik, where 1 ≤ k < K, is the one owned by neither ik′ nor c(ik′)
with k′ < k. Therefore, a J−ttc exists for all J . Note that a J−ttc is a singleton {i} if
either σ(i) = γi(J) or σ(c(i)) = γi(J).
Given any J-ttc T (J, σ) w.r.t. σ, the allocation σT (J,σ) is defined by :
(1) ∀C ∈ C such that C ∩ T (J, σ) = ∅, σT (J,σ)(C) = σ(C)
(2) For all k ∈ {1, ..., K}, σT (J,σ)(ik) = γik(J)
(3) For all k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1}, σT (J,σ)(c(ik)) = σ(c(ik))
(4) σT (J,σ)(c(i1)) =
{
σ(i1) if σ(c(i1)) = σ(c(i1))
σ(c(i1)) if σ(c(i1)) = σ(i1)
}
The allocation σT (J,σ) endows individuals in T (J, σ) with the priority good they
each point to, and their partners, maybe except the first one, keeps their current good.
The partner c(i1) of the first individual i1 keeps also her current good if iK gets the
current good σ(i1) of i1, and gets her partner’s good σ(i1) if iK gets σ(c(i1). For an
illustration, consider the following example.
Example 2.3.6 Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and where π is
the weak lexicographic profile below
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(4, 3) (3, 1) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(2, 4) (2, 3) (3, 2) (3, 2)
(4, 1) (3, 4) (2, 4) (4, 2)
(3, 1) (2, 4) (1, 3) (4, 1)
(2, 3) (4, 1) (4, 1) (3, 4)
(2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) ...
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
There are two G-ttc w.r.t. σ0, T (G, σ0) = {1, 4} and T ′(G, σ0) = {2, 3}, respectively
leading to σT (G,σ
0) = (4, 1, 3, 2) and σT ′(G,σ0) = (1, 3, 2, 4). Note that the set of goods
traded through a J-ttc may not coincide with the set of involved individuals : goods
2 and 4 are traded through T (G, σ0), which involves individuals 1 and 4. This only
happens when the last individual in the cycle points to the good owned by the partner
of the first individual in the cycle.
The modified ttc algorithm consists in forming successive J-ttc, starting with J =
G, and continuing with nested subsets of goods and individuals, some goods being
definitely assigned on the way. Formally, the algorithm operates as follows :
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Stage 1 : Form a G-ttc T 1w.r.t. σ0, and define σ1 = σT 1(G,σ0). Then remove from
G all priority goods involved in T 1, that is the set L1 = {x ∈ G : x = γi(G) for
some i ∈ T 1}, and define G2 = G\L1. Remove from I all individuals in T 1, and define
I2 = I\T 1. Clearly, |G2| = N − |T 1| = |I2|. For each i ∈ I2 with c(i) ∈ T 1, we adopt
the following convention : γi(G2) is a good x ∈ G2 which maximizes Rc(i) in the subset
of allocations Σ2 = {σ ∈ Σ : σ({i, c(i)}) ∈ {(y, σ1(c(i)), (σ1(c(i), y))} with y ∈ G2}. In
case of indifference in Rc(i), i uses her own preferences as tie-breaking criterion, or any
arbitrary one in case i is also indifferent between several goods.
...
Stage s : Define Gs = G\∪1≤s′≤s−1Ls′ and Is = I\∪1≤s′≤s−1 T s′ . Define allocation
σs−1 by : for all C ∈ C,
- If C ⊆ Is, then σs−1(C) = σ0(C) = (i, c(i))
- If C ∩ Is ̸= ∅ and C ∩ T s′ ̸= ∅ for some 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s− 1, then σs−1(C) = σs′(C)
- If C ∩ T s′ ∩ T s′′ ̸= ∅ for some 1 ≤ s′′ < s′ ≤ s− 1, then σs−1(C) = σs′(C)
Form a Gs-ttc T s ⊆ Is w.r.t. σs−1 , and define σs = σT s(Gs,σs−1). Remove from
Gs all priority goods in T s, that is the set Ls = {x ∈ Gs : x = γi(Gs) for some
i ∈ T s}, and define Gs+1 = Gs\Ls, Is+1 = Is\T s. Clearly, |Gs+1| = |Gs| − |T s| =
|Is+1|. Finally, for each i ∈ Is+1 with c(i) ∈ T s, define γi(Gs) as a good x ∈ Gs
such that either (g, σs(c(i)) or (σs(c(i), g)) which maximizes Rc(i) in Σs = {σ ∈ Σ :
σ({i, c(i)}) ∈ {(y, σs(c(i)), (σs(c(i), y)) with y ∈ Gs+1}. In case of indifference, i uses
her own preferences as tie-breaking criterion, or any arbitrary one in case i is also
indifferent between several goods.
...
We proceed to the next step s+1 as long as |Gs+1| > 0. Since G is finite, and since
at each step, at least one individual receives her final good, the algorithm terminates in
S ≤ N steps. The final outcome σS is defined as follows : ∀C = {i, c(i)} with c(i) ∈ T s,
i ∈ T s′ , and s < s′,
- σS(C) = (σs′(i), σs(c(i))) if σs′(C) maximizes Rc(i) in Σs′
- σS(C) = (σs(c(i)), σs′(i)) if (σs(c(i)), σs′(i)) maximizes Rc(i) in Σs′
The modified ttc algorithm works as follows. At each stage s, exactly one Gs-ttc
T s is formed, where Gs is the set of goods available for trade. Each individual i in
T s gets her priority good in restriction to Gs. Her partner keeps her current good,
except maybe the partner of the first individual, who may get her partner’s good.
All assigned priority goods are removed from the set Gs, and are no longer traded
throughout the algorithm, and members of T s are removed from the current set of
individuals. Moreover, the partner first involved in some cycle dictates her preference to
her partner in all subsequent stages. This preference resumes to comparing allocations
that keeps the priority good assigned to the couple (only in case of indifference are
partner’s preferences used as tie-breaking rule). Thus, every couple is involved in two
trading cycles, one for each partner. Observe that the allocation of a priority good at
some stage may not be the final one. Indeed, both priority goods are finally assigned
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to the couple so as to maximize the well-being of the one first involved in some ttc.
Consider again example 8, showing the existence of two G-ttc w.r.t. σ0. Pick T 1 =
{1, 4}, leading to allocation σ1 = (4, 1, 3, 2). Then, at the next stage, I2 = {2, 3},
G2 = {1, 3} and individual 2 considers all allocations that assign good 4 either to
individual 1 or to herself, and good 2 to the other couple. Then individual 2 points to
good 3, which makes individual 1 better off than with good 1. Similarly, individual 3
points to good 1, leading to the G2-ttc T 2 = {2, 3}. Since keeping good 4 (resp. 2) is
the best option for individual 1 (resp. 4), the final outcome is σS = (4, 3, 1, 2) = σ2. If
instead T ′1 = {2, 3} is formed, then I2 = G2 = {1, 4}, and σ1 = (1, 3, 2, 4). Individuals
1 and 4 both point to good 1, leading to T ′2 = {1} and σ′2 = (1, 3, 2, 4). Since getting
good 1 (resp. keeping good 2) is the best option for individual 2 (resp. 3), the final
outcome is σ′S = (3, 1, 2, 4).
Proposition 2.3.12 In all E =< N, C, π > with π ∈ ΠWL, a final outcome of the
modified ttc algorithm is a weak cooperative equilibrium allocation.
Proof 2.3.12 Define the price vector p by : for all x ∈ G, px = 12s if and only if
x ∈ Ls, where 1 ≤ s ≤ S. First, observe that pi + pc(i) = pσS(i) + pσS(c(i)) for all i :
σS makes all weak budget constraints binding. To see why, pick any C = {i, c(i)}, and
suppose w.l.o.g. that c(i) ∈ T s and i ∈ T s′, with s < s′. Suppose first that σs(i) =
i. By definition of p, pc(i) = pσs(c(i)) = 12s , and pi = pσs′ (i) =
1
2s′ . Since σ
S(C) ∈
{(σs′(i), σs(c(i)), (σs(c(i), σs′(i)), then pi+ pc(i) = pσS(i)+ pσS(c(i)) = 12s + 12s′ . Similarly,
suppose that σs(i) = c(i). Since i ∈ Ls, then pi = pσs(c(i)) = 12s , and pc(i) = pσs′ (i) = 12s′ ,
and the same conclusion follows.
Suppose that (σS, p) /∈ EWcoop(E). Thus, there exist i and an allocation σ ∈ BWC(i)(p)
such that either [σPiσS and σRc(i)σS] or [σRiσS and σPc(i)σS]. Suppose that C(i) is such
that i ∈ T s and c(i) ∈ T s′, with s′ > s. By construction, γi(Gs) ∈ {σS(i), σS(c(i))}.
Since preferences are weak lexicographic, σRiσ
S implies that either σS(i) ∈ {σ(i), σ(c(i)}
or there exists x /∈ Gs with x ∈ {σ(i), σ(c(i)}. In the latter case, we get px ≥
1
2s−1 ≥ 12s + 12s′ = pi + pc(i), in contradiction with σ ∈ BWC(i)(p). In the former case,
since c(i) gets at stage s′ the priority good in Gs′ according to i’s preference (given
that i already owns γi(Gs)), and since indifferences are eventually broken in favor
of the preference of c(i), there must exist x′ /∈ Gs′ with x′ ∈ {σ(i), σ(c(i)}. Thus,
pσ(i)+pσ(c(i)) ≥ 12s+ 12s′−1 > 12s+ 12s′ = pi+pc(i), again in contradiction with σ ∈ BWC(i)(p).
This completes the proof.
As for strong selfish equilibria, a weak cooperative equilibrium allocation is not
necessarily a final outcome of the modified ttc algorithm (under weak lexicographic
preferences). This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2.3.7 Let E =< 6, C, π > where C = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}}, and where π is
a (weak) lexicographic profile of joint preferences such as below
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⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6
(3, 2) (2, 4) (1, 6)
(3, 5) (1, 4) (5, 6)
(3, 1) (3, 4) (., 6)
(1, 2) ... ...
(1, .)
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Since γ3(G) = γ4(G) = 4 and γ5(G) = γ6(G) = 6, the first two stages of the modified ttc
algorithm leads to removing goods 4 and 6, and, w.l.o.g. individuals 4 and 6, while others
are staying at the initial allocation σ0. Let G2 = {1, 2, 3, 5, 6}, and G3 = {1, 2, 3, 5}.
There is a unique G3-ttc T = {1, 3}, leading to allocation σ3 = (3, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6), G4 =
{1, 5}, and I4 = {2, 5}. The final outcome of the algorithm is σ4 = σS = (3, 5, 2, 4, 1, 6}.
Now consider σ = (3, 2, 1, 4, 5, 6) and p = (2, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1). It is straightforward to check
that (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E), while σ cannot be generated by means of a sequence of modified
ttc.
We turn now to the existence of weak coordinated equilibria. First, Shapley-Scarf
markets may not admit such equilibria, as shown in the following example.
Example 2.3.8 Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, and π is
described below (two bundles appearing in the same cell being arbitrarily ranked) :
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3, 4
(3, 2); (2, 3) (3, 2); (2, 3) (3, 1); (1, 3)
(3, 4); (4, 3) (3, 4); (4, 3) (2, 4); (4, 2)
(1, 3); (4, 1) (1, 2); (2, 1) (1, 2); (2, 1)
(1, 2); (2, 1) ... (3, 4); (4, 3)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Let (σ, p) ∈ EWcoor(E), and consider all possible allocations :
Suppose first that σ(C1) ∈ {(3, 4), (4, 3)}. Then σ ∈ ΦW1 (σ, p)∩ ΦW2 (σ, p) implies
p3 > p1. Indeed, suppose p1 ≤ p3. If σ(1) = 3, then any allocation σ′ with σ′(C1) = (3, 2)
is weak budget feasible while σ′P2σ, and σ(1) = 4, any allocation σ′ with σ′(C1) = (2, 3)
is weak budget feasible while σ′P1σ. Similarly, σ ∈ ΦW3 (σ, p)∩ ΦW4 (σ, p) implies p2 > p3
and p1 > p4. It follows that p2 > p3 > p1 > p4, which implies p1 + p2 > p3 + p4.
Therefore, σ /∈ BWC2(p), a contradiction.
Suppose σ(1, 2) ∈ {(3, 1), (1, 3)}. If σ(C1) = (1, 3), then σ0 ∈ BWC1(p) and σ0P2σ
contradicts σ ∈ ΦW2 (σ, p). If σ(C1) = (3, 1), then σ′ ∈ BWC1(p) and σ′P2σ contradicts
σ ∈ ΦW1 (σ, p), where σ′ is any allocation with σ′(C1) = (2, 1).
Suppose σ(1, 2) ∈ {(2, 3), (3, 2)}. If σ(C2) = (1, 4), then σ0 ∈ BWC2(p) and σ0P3σ
contradicts σ ∈ ΦW3 (σ, p). If σ(C2) = (4, 3), then σ′ ∈ BWC2(p) and σ′P4σ contradicts
σ ∈ ΦW4 (σ, p), where σ′ is any allocation with σ′(C1) = (4, 1).
62
2.3. RESULTS
Suppose σ(1, 2) ∈ {(2, 4), (4, 2)}. If σ(C1) = (4, 2), then σ0 ∈ BWC1(p) and σ0P1σ
contradicts σ ∈ ΦW1 (σ, p). If σ(C2) = (2, 4), then σ′ ∈ BWC1(p) and σ′P2σ contradicts
σ ∈ ΦW2 (σ, p), where σ′ is any allocation with σ′(C1) = (2, 1).
Suppose σ(1, 2) ∈ {(1, 4), (4, 1)}. If σ(C2) = (3, 2), then σ0 ∈ BWC2(p) and σ0P4σ
contradicts σ ∈ ΦW4 (σ, p). If σ(C2) = (2, 3), then σ′ ∈ BWC2(p) and σ′P3σ contradicts
σ ∈ ΦW3 (σ, p), where σ′ is any allocation with σ′(C1) = (4, 3).
Finally, suppose σ(1, 2) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. If σ(C1) = (1, 2), σ ∈ ΦW1 (σ, p) implies
p3 > p1. If σ(3, 4) = (3, 4), σ ∈ ΦW3 (σ, p) implies p2 > p3. If σ(3, 4) = (4, 3), we
also get p2 > p3 from σ ∈ ΦW4 (σ, p). Thus, p2 > p3 > p2, which is impossible. If
σ(C1) = (2, 1), σ ∈ ΦW1 (σ, p) ∩ ΦW2 (σ, p) implies p3 > p1 and p4 > p2. Furthermore,
σ ∈ ΦW3 (σ, p) ∩ ΦW4 (σ, p) implies p2 > p3. Thus, p2 > p3 > p1 > p4 > p2, which is
impossible.
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 1.3 combined with Proposition 12, we
get a sufficient condition for the existence of weak coordinated equilibria :
Proposition 2.3.13 In all E =< N, C, π > where π ∈ ΠWL ∩ ΠCR , the modified ttc
algorithm terminates at a weak coordinated equilibrium allocation.
Finally, a weak selfish equilibrium may fail to exist under (weak) lexicographic
preferences, as shown by the following example.
Example 2.3.9 Let E =< 4, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4},and π is the
lexicographic profile below
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(2, 1) (1, 2) (4, 3) (3, 4)
(2, 3) ... (4, 2) ...
(2, 4) (4, 1)
(1, 2) (3, 4)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
By Proposition 6.2, EWself (E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π), while Σ(σ0, π) has σ0 as unique element.
However, σ0 /∈ EWself (E). Indeed, if (1, 2) ∈ BWC1(p) for some price vector p, then (2, 1) ∈
BWC1(p) while (2, 1) P1 (1, 2). Therefore (1, 2) /∈ argmaxBWC1 (p)R1, which shows that
EWself (E) = ∅.
2.3.4 Maximal domains
We have shown the existence of strong selfish (resp. weak cooperative) equilibria
under coalition responsive (resp. weakly lexicographic) preferences. An interesting ques-
tion is whether these domains are maximal. A preference domain D ⊂ Π is maximal
for some property α if α is satisfied for all profiles selected from D, and is violated
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when D is enlarged with any preference not in D. A related, although not equivalent,
approach is followed by Dog˘an et al. (2011) for Shapley-Scarf markets with joint and
discriminatory preferences. Given two linear orders P, P ′ over Σ, define the lexicogra-
phic index of P by L(P ) = min{dK(P, P ′) : P ′ is lexicographic}, where dK stands for
the Kemeny distance. Hence, the lexicographic index of P is the minimal number of
pairwise comparisons of allocations to be reverted for the lexicographic property to
hold. The minimal departure from the lexicographic property is associated with a lexi-
cographic index 1. Dog˘an et al. (2011, Proposition 3 page 65) prove that the coalitional
Core (and hence, by Proposition 9.1, the set of weakly cooperative equilibria) may be
empty in some market where all preferences but one are lexicographic, and where the
non-lexicographic preference has an index 1. Now consider profile π below involving 2
couples :
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4
(2, 3) (4, 3)
(4, 3) (4, 2)
(3, 1) (4, 1)
(1, 3) (1, 3)
(4, 1) (2, 3)
(2, 1) (3, 4)
(1, 2) ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Clearly, preferences of 1 and 2 have lexicographic index 1, while preferences of 3
and 4 are lexicographic. Moreover, preferences of 1 and 2 are weak lexicographic. By
Proposition 12, there exists a weak cooperative equilibrium. And by Proposition 9.1 the
coalitional Core is non-empty. This implies that the domain of lexicographic preferences
is not maximal for the existence of weak cooperative equilibria (and coalitional Core).
However, Proposition 14 shows maximality holds for weak lexicographic preferences if
there are enough goods (see Appendix 5.1 for the proof). .
Proposition 2.3.14 If N ≥ 10, ΠWL is maximal for the existence of weak cooperative
equilibria.
We end up this section with showing that the coalition responsive domain is maximal
for the existence of strong selfish equilibria. The proof of Proposition 15 is postponed
to Appendix 5.2.
Proposition 2.3.15 If N ≥ 8, then ΠCR is maximal for the existence of strong selfish
equilibria.
2.4 Further comments
We conclude this paper with three additional comments.
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(1) Proposition 11 states that the standard ttc algorithm always terminates at a
strong selfish equilibrium when preferences are coalition responsive. Roth (1982) was
the first to show that, in the original Shapley-Scarf market, the ttc algorithm defines a
strategy-proof allocation mechanism. This is no longer the case with coalitional trade,
even in the case of joint preferences, as shown by the following example.
Example 2.4.1 Let E =< 4, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, and
π =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4
(4, 3) (3, 1)
(2, 3) (3, 4)
(2, 4) ...
(4, 2)
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Clearly, one may complete π so as to ensure coalition responsiveness (with linear orders
over goods such as 4 ≻1 2 ≻1 1 ≻1 3, 3 ≻2 4 ≻2 2 ≻2 1, 3 ≻3 ... , and 1 ≻4 4 ≻4 ... . The
outcome of the ttc algorithm is σ∗ = (4, 2, 3, 1). If individual 1 reports any (coalition
responsive) preference with (2, 3) at top instead of her true preference, the ttc outcome
becomes σ = (2, 4, 3, 1), and misrepresenting is worthwhile since σP1σ∗.
Proposition 12 states that the modified ttc algorithm ends up at a weak cooperative
equilibrium allocation if preferences are weakly lexicographic. A simple example shows
that, as for the standard ttc algorithm, the modified one fails at satisfying strategy-
proofness.
Example 2.4.2 Let E =< 8, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6}, C4 =
{7, 8}}, and
π =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(5, 3) (1, 4) (1, 6) (3, 8)
(., 3) (1, .) (5, 6) (7, 8)
(1, 2) (2, .) ... ...
... (3, 4) ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Clearly, π can be completed in order to satisfy the weak lexicographic property. In a first
stage of the modified algorithm, one can get allocation σ1 = (3, 2, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). Since
all individuals but 2 point to their own goods at stage 2, one gets as final outcome
σS = (2, 3, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). If individual 1 reports any (lexicographic) preference with
(5, 3) P1 (5, .) P1 (1, 2) P1... instead of her true preference, one gets at stage 1 σ′1 =
(5, 2, 3, 4, 1, 6, 7, 8). At stage 2, individuals 2 and 3 point to each other, leading to σ′2 =
(5, 3, 2, 4, 1, 6, 7, 8), which is the final outcome. Since σ′2P1σS, strategy-proof is violated.
(2) Under weak lexicographic preferences, the modified ttc algorithm may not ter-
minate at a weak selfish equilibrium allocation (see example 11). An open problem is
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finding a domain restriction ensuring the existence of weak selfish equilibria. Note that
assuming uniform preferences does not give such a domain, as show in
Example 2.4.3 Consider E =< 4, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, C3 =
{5, 6}, C4 = {7, 8}}, and for all i ∈ N , Ri is such that (5, 2) Pi (1, 4) Pi (1, 2) Pi
(3, 2) Pi (3, 7) Pi (3, 4) Pi (4, 6) Pi (1, 6) Pi (5, 6) Pi (5, 8) Pi (7, 8) ... . Since all indi-
viduals have the same preferences, then any σ ∈ EWcoop(E) must be individually rational.
To see why, note joint preferences imply that EWcoop(E) = EWself (E) for all E. Moreover,
proposition 7.1 shows that EWcoop(E) ̸= ∅ under joint preferences. The four individually
rational allocations are : σ0, σ1 = (1, 4, 3, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8), σ2 = (5, 2, 3, 4, 1, 6, 7, 8), and
σ3 = (1, 2, 3, 7, 4, 6, 5, 8).
Then (σ0, p) ∈ EWcoop(E) and (σ1, p) ∈ EWcoop(E) both imply p5 > p1 > p5 (since
σ′P1σ0 and σ′P2σ0 for all σ′ with σ′(C1) = (5, 2), and since σ′′P5σ0 and σ′′P6σ0 for all
σ′′ with σ′′(C3) = (1, 6)). Similarly, (σ2, p) ∈ EWcoop(E) implies p7 > p4 > p5 > p7, while
(σ3, p) ∈ EWcoop(E) implies p4 > p2 > p4. Thus EWcoop(E) = ∅, and therefore EWself (E) = ∅
by Proposition 1.
(3) It is well-known that in standard Shapley-Scarf markets, an allocation is a
competitive equilibrium allocation if and only if it is the outcome of the ttc algorithm.
Moreover, when preferences over goods are linear orders, there is a unique competitive
allocation. We have shown that Shapley-Scarf markets with coalitional trade may have
multiple strong and weak equilibrium allocations. This leads to the following questions :
- In all markets with coalition responsive preferences, the outcome of the ttc algo-
rithm is a strong selfish equilibrium allocation. Since this outcome is necessarily unique
under coalition responsive preferences, we may find strong selfish equilibria that are
not obtained by means of the ttc algorithm. By construction, all these allocations are
associated with a set of trading cycles. Can we characterize all sets of trading cycles
that are associated with strong selfish equilibria ?
- In all markets with weakly lexicographic preferences, the outcome of the modified
ttc algorithm is a weak cooperative equilibrium allocation, but the reverse implica-
tion does not hold (see example 9). Can we characterize weak cooperative equilibrium
allocations which are not outcomes of the generalized ttc algorithm?
2.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 14
Given w, x, y, z ∈ G, denote by {x, y}δ R {w, z}δ a situation where either (x, y) R
(w, z) or (y, x) R (w, z) or (x, y) R (z, w) or (y, x) R (z, w). If R is a preference that is
not weakly lexicographic, P must satisfy one of the two following properties :
(1) there exist w, x, y, z ∈ G such that one of the two conditions below holds
(1.1) {x, y}δ P {w, z}δ P {w, y}δ
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(1.2) {x, y}δ P {x, z}δ P {w, y}δ
(2) there exist v, w, x, y, z ∈ G such that {x, y}δ P {v, w}δ P {z, y}δ
Pick any number of goods N ≥ 8, and pick a preference P satisfying property (1.1).
Since one can assign this preference to any individual, there is no loss of generality
with assuming that P is such that {2, 5}δ P {1, 4}δ P {1, 2}δ.
Consider E =< 8, C, π > where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6}, C4 = {7, 8}}
and
π =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(5, 2) (3, 2) (4, 6) (5, 8)
(1, 4) (3, 7) (1, 6) (7, 8)
(1, 2) (3, 4) (5, 6) ...
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
For any N > 8, we can extend π by adding up couples where both partners rank σ0
without harming the argument. Dog˘an et al. (2011, proposition 2, page 65) use π (up
to a relabeling of goods) to show that Ωcoal(E) = ∅. By Proposition 9.1, we conclude
that EWcoop(E˜) = ∅.
Now pick any number of individuals N ≥ 10, and pick a preference P satisfying
property (1.2). Using the same trick as above, we can assume that (9, 2) P (9, 7) P (1, 2),
and consider a market involving exactly 10 individuals. Consider E ′ =< 10, C, π′ >
where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6}, C4 = {7, 8}}, C5 = {9, 10}, and
π′ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10
(9, 2) (3, 7) (4, 6) (2, 8) (7, 10)
(9, 7) (3, 5) (1, 6) (9, 8) (1, 10)
(1, 2) (3, 4) (5, 6) (7, 8) (9, 10)
... ... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
By Proposition 7.1, EWcoop(E ′) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π). The reader will check that Σ(σ0, π) =
{σ0, ..., σ6}, where
- σ1 = (9, 2, 3, 5, 4, 6, 7, 8, 1, 10)
- σ2 = (9, 7, 3, 4, 5, 6, 2, 8, 1, 10)
- σ3 = (9, 7, 3, 5, 4, 6, 2, 8, 1, 10)
- σ4 = (1, 2, 3, 5, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
- σ5 = (1, 2, 3, 5, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
- σ6 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 8, 7, 10)
Consider σ ∈ {σ0, σ2, σ6}. If (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′), then σ ∈ OWC2(p) ∩ OWC3(p) implies
p5 > p4 > p5, which is impossible. Similarly, consider σ ∈ {σ1, σ5}. If (σ, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′),
then σ ∈ OWC4(p) ∩ OWC5(p) implies p9 > p7 > p9. If (σ4, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′), then σ4 ∈
OWC1(p) ∩ OWC5(p) implies p9 > p1 > p9.
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Finally, suppose (σ3, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′). Since σ3 ∈ BWC1(p)∩BWC4 , then p1+ p2 ≥ p7+ p9
and p7 ≥ p2. Thus p1 + p2 ≥ p2 + p9, in contradiction with σ ∈ OWC1(p). This proves
that EWcoop(E ′) = ∅.
Finally, pick any N ≥ 8, and consider a preference P satisfying property (2). Again
by the same trick, we can assume that (5, 2) P (7, 4) P (1, 2), and restrict attention
to a market involving exactly 8 goods. Consider E ′′ =< 8, C, π′′ > where C1 = {1, 2},
C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6}, C4 = {7, 8}, and
π′′ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(5, 2) (3, 2) (4, 6) (5, 8)
(7, 4) (3, 5) (1, 6) (1, 8)
(1, 2) (3, 7) (5, 6) (7, 8)
... (3, 4) ... ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Again, by Proposition 7.1, EWcoop(E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π). The reader will check that Σ(σ0, π) =
{σ0, ..., σ6}, where
- σ1 = (5, 2, 3, 7, 4, 6, 1, 8)
- σ2 = (5, 2, 3, 4, 1, 6, 7, 8)
- σ3 = (7, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6, 5, 8)
- σ4 = (7, 4, 3, 2, 5, 6, 1, 8)
- σ5 = (1, 2, 3, 7, 4, 6, 5, 8)
- σ6 = (1, 2, 3, 5, 4, 6, 7, 8)
Then (σ1, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′′) implies p5 ≤ p1 ≤ p7, which makes bundle {5, 8} bud-
get feasible for couple {7, 8}, in contradiction with σ1 ∈ OWC4(p). Moreover, (σ2, p) ∈
EWcoop(E ′′) implies p5 > p4 > p5, an impossibility. If (σ3, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′′), budget feasi-
bility for all couples requires p1 = p5, in contradiction with σ3 ∈ OWC1(p). Moreover,
(σ4, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′′) implies p5 > p1 > p5. If (σ5, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′′), then budget feasibi-
lity requires p4 = p5 = p7, while σ5 ∈ OWC2(p) requires p5 > p4, a contradiction. If
(σ6, p) ∈ EWcoop(E ′′), one has p4 = p5 by budget feasibility. Then σ6 ∈ OWC1(p) ∩ OWC4(p)
implies p5 > p1 > p7, while σ
6 ∈ OWC2(p) implies p2 > p4. Thus p1 + p2 > p4 + p7. Since
(7, 4) is budget feasible for C1, one contradicts σ6 ∈ OWC1(p). Finally, σ0 /∈ Ωcoal(E) (since
I is a (σ3, σ0)−blocking coalition), we conclude by Proposition 9.1 that σ0 /∈ EWcoop(E ′′).
This shows that EWcoop(E ′′) = ∅, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 15
Two possible violations of coalition responsiveness must be considered : either res-
ponsiveness does not hold, or responsiveness holds but coalition responsiveness does
not. Consider the first type of violation. Pick a non-responsive preference R. By defini-
tion, there exist w, x, y, z ∈ G such that one of the two following property is satisfied :
(1) either (w, x) P (z, y) P (w, y) P (z, x) (1.1) or (x,w) P (y, z) P (y, w) P (x, z)
(1.2)
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(2) either (w, x) P (w, y) P (z, y) P (z, x) (2.1) or (x,w) P (y, w) P (y, z) P (x, z)
(2.2)
Suppose property (1.1) is satisfied. We can assume w.l.o.g. that (5, 2) P (1, 4) P
(5, 4) P (1, 2).
Let N ≥ 8. Suppose for a while that neither (2, 4) nor (4, 2) is ranked between
(5, 2) and (1, 2). Consider E =< 8, C, π >, where C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6},
C4 = {7, 8}, and
π =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(5, 2) (3, 2) (4, 6) (5, 8)
(1, 4) (3, 7) (1, 6) (7, 8)
(5, 4) (3, 4) (5, 6) ...
(1, 2) ... ... ...
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
As in the proof above, for any N > 8, we can extend π by adding up couples where
both partners rank σ0 without harming the argument. Observe that E is very similar
to the market considered in example 4. By Proposition 7.1, EScoop(E) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π). It is
easy to check that Σ(σ0, π) = {σ0, ..., σ4} where
- σ1 = (1, 4, 3, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- σ2 = (5, 2, 3, 4, 1, 6, 7, 8)
- σ3 = (1, 2, 3, 7, 4, 6, 5, 8)
- σ4 = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6, 7, 8)
Using the same argument as in example 4, we get that σ ∈ EScoop(E) only if σ = σ4.
If (σ4, p) ∈ EScoop(E), then strong budget feasibility implies that p5 ≤ p1. This implies
that bundle (5, 2) ∈ BSC1(p), while (5, 2) P1 (5, 4) and (5, 2) P2 (5, 4). This contradicts
σ4 ∈ OSC1(p). Thus EScoop(E) = ∅, and therefore EScoop(E) = ∅. By Proposition 1.1,
ESself (E) = ∅.
Now if (2, 4) and/or (4, 2) is ranked in R1 and in R2 between (5, 2) and (1, 2), this
leads to at most two additional individually rational allocations σ5 = (2, 4, 3, 7, 1, 6, 5, 8)
and σ6 = (4, 2, 3, 7, 1, 6, 5, 8). Strong budget feasibility for σ5 implies p1 = p2 = p4 =
p7 = p5, in contradiction with σ5 ∈ OSC3(p). Similarly, budget feasibility for σ6 implies
p1 = p4 = p5 = p7, in contradiction with σ6 ∈ OSC1(p).
If property (1.2) holds, the same proof applies, provided we swap goods in all bundles
listed in π.
The reader will check that the same argument applies to property 2. Indeed, swap-
ping bundles (1, 4) and (5, 4) in the preferences of individuals 1 and 2 does not alter
the argument.
Consider now the case of a responsive preference that is not coalition responsive.
This prevails when a coalition contains two individuals with mutually incompatible
responsive preferences. Using the same trick as above, we can restrict attention to a
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market containing exactly 8 goods.
Assume w.l.o.g. that (1, 4) P1 (5, 4) P1 (1, 2), while 2 has responsive preferences
such that (5, 2) P2 (5, 4). Consider the market E ′ =< 8, C, π′ >, where C1 = {1, 2},
C2 = {3, 4}, C3 = {5, 6}, C4 = {7, 8}, and
π′ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8
(1, 4) ... (3, 2) (4, 6) (5, 8)
(5, 4) (5, 2) (3, 7) (1, 6) (7, 8)
(1, 2) ... (3, 4) (5, 6) ...
... (5, 4) ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
By Proposition 6.2, ESself (E ′) ⊆ Σ(σ0, π′). Moreover, Σ(σ0, π′\R2) = {σ0, ..., σ3} where
- σ1 = (1, 4, 3, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- σ2 = (5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6, 7, 8)
- σ3 = (1, 2, 3, 7, 4, 6, 5, 8)
Since R2 is responsive, then (1, 2) P2 (1, 4). Thus σ1 /∈ Σ(σ0, π′), which implies
σ1 /∈ ESself (E ′). If (σ2, p) ∈ ESself (E ′), we get from strong budget feasibility that p1 = p5
and p2 ≥ p4. Thus (5, 4) ∈ BSC1(p), and (5, 4) /∈ argmaxBSC1 (p)R2, a contradiction. If
(σ3, p) ∈ ESself (E ′), (1, 2) ∈ argmaxBSC1 (p)R1 implies p4 > p2. Since (3, 2) ∈ B
S
C2(p), then
(3, 7) /∈ argmaxBS3 (p)R3, a contradiction. If (σ0, p) ∈ ESself (E ′), we get again p4 > p2,
and thus (3, 4) /∈ argmaxBSC2 (p)R3, a contradiction. This shows that E
S
self (E ′) = ∅.
Observe that we can insert in R1 any bundle containing good x ∈ {3, 6, 8} without
modifying the argument.
If (5, 4) P1 (5, 2) P1 (1, 2) we get σ4 = (5, 2, 3, 4, 1, 6, 7, 8) as additional candi-
date for equilibrium. If (σ4, p) ∈ ESself (E ′), we get from (3, 4) ∈ argmaxBSC2 (p)R3
that p2 > p4. It follows that (1, 4) ∈ BSC1(p). Since (1, 4) P1 (5, 2), we contradict
(5, 2) ∈ argmaxBSC1 (p)R1.
Suppose that (2, 4) and/or (4, 2) is ranked in R1 at least as high as (1, 2). Consi-
der bundle (2, 4), which creates one additional candidate σ5 = (2, 4, 3, 7, 1, 6, 5, 8) for
equilibrium. If (σ5, p) ∈ ESself (E ′), we get from (3, 7) ∈ argmaxBSC2 (p)R3 that p2 > p4,
and from (1, 6) ∈ argmaxBSC3 (p)R5 that p4 > p5. Since (1, 6) ∈ B
S
C3(p), p5 ≥ p1. Thus
p2 > p1, in contradiction with (2, 4) ∈ BSC1(p). Consider bundle (4, 2), which creates
candidate σ6 = (4, 2, 3, 7, 1, 6, 5, 8). The argument just above leads to p4 > p1, in
contradiction with (4, 2) ∈ BSC1(p). This completes the proof.
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Chapitre 3
Characterization of Competitive
Equilibria in Shapley-Scarf Markets
with Coalitional Trade
Abstract : Aslan and Laine´ (2018) introduce three types of competitive equilibrium in
Shapley-Scarf markets where trades are organized among couples of individuals. They
prove that for each equilibrium type the Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) algorithm always
finds an equilibrium allocation. TTC corresponds to the construction of a specific se-
quence of trading cycles. Moreover, they show the existence of equilibrium allocations
that are not TTC outcomes. In this note, we characterize for each equilibrium type the
set of trading cycle sequences which implement equilibrium allocations. 1
Keywords: Shapley Scarf markets - Competitive equilibrium - Top trading cycles
3.1 Introduction
Shapley-Scarf markets relate to barter systems involving purely indivisible goods
(Shapley and Scarf, 1974). In such markets, there are finitely many individuals, each
owning one specific indivisible good and ranking all goods according to some (weak)
preference order. Trades ensure that everyone ends up with exactly one good. Shapley
and Scarf (1974) show that the core of such a market is non-empty and contains the
set of competitive allocations. Moreover, they show that the set of allocations that are
reached by means of the so-called Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC) algorithm (attributed to
David Gale) coincides with the set of competitive allocations.
TTC is a desirable algorithm to guide the trade : at every step, TTC first lets every
remaining agent point to his most preferred remaining good and every remaining ob-
ject point to its owner, then trades every cycle by letting agents in the cycle obtain the
objects they point to. As an algorithm, it can be run by a simple computer code. As a
1. This is a joint work with Jean Laine´ of CNAM-LIRSA, Paris, France
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function from the set of problems to the set of solutions, TTC finds the unique strict
core allocation (i.e., defined by weak domination) 2, and is the unique mechanism that
satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and Pareto efficiency (Ma, 1994).
These merits help TTC at becoming prominent in the market design literature. Many
papers have extended TTC to other models including, to name a few, on-campus hou-
sing allocation (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999), school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003), Morrill (2013, 2015), kidney exchange (Roth et al.,(2004)), and tuition
and worker exchange (Dur and U¨nver (2019)).
TTC also plays an important role in Shapley-Scarf markets with coalition structure
introduced in Aslan and Laine˙ (2018). They assume that
— the set of individuals is partitioned into couples, each individual paying attention
to the good assigned to her partner,
— individuals have preferences over allocations defined by weak orders that make
indifferent any two allocations assigning the same goods to their coalition,
— given any price vector, coalition budget sets contain all vectors of goods such
that the one assigned to an individual is priced less than her initially owned
one. 3
Three concepts of competitive equilibrium are considered, each being related to the
type of cooperation prevailing among partners. An allocation σ is a selfish equilibrium
allocation there is a price vector for which each individual maximizes her utility within
her coalition budget set. Moreover, σ is a cooperative equilibrium allocation if it assigns
each coalition a budget-constrained Pareto optimal vector of goods. Furthermore, σ is
a coordinated equilibrium allocation if it satisfies all coalition budget constraints and
maximizes each individual’s satisfaction given what her partners are endowed with.
Interesting enough, TTC finds an equilibrium allocation which can be implemented
as an equilibrium of all three types provided preferences over allocations are coalition
responsive. Coalition responsiveness means the existence for each partner of a linear
order over goods that is consistent with preferences over allocations in the following
sense : getting a good better for one partner makes every coalition member better off.
While TTC guarantees the existence of equilibria, they are not unique. Therefore, TTC
no longer characterizes competitive equilibria.
This contrasts with standard Shapley-Scarf markets. Indeed, Roth and Postlewaite
(1977) show that when indifference is ruled out, TTC yields a competitive allocation,
which is also the unique strict core allocation. 4
Since every allocation can be defined as a set of trading cycles, a natural question
2. Shapley and Scarf (1974) give a simple example showing that the core (defined by strict domination)
may contain several elements. Roth and Postewaite (1977) show that when indifference is ruled out, the strict
core reduces to a singleton, which coincides with the competitive allocation.
3. Aslan and Laine´ (2018) also consider equilibrium concepts with transferable income among partners.
4. When indifferences are allowed on preferences of agents ; there are results that are more general. Wako
(1984) shows that strict core is included in the set of competitive allocations. Wako (1991) shows that every
non-competitive allocation is weakly dominated by some competitive allocation and the non-empty strict core
is unique von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. Further properties of Shapley-Scarf markets may be found in
Roth (1982), Roth (1984), Ma (1994), Bird (1994), So¨nmez (1996), Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999).
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is finding for each type of equilibrium the sets of trading cycles that implement an
equilibrium allocation. This is what this paper aims at. We characterize equilibrium
trading sequences by means of three properties, namely top-balanceness, δ-balanceness
and strong δ-balanceness. Each of these properties is slight alterations of the top-trading
cycle properties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 is devoted to the formal model of
Shapley-Scarf markets with coalitional trade. Competitive equilibrium concepts are
defined in Section 2.2. Coalition responsiveness is formalized in Section 2.3. Characte-
rization results are presented in Section 3. Further comments conclude the paper.
3.2 Shapley-Scarf Markets with Coalitional Trade
3.2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a finite set I = {1, 2, ..., N} of individuals confronting a set G =
{1, 2, ..., N} of purely indivisible goods. Individuals (resp. goods) are denoted by i, j, k
(resp. x, y, z). An allocation σ is a bijection from I to G where σ(i) is the good allocated
to i. There exists an initial allocation σ0 ∈ Σ. Without loss of generality, σ0 is defined
by σ0(i) = i for all i. Under this assumption, allocations are permutations of I. The
set of allocations is denoted by Σ.
There exists an exogenous coalition structure, defined as a partition C = {C1, C2, ..., CM}
of I into non-empty sets. We define C(i) as the element C of C such that i ∈ C. For
coalition C = {i1, ..., iK} with i1 < i2 < ... < iK , we denote by σ(C) = (σ(i1), ..., σ(iK))
the vector of goods σ assigns to the members of C.
For any finite setX,W(X) (resp. L(X)) denotes the set of weak (resp. linear) orders
over X. Each individual i has preferences over allocations represented by Ri ∈ W(Σ),
with asymmetric part Pi. Given σ, σ
′ ∈ Σ, σRiσ′ means that σ is at least as good as
σ′ for i. A profile is an N -tuple π = (Ri)i∈I , and Π stands for the set of profiles. We
assume preferences satisfy coalition selfishness : members of each coalition pay interest
only to the goods allocated to the coalition. Formally, coalition selfishness holds if
∀C ∈ C, ∀i ∈ C, ∀ σ1, σ2, σ′1, σ′2 ∈ Σ, σ1(C) = σ′1(C) and σ2(C) = σ′2(C) implies that
σ1Riσ2 ⇔ σ′1Riσ′2. Using coalition selfishness, we equivalently write (xj)j∈CRi(yj)j∈C
and σRiσ
′, where σ(C(i)) = (xj)j∈C and σ′(C(i)) = (yj)j∈C .
Definition 3.2.1 A Shapley-Scarf market with coalitional trade is a triple E =< N, C, π >
where N is the number of goods and individuals, C is a coalition structure, and π is a
profile satisfying coalition selfishness.
Observe that a standard Shapley-Scarf market is a Shapley-Scarf market with coa-
litional trade where C = {{1}, {2}, ..., {N}}.
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3.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium concepts
We first define budget sets.
Definition 3.2.2 Let p = (px)x∈G ∈ RN+ be a price vector. The budget set of i for p is
the subset of allocations Bi(p) = {σ ∈ Σ : ∀j ∈ C, pσ(j) ≤ pj}.
Budget sets are natural generalizations of standard Shapley-Scarf budget constraint
to coalitions. Each being endowed with a single good, her income is the price of her
initial endowment, and a good is affordable if its price does not exceed the price of
that single good. Budget sets impose this constraint to all coalition members, without
allowing for income transfers. Observe that BSi (p) = BSj (p) for all i, j ∈ C ∈ C.
Therefore, we can write BSi (p) = BSC(p) for all i ∈ C.
There is no obvious equivalent of the standard notion of competitive equilibrium
when within-coalition externalities are introduced in individual valuations. Different
types of cooperation within coalitions allow for several alternative definitions of equi-
librium. We introduce below the three equilibrium concepts which differ according to
the type of cooperation that prevails between partners.
Definition 3.2.3 A selfish equilibrium for E is a 2-tuple (σ, p) ∈ Σ × RN+ such that
∀i ∈ I, σ ∈ argmaxBC(i)(p)Ri.
We denote the set of selfish equilibria for E by Eself (E) and denote the set of
selfish equilibrium allocations (i.e. allocations σ such that (σ, p) is a selfish equilibrium
for some price vector p) by Eself (E). Selfish equilibria relate to the lowest degree of
collusion among partners : each individual pays attention only to her own well-being
given what is affordable by the coalition.
Pick a price vector p and a coalition C. An allocation σ is a p-optimum for C if
σ ∈ BC(p) and there is no σ′ ∈ BC(p) such that σ′Riσ for all i ∈ C and σ′Pjσ for some
j ∈ C. The set of p-optima for C is denoted by OC(p).
Definition 3.2.4 A cooperative equilibrium for E is a 2-tuple (σ, p) ∈ Σ × RN+ such
that σ ∈ OC(p).
A cooperative equilibrium allocation results from some unspecified bargaining pro-
cedure among partners, which ends up at a budget-constrained Pareto optimal situa-
tion. We denote the set of cooperative equilibria by Ecoop(E) and denote the set of
cooperative equilibrium allocations by Ecoop(E).
Pick an allocation σ, a price vector p, and an individual i. The (σ, p)-restricted
budget set for i is the set of allocations Bi(σ, p) = {σ′ ∈ BC(i)(p) : ∀j ∈ C\{i}, σ′(j) =
σ(j)}. A (σ, p)-restricted budget set for i contains all allocations which endow her
partners with the same good as in σ and which give i a good making the coalition bundle
budget-feasible. The best response of i to (σ, p) is the set Φi(σ, p) = argmaxBi(σ,p)Ri.
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Definition 3.2.5 A coordinated equilibrium for E is a 2-tuple (σ, p) ∈ Σ × RN+ such
that ∀i ∈ I, σ ∈ Φi(σ, p).
Coordinated equilibria relate to a tacit Nash-type collusion scheme in coalitions.
Given her partners’ current goods, each individual maximizes her satisfaction under
budget constraint. We denote the set of coordinated equilibria by Ecoor(E) and denote
the associated set of equilibrium allocations by Ecoor(E).
3.2.3 Preferences restrictions
Aslan and Laine´ (2018) show that the existence of equilibria is sensitive to the
structure of preferences over allocations. Indeed, a selfish equilibrium may not exist
under the full domain assumption. We define below coalition responsive preferences.
Definition 3.2.6 A profile π = (Ri)i∈I is responsive if ∀C ∈ C, ∀i ∈ C, there exists
(≻ij)j∈C ∈ L(G)|C| such that :
∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ with σ(C) ̸= σ′(C), we have σPiσ′ if ∀j ∈ C, either σ(j) ≻ij σ′(j) or
σ(j) = σ′(j).
We denote by ΠR ⊆ Π the set of responsive profiles. Responsiveness holds if each
individual has a linear order over goods for each of all her partners (including herself),
and gets better off with a Pareto improving change according to these linear orders.
Responsiveness relates the welfare of the coalition to the welfare of its members. Ob-
serve that in definition 6, ≻ij may not coincide with ≻jj : i may assign j a ranking of
goods that is not the one that j assigns to herself. On the contrary, if each individual
rank goods allocated to any partner as this partner does, any unilateral improvement
of one partner’s well-being will benefit to all members of the coalition. This special case
is called coalition responsiveness.
Definition 3.2.7 A profile π = (Ri)i∈I is coalition responsive if and only if it is res-
ponsive and ∀C, ∀i, j, k ∈ C, ≻ji= ≻ki .
We denote the set of all coalition-based-responsive profiles by ΠCR.
Coalition responsiveness plays an important role both in the non-emptiness and
set-comparison of equilibrium allocation sets. This role is summarized in the two pro-
positions below.
Proposition 3.2.1 For any E, Eself (E) ⊆ Ecoop(E), and for any E with π ∈ ΠCR,
Ecoop(E) ⊆ Ecoor(E). Moreover, there exists E with π ∈ ΠCR such that Eself (E) ̸=
Ecoop(E), and there exists E with π ∈ ΠCR such that Ecoop(E) ̸= Ecoor(E).
Proof 3.2.1 See Aslan and Laine´ (2018), propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3.2.2 Eself (E) ̸= ∅ in any E =< N, C, π > with π ∈ ΠCR.
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Proof 3.2.2 See Aslan and Laine´ (2018), proposition 11.
Under coalition responsive preferences, the TTC algorithm always finds a selfish
equilibrium allocation. By Proposition 1, it finds an equilibrium allocation for the
other two concepts. In the sequel, we assume that all preference profiles are coalition
responsive.
3.3 Characterization of Equilibria
It is well-known that in standard Shapley-Scarf markets, any competitive allocation
”can be thought of as resulting from the method of top trading cycles” (Roth and
Postlewaite 1977), page 135). However, this is no longer true with coalitional trade,
even under the assumption of coalition responsive preferences. This is illustrated by
the example below.
Example 3.3.1 Let E =< 4, C, π > where C = {C1, C2} = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and
π =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3 4
(2, 1) (2, 1) (4, 3) (4, 3)
(1, 2) (1, 2) (3, 4) (3, 4)
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Clearly π can be completed so as to ensure coalition responsiveness, with linear orders
over goods :
- i = 1, 2 : 2 ≻i 1 ≻i ...
- i = 3, 4 : 4 ≻i 3 ≻i ...
The TTC outcome is σ0, and (σ0, p) is a selfish equilibrium where p = (2, 1, 2, 1).
Consider σ′ = (2, 1, 4, 3) and p′ = (1, 1, 1, 1). Since σ ∈ argmaxBj(p′)Ri for all i ∈ I,
(σ′, p′) is a selfish equilibrium.
Allocation σ′ in example 1 is associated with the set of trading cycles 1 ⇄ 2 and
3 ⇄ 4. Clearly, every allocation is associated with a set of trading cycles. Formally, a
trading cycle associated with an allocation σ is defined as a non-empty subset T k =
{ik1, ..., ikM(k)} of I such that σ(ikm) = ikm+1 for all 1 ≤ m < M and σ(ikM(k)) = ik1. A
trading sequence for an allocation σ is a partition Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K of I into trading
cycles.
The TTC outcome is associated with a specific trading sequence. Given an indivi-
dual i and a subset of goods G′ ⊆ G, given n ∈ {1, ..., N}, the n−th best good among
G′ according to a linear order ≻i is denoted by nG′(i).
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Definition 3.3.1 The top-trading sequence T ttcσ = {T k}k=1,...,K for allocation σ is the
trading sequence defined by :
— T 1 = {i11, ..., i1M(1)} satisfies i1m+1 = 1G(im) and i11 = 1G(iM(1)) for all m =
1, ...,M(1) and for all i ∈ I1 = I.
— for all k ∈ {2, ..., K}, T k = {ik1, ..., ikM(k)} satisfies ikm+1 = 1Ik(im) and ik1 =
1Ik(iM(k)) for all m = 1, ...,M(k) and for all i ∈ Ik = I\
⋃
1≤k′<k T k
′
.
— IK+1 = ∅
Now, an allocation is a competitive equilibrium allocation in a standard Shapley-
Scarf market if and only if its associated trading sequence is the top-trading one. Since
a competitive allocation in Shapley-Scarf market with coalitions may be associated
with a trading sequence that is not the top-trading one, the question we address is
finding the set of all trading sequences associated with each equilibrium concept. All
results are stated and proven for a coalition structure involving only couples. However,
They can be generalized to any coalition structure with some (heavy) notational cost.
We first characterize the set of trading sequences for strong coordinated equilibrium
allocations. Given any i, we denote C(i) = {i, j}.
Definition 3.3.2 A trading sequence Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K for allocation σ is top-balanced
if and only if for all k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., K} and for all C = {i, j} ∈ C with i ∈ T k and j ∈ T k′
where k′ ≥ k such that either the condition (a) or (b) below are satisfied :
(a) σ(i) = 1Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk′ (j)
(b) σ(i) = 2Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk(i) = 1Gk′ (j)
where G1 = G and Gk = G\⋃1≤l<k T z for all k ≥ 2
Top-balanceness is a natural extension of the top-trading property : it states that
the only case where an individual i involved in some trading cycle T k is not given her
most preferred good according to ≻i among available ones is when both partners share
the same most preferred available good when trading, while j obtains this good in some
subsequent trading cycle T k
′
and i is assigned her second most preferred good among
those available at stage k.
Top-balanceness characterizes trading sequences for strong coordinated equilibrium
allocations.
Proposition 3.3.1 For all E =< N, C, π > where π ∈ ΠCR, σ ∈ Ecoor(E) if and only
if Tσ is top-balanced.
Proof 3.3.1 Necessary part : Let σ ∈ Ecoor(E), then there exists a price vector p =
(px)x∈G such that (σ, p) ∈ Ecoor(E). Consider the trading sequence Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K
for σ. Since px = py for all x, y ∈ T k and for all T k ∈ Tσ, we can rank cycles T k
according to the decreasing order of price levels (i.e. ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., K}, [k < k′] ⇔
[px > py, ∀(x, y) ∈ T k × T k′ ]). We will say hereafter that Tσ is p− ordered. Below, we
inductively show that Tσ is top-balanced.
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First consider k = 1. Take any i ∈ T 1 so that G1 = G. Let c(i) ∈ T k′ where k′ ≥ 1.
Suppose σ(i) = 1G(i) and σ(j) ̸= 1Gk′ (j). Then, take an allocation σ′ such that
σ′(i) = σ(i) and σ′(j) = 1Gk′ (j). Note that σ
′ ∈ Bj(σ, p) and by definition of coalitional
responsive preferences σ′Piσ and σ′ Pj σ. Hence, it contradicts with σ ∈ Ecoor(E).
Now suppose that σ(i) ̸= 1G(i) and σ(j) ̸= 1G(i). Consider any allocation σ′ with
σ′(i) = 1G(i) and σ′(j) = σ(j). It is obvious that σ′ ∈ Bi(σ, p). Again by definition of
ΠCR, we have σ′Piσ. It contradicts with σ ∈ Ecoor(E). Thus σ(i) ̸= 1G(i) ⇒ σ(j) =
1G(i). Similarly, suppose 1Gk′ (j) ̸= 1G(i). Consider any allocation σ′′ with σ′′(i) = σ(i)
and σ′′(j) = 1Gk′ (j). It obvious that σ
′′ ∈ Bj(σ, p). Since π ∈ ΠCR we have σ′′Pjσ.
Hence, it contradicts with σ ∈ Ecoor(E). Thus σ(i) ̸= 1G(i) ⇒ σ(j) = 1G(i) = 1Gk′ (j).
Now suppose σ(i) ̸= 2G(i). Then, consider any allocation σ′′′ with σ′′′(j) = σ(j) and
σ′′′(i) = 2G(i). It obvious that σ′′′ ∈ Bi(σ, p). Since π ∈ ΠCR, σ′′′Piσ. It contradicts
with σ ∈ Φi(σ, p). Hence it contradicts with σ ∈ Ecoor(E). Thus either condition (a) or
condition (b) must hold for i ∈ T 1 such that j ∈ T k′ and k′ ≥ 1.
Next consider k = 2. Take any i ∈ T 2. We have G2 = G \ T 1. Let j ∈ T k′. If
k′ = 1 < k, then we get back to the arguments above. If k′ ≥ k, then any allocation σ′
with {σ′(i), σ′(j)} ⊆ G \ G2 = T 1, we have σ′ /∈ Bi(p) = Bj(p) for all i ∈ T 2. So, the
proof used for i ∈ T 1 where G1 = G clearly works for any i ∈ T 2 where G2 = G \ T 1.
Finally, by induction over k = 1, ..., K we can prove that any i ∈ T k and j ∈ T k′
where k′ ≥ k, either (a) or (b) is satisfied.
Sufficiency part : Let σ ∈ ΣG be such that Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K is top-balanced.
Given any i ∈ I, define as the number k(i) ∈ {1, ..., K} such that i ∈ T k(i). Let p
be the price vector defined by pi = 1k(i) for all i ∈ T k(i). Suppose (σ, p) /∈ Ecoor(E).
Thus, there exists some individuals for whom the allocation σ is not the most preferred
(σ, p)-restricted budget feasible allocation. Let us denote the set of these individuals by
H. Hence H = {i ∈ I : σ /∈ Φi(σ, p)}. Take an individual i∗ ∈ H who is the member of
the earliest trading cycle among the individuals in H, and denote the partner of i∗ by
j∗. Then there exists an allocation σ′ ∈ Bi∗(σ, p) such that σ′Pi∗σ while σ′(j∗) = σ(j∗).
Suppose k(j∗) ≥ k(i∗). Since Tσ is top-balanced, it implies either σ(i∗) = 1Gk(i∗)(i∗)
or σ(i∗) = 2Gk(i∗)(i∗) and σ(j∗) = 1Gk(j∗)(j∗) = 1Gk(i∗)(i∗). Therefore, σ′Pi∗σ implies
that σ′(i∗) /∈ Gk(i∗). Hence, σ′(i∗) ∈ Gk where k < k(i∗). Thus pσ′(i∗) > 1k(i∗) = pi∗
which contradicts σ′ ∈ Bi(σ, p). Finally, if k(j∗) < k(i∗), then, top-balanceness implies
σ(i∗) = 1Gk(i∗)(i∗) and the same argument applies.
We turn now to cooperative equilibrium. Thanks to proposition 1, characterizing
trading sequences for cooperative equilibria amounts to strengthen the top-balanceness
property to δ−balanceness. With words, δ−balanceness holds if top-balanceness is sa-
tisfied and the following additional condition is satisfied. Suppose the first endowed
partner i gets her second-best available good. By top-balanceness, this means that her
first-best good is assigned to her partner j, and this good is j′s first-best available one.
Now suppose that j gives her good back to i and gets instead her second-best available
good (in case more than one good is available when j trades). Then one of the two
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partners would be worse off with this change.
Definition 3.3.3 A trading sequence Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K for allocation σ is δ-balanced
if and only if for all k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., K} and for all C = {i, j} ∈ C with i ∈ T k and
j ∈ T k′ where k′ ≥ k, either the condition (a) or (b) holds :
(a) σ(i) = 1Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk′ (j)
(b.1) σ(i) = 2Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk(i) = 1Gk′ (j)
(b.2) If 2Gk′ (j) exists, then (2Gk(i), 1Gk′ (j))Pl(1Gk(i), 2Gk′ (j)) for some l ∈ {i, j}
where G1 = G and Gk = G\⋃1≤l<k T z for all k ≥ 2.
Proposition 3.3.2 For all E =< N, C, π > where π ∈ ΠCR, σ ∈ Ecoop(E) if and only
if Tσ is δ-balanced.
Proof 3.3.2 Necessary part : Let σ ∈ Ecoop(E), then there exists a price vector
p ∈ RG+ such that (σ, p) ∈ Ecoop(E). Consider the trading sequence Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K
for σ. Since for all T k ∈ Tσ and for all x, y ∈ T k, px = py, we can rank trading cycles
in Tσ in such a way that Tσ is p − ordered. Below, we inductively show that Tσ is
δ-balanced.
First consider k = 1 and take C = {i, c(i) = j}. Let i ∈ T 1 so that G1 = G.
Let j ∈ T k′ where k′ ≥ 1. We know from Aslan and Laine´ (2018) that if π ∈ ΠCR
then Ecoop(E) ⊆ Ecoor(E). Then Proposition 3 implies that if σ ∈ Ecoop(E) then either
condition (a) or condition (b1) is satisfied. Thus, to complete the proof, one must show
that condition (b2) must hold. Suppose that σ(i) = 2Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk(i) = 1Gk′ (j).
Assume that 2Gk′ (j) exists and (1G(i), 2Gk′ (j))Pl(2G(i), 1Gk′ (j)) for all l ∈ {i, j}. Then,
consider any allocation σ′ such that σ′(i) = 1G(i) and σ′(j) = 2Gk′ (j). σ
′ clearly belongs
to BSC(p) and σ′Plσ for all l ∈ {i, j}. Hence σ /∈ Ecoop(E), a contradiction. This proves
that condition (b2) must hold.
Next consider k = 2. Let i ∈ T 2 so that G2 = G \ T 1. Let j ∈ T k′. If k′ < k, then
we get from construction above that either condition (a) or condition (b) must hold. If
k′ ≥ k, then any allocation σ with {σ(i), σ(j)} ⊆ G \G2 = T1, we have σ /∈ BC(p). So,
the arguments for i ∈ T 1 where G1 = G clearly works for any i ∈ T 2 where G2 = G\T 1.
Finally by iterating the same argument over k = 3, ..., K, we can prove that for any
i ∈ T k and j ∈ T k′ where k′ ≥ k, either (a) or (b) is satisfied.
Sufficiency part : Let σ ∈ Σ be such that Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K is δ-balanced. Given
any i ∈ I, define as the number k(i) ∈ {1, ..., K} such that i ∈ T k(i). Let p be the
price vector defined by pi = 1k(i) for all i ∈ T k(i). Suppose (σ, p) /∈ Ecoop(E). Thus, there
exists C = {i, c(i) = j} such that σ /∈ OC(p). Consider H = {i ∈ I : σ /∈ OC(i)(p)}.
Take an individual i∗ ∈ H who is the member of the earliest trading cycle among
the individuals in H, and denote the partner of i∗ by j∗. Then, there exists an al-
location σ′ ∈ BC(p) such that σ′Pi∗σ and σ′Pj∗σ . If k(j∗) ≥ k(i∗), π ∈ ΠCR im-
plies either σ′(i∗) ≻i∗ σ(i∗) or σ′(j∗) ≻j∗ σ(j∗). Suppose σ′(j∗) ≻j∗ σ(j∗). From
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δ-balanceness of Tσ, we have σ(j∗) = 1Gk(j∗)(j∗) thus σ′(j∗) /∈ Gk(j∗), which contra-
dicts σ′ ∈ BC(p). If σ′(i∗) ≻i∗ σ(i∗) and σ(j∗) ≻j∗ σ′(j∗), δ-balanceness of Tσ implies
σ(i∗) ∈ {1Gk(i∗)(i∗), 2Gk(i∗)(i∗)}. If σ(i∗) = 1Gk(i∗)(i∗) then σ′(i∗) /∈ Gk(i∗) and this contra-
dicts σ′ ∈ BC(p). If σ(i∗) = 2Gk(i∗)(i∗), then (σ(i∗), σ(j∗)) = (2Gk(i∗)(i∗), 1Gk(j∗)(j∗))
where 1Gk(j∗)(i∗) = 1Gk(i∗)(i∗). The definition of BC(p) together with δ-balanceness im-
plies (σ′(i∗), σ′(j∗)) = (1Gk(i∗)(i∗), kGk(j∗)(i∗)) where k ≥ 2. Again by definition of δ-
balanceness, we have (2Gk(i∗)(i∗), 1Gk(j∗)(j∗)) Pi (1Gk(i∗)(i∗), 2Gk(j∗)(j∗)) Ri (1Gk(i∗)(i∗), kGk(j∗)(i∗))
for some i ∈ {i∗, j∗}, which contradicts σ′Piσ for all i ∈ {i∗, j∗}.
We introduce now the property of strong δ-balanced trading sequence, which slightly
strengthen δ-balanceness, by stating that instead of one partner, both would get worse
off with the change considered for δ-balanceness.
Definition 3.3.4 The strong δ-balanced trading sequence Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K is strong
δ-balanced if and only if for all k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., K} and for all C = {i, j} ∈ C with i ∈ T k
and j ∈ T k′ where k′ ≥ k, the condition (a′) or (b′) holds :
(a′) σ(i) = 1Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk′ (j)
(b′.1) σ(i) = 2Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk(i) = 1Gk′ (j)
(b′.2) If 2Gk′ (j) exists, then (2Gk(i), 1Gk′ (j)) Pl (1Gk(i), 2Gk′ (j)) for all l ∈ {i, j}
where G1 = G and Gk = G\⋃1≤l<k T z for all k ≥ 2.
Note that condition b′ implies condition b for δ-balanced trading sequence.
Proposition 3.3.3 For all E =< N, C, π > where π ∈ ΠCR, σ ∈ Eself (E) if and only
if Tσ is strongly δ-balanced.
Proof 3.3.3 Necessary part : Let σ ∈ Eself (E), then there exists a price vector
p ∈ RG+ such that (σ, p) ∈ Eself (E). Consider the trading sequence Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K
for σ. Since for all k and for all x, y ∈ T k, px = py, we can rank cycles T k in such a
way that Tσ is p− ordered. Below, we inductively show that Tσ is strongly δ-balanced.
By proposition 4, we know that π ∈ ΠCR implies Eself (E) ⊆ Ecoop(E). Therefore, if
σ ∈ Eself (E) then either condition (a) or condition (b′1) is satisfied. Thus, to complete
the proof, one must show that condition (b′.2) must hold.
First consider k = 1. Let i ∈ T 1 so that G1 = G. Let j ∈ T k′ where k′ ≥ 1.
Suppose that σ(i) = 2Gk(i) and σ(j) = 1Gk(i) = 1Gk′ (j). Assume that 2Gk′ (j) exists and
(1G(i), 2Gk′ (j)) ≻l (2G(i), 1Gk′ (j)) for some l ∈ {i, j}. Then, consider any allocation
σ′ such that σ′(i) = 1G(i) and σ′(j) = 2Gk′ (j). σ
′ clearly belongs to Bj(p) and σ′Pjσ.
Hence σ /∈ Eself (E), a contradiction. This proves that condition (b′.2) must hold.
Next consider k = 2. Let i ∈ T 2 so that G2 = G \ T 1. Let j ∈ T k′. If k′ < k, then
we get from construction above that either condition (b′2) must hold. If k′ ≥ k, then
any allocation σ with {σ(i), σ(j)} ⊆ G \G2 = T1, we have σ /∈ Bi(p) = Bj(p). So, the
proof used for i ∈ T 1 where G1 = G clearly works for any i ∈ T 2 where G2 = G \ T 1.
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Finally by iterating the same argument over k = 3, ..., K, we can prove that for any
i ∈ T k and j ∈ T k′ where k′ ≥ k, (b′.2) is satisfied.
Sufficiency part : Let σ ∈ Σ be such that Tσ = {T k}k=1,...,K is strongly δ-balanced.
Given any i ∈ I, define as the number k(i) ∈ {1, ..., K} such that i ∈ T k(i). Let p be
the price vector defined by pi = 1k(i) for all i ∈ T k(i). Suppose that (σ, p) /∈ Eself (E).
Thus, there exists some individuals for whom the allocation σ is not the most preferred
budget feasible allocation. Let us denote the set of these individuals by H.
Take an individual i∗ ∈ H who is the member of the earliest trading cycle among the
individuals in H. Then, there exists an allocation σ′ ∈ Bi∗(p) such that σ′Pi∗σ. Suppose
k(j∗) ≥ k(i∗) where C = {i∗, j∗ = c(i∗)}. π ∈ ΠCR implies either σ′(i∗) ≻i∗ σ(i∗) or
σ′(j∗) ≻j∗ σ(j∗).
Suppose that σ′(j∗) ≻j∗ σ(j∗). From strongly δ-balanceness of Tσ, we have σ(j∗) =
1Gk(j∗)(j∗) implies that σ′(j∗) /∈ Gk(j∗). Thus pσ′(i∗) > 1k(i∗) = pi∗ which contradicts
σ′ ∈ BC(p).
If σ′(i∗) ≻i∗ σ(i∗) and σ(j∗) ≻j∗ σ′(j∗), strongly δ-balanceness of Tσ implies that
σ(i∗) ∈ {1Gk(i∗)(i∗), 2Gk(i∗)(i∗)}. If σ(i∗) = 1Gk(i∗)(i∗) then σ′(i∗) /∈ Gk(i∗) and this contra-
dicts σ′ ∈ BC(p). If σ(i∗) = 2Gk(i∗)(i∗) then (σ(i∗), σ(j∗)) = (2Gk(i∗)(i∗), 1Gk(j∗)(j∗))
where 1Gk(j∗)(i∗) = 1Gk(i∗)(i∗). The definition of BC(p) together with strongly δ-balanceness
implies (σ′(i∗), σ′∗)) = (1Gk(i∗)(i∗), kGk(j∗)(i∗)), where k ≥ 2. Again by definition of
strongly δ-balanceness, we have (2Gk(i∗)(i∗), 1Gk(j∗)(j∗)) Pi (1Gk(i∗)(i∗), 2Gk(j∗)(j∗)) Ri
(1Gk(i∗)(i∗), kGk(j∗)(i∗)) for all i ∈ {i∗, j∗}, which contradicts σ′Pi∗σ and the proof is
complete.
3.4 Further comments
In this paper, we generalize Shapley-Scarf markets to the case where trades are orga-
nized between coalitions. We define three types of competitive equilibrium. Moreover,
we characterize each type of equilibrium allocation in terms of the properties of their
associated trading cycles. These properties explicitly describe rather slight deviations
from the well-known top-trading cycles. They also provide a simple test allowing to
check whether an allocation is competitive.
A common feature of equilibrium types is that budget sets do not allow for income
transfers among partners. When such transfers are permitted, Aslan and Laine´ (2018)
show the existence of cooperative equilibria under the strong assumption of lexico-
graphic preferences. The proof is based on an alteration of TTC. However, as in the
present paper, there exist cooperative equilibrium allocations which cannot be obtained
as outcomes of the modified TTC. Characterizing cooperative equilibrium allocations
by their associated trading sequence remains an open problem.
81
3.4. FURTHER COMMENTS
82
Chapitre 4
Stability of Shapley Scarf Markets
with Couple Agreements : When
distance Matters
Abstract : This paper considers Shapley-Scarf markets where individuals live in
couple and where the set of goods is endowed with a geographical structure. This struc-
ture aims at capturing the fact that couples prefer living together. Individual preferences
over allocations are based on the satisfaction derived from the assigned job and the dis-
tance to partner. Several notions of core stability are introduced, each relating to the
type of agreements prevailing among partners. We investigate the sensitivity of Core to
the preference domain, the location structure and the initial distribution of goods. 1
Keywords: Shapley-Scarf markets- Core - Distance - Preference extension
4.1 Introduction
This paper considers a generalization of Shapley-Scarf markets where the set of
individuals is partitioned into couples and the set of goods is partitioned into geo-
graphical areas. In Shapley-Scarf markets, purely indivisible goods are traded without
money. There are finitely many individuals, each owning an indivisible good, and trades
are organized in such a way that everyone ends up with exactly one good. It is well-
known since Shapley and Scarf (1974) that when there is no indifference, the Gale’s
Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC for short) algorithm admits a unique outcome which is a
core stable allocation. Characterizations of the core are provided in Ma (1994), Svens-
son (1999), Takamiya (2001), and Miyagawa (2002). Furthermore, TTC is not only
strategy-proof (Roth, 1982) but also coalitional strategy-proof (Bird (1984)), dominant
strategy implementable (Mizukami and Wakayama (2007)), and Nash implementable
when there are at least three individuals (So¨nmez, 1996). Moreover, Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez (1998) show that one can generate all Pareto efficient allocations from
1. This is a joint work with Jean Laine´ of CNAM-LIRSA, Paris, France
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TTC by varying individuals’ endowments.
Our primary purpose is investigating the existence of core allocations when indivi-
duals live in couples, and where goods are distributed among several locations. Moreo-
ver, we are interested in checking whether core stable allocations can be obtained as
outcomes of a relevant adaptation of TTC.
Living in a couple creates an externality in the individual valuation of allocations.
We assume that individuals compare allocations according to two criteria : the quality
of their assigned good, and the distance between the two goods assigned to the couple.
Moreover, we assume that preferences over allocations satisfy separability : among
two allocations placing the goods at the same distance, an individual prefers the one
assigning her a better good, and among two allocations assigning the same good to an
individual, she prefers the one making the two goods closer to each other.
A natural interpretation of our model is organizing job mobility among employees
through a centralized procedure where each individual report her preferences over all
positions. In many real-life situations (e.g., the mobility of school teachers), employees
live in couples, and the location of the partner’s position matters a lot when evaluating
different outcomes.
The potential instability created by the presence of couples has been extensively in-
vestigated in two-sided matching markets. 2 In contrast, very few similar studies prevail
for Shapley-Scarf markets. Mumcu and Saglam (2007) show that the core of Shapley-
Scarf market may be empty in the presence of externalities, individuals having prefe-
rences over allocations and not only goods. Hong and Park (2017) prove that egocentric
preferences over allocations essentially preserve the properties of TTC. 3 Dog˘an et al.
(2011) consider Shapley-Scarf markets where couples have joint preferences over pairs
of goods and prove the non-emptiness of the Core when these joint preferences have
a lexicographic structure. 4. While the criterion of distance is sometimes mentioned as
a source of externality in preferences in the literature on two-sided markets, the role
played by an explicit location structure remains to be modeled for both two-sided and
Shapley-Scarf markets. A notable exception for two-sided markets is Cantala (2004),
where the set of goods are partitioned into different regions and a togetherness condition
is formalized. Cantala shows that core existence is not guaranteed even when couples
agree on the same ranking of regions.
Hence, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first at investigating core
existence with an explicit treatment of distance in a Shapley-Scarf market. Distance
determines how preferences over goods are transformed into preferences over alloca-
2. The reader may refer to Sasaki and Toda (1996), Dutta and Masso (1997), Roth and Peranson (1999),
Cantala (2004), Klaus and Klijn (2005), Echenique and Yenmez (2007), Klaus, Klijn and Masso (2007), Hafalir
(2008), Mumcu and Saglam (2010), Bando (2012), Kojima, Pathak and Roth (2013), Bando (2014), Ashlagi,
Braverman and Hassidim (2014), Fisher and Hafalir (2016). See also Bando et al. (2016) for a recent survey.
3. Preferences of an individual are egocentric whenever any two allocations assign distinct houses to him,
her ranking between the two allocations is determined her ranking of the goods she receives at those allocations.
4. Dog˘an et al. (2011) also show that their results extend to the case where individuals trade several goods,
studied in Konishi, Quint and Wako (2001). See Papai (2003), Wako (2005), Papai (2007) and Klaus (2008)
for generalizations of Shapley- Scarf Market with multiple or multiple types of indivisible goods.
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tions in the following way. Each individual identifies an allocation with the good she is
assigned together with the distance to her partner’s good. Thus, comparing two allo-
cations amounts to compare two vectors (rank of assigned good, distance to partner),
and preferences over allocations are defined as weak orders over all those vectors.
Having defined preferences over allocations, we focus on a concept of core where no
blocking coalition can ”break couples” : no blocking coalition can involve one individual
and not her partner. Since each individual has her own ranking of allocations, asserting
a couple gets better off requires assumptions on how partners with different rankings
of goods may agree on how to compare allocations. We assume the existence of an
unspecified bargaining procedure extending partners’ preferences over allocations into
a quasi-ordering of allocations. This quasi-ordering is called couple agreement, and
lists all mutually agreed binary comparisons of allocations. Hence, each possible way to
generate a quasi-ordering of allocations from a couple of orderings of allocations defines
a specific concept of core. We consider two classes of quasi-orderings.
- the (resp. strict) core couple agreement : a couple gets better off when both
partners get better off (resp. none of the partners gets less well off and one gets better
off),
- the (resp. strict) Minmax couple agreement : a couple gets better off when both
the best treated and the worst treated partners get better off (resp. at least one of
them gets better off, the other staying at worst as well off)
Our main results can be summarized as follows :
- The core may be empty for all types of couple agreement.
- If preferences over allocations give priority to goods (i.e., are lexicographic w.r.t.
good quality), TTC finds an allocation which is in the core for core and strict core
couple agreements. However, core existence for strict Minmax couple agreements is not
guaranteed. Moreover, we provide a constructive proof of the existence of the core for
Minmax couple agreement under a further restriction such that all partners are initially
close to each other based on a modification of TTC.
- If preferences give priority to distance (i.e., are lexicographic w.r.t. the distance to
partner), the core for Minmax couple agreement, and the core for core couple agreement
always exists in a market where all partners are initially close to each other, while it may
fail to exist even if the initial distribution of goods in such that all partners can be made
close to each other by some reallocation. Moreover, we specify another modification of
TTC which ends up an allocation in the core for strict core couple agreements if there
are only two locations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formalize Shapley-Scarf markets
with couple agreements and a location structure of goods. Having provided notations
and basic definitions (section 2.1), preferences over allocations are formalized in section
2.2. Alternative couple agreements are introduced in section 2.3, and the core is defined
in section 2.4. Results are stated in section 3. Section 3.1 deals with existence results
for the case of preferences giving priority to goods, while those for preferences giving
priority to distance are given in section 5.2. Properties of core allocations are investi-
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gated in Section 5.3. For exposition clarity, proofs are postponed to an Appendix. We
conclude the paper with some open questions.
4.2 Shapley-Scarf markets with couples and a location struc-
ture
4.2.1 Notations
For any finite setX,W(X) (resp. L(X),Q(X)) denotes the set of weak orders (resp.
linear orders, quasi-orderings) over X. If γ ∈ W(X) ranks good x as high as good y,
we write xγy. Moreover, the upper-contour set of x for γ is defined by U(x, γ) = {y ∈
G : yγ+x}, where γ+ denote the asymmetric part of γ. Moreover, the rank of x in pi is
defined by r(x, γ) = 1 + |U(x, γ)|.
We consider a finite set of individuals I confronting a set of purely indivisible goods
G = {1, 2, ..., n}, where n ≥ 2 is even 5. Individuals (resp. goods) are denoted by i, j, k
(resp. x, y, z).
Individual preferences over goods are elements L(G), and pi stands for individual
i’s preference. A profile over goods is an n−tuple p = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ (L(G))n, and Π
stands for the set of all profiles over goods.
An allocation σ is a bijection from I to G. Hence, σ(i) is the good allocated to
individual i. The set of allocations is denoted by Σ. There exists an initial allocation
σ0 ∈ Σ. Without loss of generality, σ0 is defined by σ0(i) = i for all i. Under this
assumption, allocations are permutations of I.
The set of individuals is partitioned into couples. This partition is exogenous and
denoted by C = {Ch, h = 1, ..., n/2}. Individual i ’s partner is usually denoted by
i′. Given an allocation σ and a couple C = {i, i′}, we denote the (resp. ordered) set
of goods that σ assigns to the members of C by σ(C) = {σ(i), σ(i′)} (resp. −→σ (C) =
(σ(i), σ(i′)).
A critical feature of the model is that goods differ in their location. Formally, we
consider a partition L = {Ll, l = 1, ..., L} of G into non-empty subsets, each being
interpreted as a location. Moreover, we retain the discrete metric d between goods,
defined on G × G by ∀l ∈ {1, ..., L}, ∀x ∈ Ll, ∀y ∈ Ll′ , d(x, y) = 0 if l = l′ and
d(x, y) = 1 otherwise.
4.2.2 Preferences over allocations
The existence of couples creates an externality in individual valuations of alloca-
tions : the partner’s assigned good matters. In order to formalize how preferences over
5. The assumption | I |=| G | is made for notational simplicity. All results below are easily generalized to
the case where | I |>| G |.
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goods generate to preferences over allocations, we first introduce the concept of prefe-
rence extension :
Definition 4.2.1 A preference extension is a weak order ≿ (with asymmetric part ≻)
on {1, ..., n} ×{0, 1} which satisfies :
(a) ∀k ̸= k′ ∈ {1, ..., n}, t ∈ {0, 1}, [k < k′]⇒ [(k, t) ≻ (k′, t)]
(b) ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}, (k, 0) ≻ (k, 1)
We define the switch for k ∈ {1, ..., n} in ≿ as the integer φ(k,≿) = Max{k′ ∈
{1, ..., n} : (k′, 0) ≻ (k, 1)}. Observe that separability implies φ(k,≿) ≥ k. We define
next two polar types of preference extensions.
Definition 4.2.2 - The priority-to-good preference extension is the element ≻G of
L({1, ..., n} ×{0, 1}) such that ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}, φ(k,≻G) = k.
- The priority-to-distance preference extension is the element ≻D of L({1, ..., n}
×{0, 1}) such that ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}, φ(k,≻D) = n.
Note that there is no indifference if the preference extension is priority-to-good
or priority-to-distance. To see why, pick k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., n}, t, t′ ∈ {0, 1} and suppose
(k, t) ∼ (k′, t′). If ≻=≻G, one must have k = k′. It follows from separability that t = t′.
If ≻=≻D, one must have t = t′, and separability implies k = k′. Thus, (k, t) ∼ (k′, t′)
if and only if (k, t) = (k′, t′). An extension profile is an element ≿n= (≿i, ,≿i) of
W({1, ..., n} × {0, 1}).
Given individual i and allocation σ, we define Γ(i, σ) = (r(σ(i), pi), d(σ(i), σ(i′)). A
preference extension ≿i generates the preference over allocations Ri ∈ W(Σ) defined
as follows.
Definition 4.2.3 A preference over allocations for (pi,≿i) is the element Ri of W(Σ)
(with asymmetric part Pi) such that for all σ, γ ∈ Σ, for all i ∈ I, σRiγ if and only if
Γ(i, σ) ≿i Γ(i, γ).
This way of defining preferences over allocations deserves several comments :
- An individual’s preference over allocations is sensitive only to the goods assigned
to her and her partner. This justifies the following notational abuse : instead of writing
σRiγ, we will often write (σ(i), σ(i′))Ri(γ(i), γ(i′)).
- Each individual i compares allocations w.r.t. two criteria. The first is the satis-
faction level obtained from her assigned good, measured by the rank r(σ(i), pi). The
second is the distance t ∈ {0, 1} between her assigned good and the good assigned to
her partner i′ . Therefore, comparing σ and σ′ reduces to comparing vectors Γ(i, σ) and
Γ(i, σ′). Observe that i does not consider the level of well-being reached by i′ : only
distance matters.
- Properties (a) and (b) in definition 1 relate to standard separability. Property
(a) states that among two allocations making partners at the same distance to each
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other, the one assigning to a higher ranked good is preferable. Property (b) states that
among two allocations assigning the same good to i, the one is making i closer to i′ is
preferable.
- Individuals face a trade-off between the quality of their assigned good and the
distance to partner. The switch towards distance is the maximum sacrifice an individual
is willing to afford in order to be close to her partner. The trade-off between distance and
good quality disappears for both priority-to-good and priority-to-distance preference
extensions. In the former case, an individual will never accept to trade good quality
against a reduction of distance. Conversely, in the latter case, an individual will not
accept a gain in good quality against an increase in distance. Among intermediate cases
between the good priority and distance priority preference extensions, a possible one
refers to the following position : ”As long as I get a good which is ranked high enough,
I would not accept to lose it in exchange for a good closer to my partner. But if my
good is of poor quality to myself, I would accept any other good closer to my partner”.
The next definition summarizes the Shapley-Scarf Market with couples and a loca-
tion structure :
Definition 4.2.4 A market is a 7-tuple E = {I,G,C,L, p,≿n, σ0}, where I is the set
of individuals, G is the set of goods, C is a partition of individuals into couples, L is
a partition of goods into locations, p is a profile over goods, ≿n is an extension profile
and σ0 is the initial allocation.
4.2.3 Couple agreements
Since partners may disagree in comparing allocations, we assume some bargaining
prevails within couples. A couple agreement is a list of mutually agreed binary compa-
risons. More precisely, a couple agreement is obtained by aggregating partners’ prefe-
rences over allocations to a quasi-ordering over allocations.
Definition 4.2.5 A couple agreement is an application ε : W(Σ) × W(Σ) → Q(Σ)
such that ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, ∀C = {i, i′}, ∀(Ri, Ri′) ∈ W(Σ) × W(Σ), σε(Ri, Ri′)σ′ and
σ′ε(Ri, Ri′)σ if σRjγ and σ′Rjσ for j = i, i′.
For notational simplicity, we equivalently write σεCσ
′ and σε(Ri, Ri′)σ′ for a couple
C = {i, i′}. We introduce below alternative couple agreements. We first introduce useful
notations. Given two different 2-tuples (x, y) and (x′, y′) in {1, ..., n}2, we write (x, y)
< (x′, y′) if and only if x ≤ y and x′ ≤ y′, and (x, y) ≪ (x′, y′) if and only if x < y
and x′ < y′. Moreover, given a profile over allocations R, an allocation σ, and a couple
C = {i, i′}, we define
- Γ(σ,R,C) = (r(σ,Ri), r(σ,Ri′)),
- Γ+(σ,R,C)) = max{r(σ,Ri), r(σ,Ri′)} and Γ−(σ,R,C)) = min{r(σ,Ri), r(σ,Ri′)},
- Γ∼(σ,R,C)) = (Γ−(σ,R,C),Γ+(σ,R,C))
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Pick σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, C = {i, i′}, and a profile R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ W(Σ)n of preferences
over allocations.
Definition 4.2.6 The Core couple agreement εco is defined by : σεcoC σ
′ if and only if
Γ(σ,R,C)≪ Γ(σ′, R, C).
The strict Core couple agreement εSco is defined by : σεScoC σ
′ if and only if Γ(σ,R,C) <
Γ(σ′, R, C).
Definition 4.2.7 The Minmax couple agreement εMm is defined by : σεMmC σ
′ if and
only if Γ∼(σ,R,C)≪ Γ∼(σ′, R, C).
The strict Minmax couple agreement εSMm is defined by : σεSMmC σ
′ if and only if
Γ∼(σ,R,C) < Γ∼(σ′, R, C).
Given two couple agreements ε and η, we say that ε is a refinement of η if and
only if ∀C = {i, i′} ∈ C, ∀R ∈ W(Σ)n, ∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, σε(Ri, Ri′)σ′ if σ η(Ri, Ri′) σ′.
Observe that εMm is a refinement of εco. Indeed, pick any σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, any C = {i, i′},
and any profile R over allocations with σεcoC σ
′. By definition of εcoC , r(σ,Ri) < r(σ′, Ri)
and r(σ,Ri′) < r(σ′, Ri′). It follows that Γ+(σ,R,C) < Γ+(σ′, R, C) and Γ−(σ,R,C) <
Γ−(σ′, R, C) which clearly implies Γ∼(σ,R,C) ≪ Γ∼(σ,R,C). Thus σεSMmC σ′. The
reverse implication does not hold. Similarly, one gets that
- εSMm is refinement of εMm,
- εSMm is a refinement of εSco,
- εSco is a refinement of εco.
4.2.4 The Core
Definition 4.2.8 An allocation σ is blocked in E for couple agreement ε if there exist
a set S of couples and an allocation σ′ satisfying the following two properties :
(1) ∀C ∈ S, σ′εCσ and ⌉(σεCσ′)
(2) σ(C\S) = σ0(C\S).
The Core for ε is the subset C(E , ε) of allocations which are not blocked for ε.
For sake of simplicity, we use the following terminology : the (resp. strict) Core of E
is C(E , εco) (resp. C(E , εSco)), and the (resp. strict) Minmax Core of is C(E , εMm) (resp.
C(E , εSMm)).
If σ is blocked for ε, S is called blocking coalition, and we say that S blocks σ with
σ′. Observe that if ε is a refinement of η, C(E , ε) ⊆ C(E , η).
4.3 Results
We will show with a simple example shows that TTC does not always find a core al-
location whatever the prevailing couple agreement. For sake of completeness, we briefly
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recall how TTC operates. Each individual i points to the individual endowed with the
good i prefers the most. Since the number n of individuals is finite, at least one cycle
of individuals can be formed. Then assign each individual in a cycle her most preferred
good, and remove all individuals (and goods) involved in the cycle. By proceeding in
the same way in all subsequent stages, the set of individuals is exhausted in at most n
stages.
Example 4.3.1 Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, 2, 2′}, L = {L1, L2}, where
L1 = {1, 1′}, L2 = {2, 2′} and Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2. Consider the profile over
goods
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
2 1′ 1 2′
1 ... 2 ...
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Moreover suppose that preference extensions are defined by (1, 0) ≻i (2, 0) ≻i (1, 1)
≻i (2, 1) for all i ∈ I. It implies the profile R over allocations as follows : 6
R =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
(2, 2′) (1, 1′) (1, 1′) (2, 2′)
(1, 1′) ... (2, 2′) ...
(2, 1′), (2, 1′) (1, 2), (1, 2′)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
TTC ends up at allocation σ = (2, 1′, 1, 2′). Observe that ∀i ∈ I, σ0Piσ. Thus S =
{1, 1′, 2, 2′} blocks σ with σ0 for couple agreement εco. Since σ /∈ C(εco, p) while all
other couple agreements are refinements of εco, σ belongs to the Core for no couple
agreement.
Actually, not only TTC fails at finding a core allocation, but the core may be empty
for all couple agreements, as stated in
Proposition 4.3.1 Let n ≥ 6. There exists a market E such that C(E , ε) = ∅ for all
ε = {εco, εSco, εMm, εSMm}.
This negative results suggests restricting the domain of preferences over allocations.
Hereafter, we focus on the polar cases of preferences giving priority either to goods or
to distances.
6. Putting more than one allocation in the preference Ri of an agent i means that the agent i is indifferent
between those allocations.
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4.3.1 Priority-to-Good Preferences
Our first result is that priority-to-good preferences ensure the non-emptiness of the
strict Core. Actually, the reason is that TTC finds a strict core allocation. 7
Proposition 4.3.2 C(E , εSco) ̸= ∅ in any market E where ≿i=≻Gi for all i ∈ I.
Since εSco is a refinement of εco, Proposition 2 implies
Corollary 4.3.1 C(E , εco) ̸= ∅ in any market E where ≿i=≻Gi for all i ∈ I.
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that in standard Shapley-Scarf markets where
indifferences are ruled out, there exists a unique strict core allocation, which is the
outcome of TTC. This is no longer true in our setting, as shown by the following
example.
Example 4.3.2 Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, 2, 2′}, L = {L1, L2}, ≿n= (≿G1
, ...,≿Gn ) , L1 = {1, 1′}, L2 = {2, 2′} and Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2. Consider the
profile over goods
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
1 1 2 2
1′ 1′ 2′ 2′
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Since ∀i ∈ I, ≿i=≻Gi , one gets the profile over allocations
R =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
(1, 1′) (1′, 1) (2, 2′) (2′, 2)
(1, 2); (1, 2′) (2, 1); (2′, 1)) (2, 1); (2, 1′) (1, 2); (1′, 2)
(1′, 1) (1, 1′) (2′, 2) (2, 2′)
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
TTC ends up at allocation σ = (1, 1′, 2, 2′) ∈ C(E , εSco). However, there is another
allocation σ′ = (1′, 1, 2′, 2) ∈ C(E , εSco).
We move to existence of Minmax and strict Minmax Cores. We first show the
possible emptiness of strict Minmax Core.
Proposition 4.3.3 There exists a market E where ∀i ∈ I, ≿i=≻Gi and C(E , εSMm) =
∅.
7. This result is similar to the one by Hong and Park (2017), since priority-to-good preference is a concept
very similar to the one of egocentric preference.
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It turns out that a positive result is established for the Minmax Core provided
an additional restriction on the initial allocation : all partners are initially close. As a
preliminary step, we define a modified version of the TTC algorithm (TTC1) algorithm
for markets verifying this additional condition.
4.3.1.1 The TTC1 algorithm
Take any market E where ≿i=≻Gi for all i ∈ I and d(
−→
σ0(C)) = 0 for all C ∈ C.
We begin with some useful basic notations and definitions. Given a non-empty
subset G′ of G, we denote the first-best good of individual i in G′ according to pi by
1G′(i). Moreover, for any couple C = {i, i′} and any G′ ⊆ G, we define the first-best
good for C in G′ as the good x(C,G′) such that :
- x(C,G′) = 1G(i) if r(1G(i), pi) ≤ r(1G′(i′), pi′)
- x(C,G′) = 1G′(i′) if r(1G(i), pi) > r(1G′(i′), pi′)
The TTC1 algorithm (TTC1) operates as follows.
Stage 1 : Define the directed graph D1 with couples as vertices such that (C,C ′) ∈
D1 if and only if x(C,G) ∈ σ0(C ′). Observe that each couple points in D1 to at least
one couple and at most two couples. Since each vertex has a strictly positive out-degree,
D1 contains a cycle T1 = {C1, ..., CK} where : 8
- Ck ̸= Ck′ for all k ̸= k′ ∈ {1, ..., K},
- x(Ck, G) ∈ σ0(Ck+1) for all k ∈ {1, ..., K} (with the convention K + 1 ≡ 1)
Define allocation σ1 by :
-
−→
σ1(C) =
−→
σ0(C) for all C ∈ C\T1,
-
−→
σ1(Ck) = (ik+1, i′k+1) if x(Ck, G) = 1G(ik) = ik+1 and
−→
σ1(Ck) = (i′k+1, ik+1) if
x(Ck, G) = 1G(i′k) = ik+1 for all Ck = {ik, i′k} ∈ T1.
Define C2 = C\T1 and G2 = G\ ∪C∈T1 σ0(C).
...
Stage s : Define the directed graph Ds with vertices in Cs such that (C,C ′) ∈ Ds
if and only if x(C,Gs) ∈ σs−1(C ′). Then built cycle Ts = {C1, ..., CS} such that :
- Cs ̸= Cs′ for all s ̸= s′ ∈ {1, ..., S},
- x(Cs, Gs) ∈ σs−1(Cs+1) for all s ∈ {1, ..., S} (with the convention S + 1 ≡ 1)
Moreover, define allocation σs by :
-
−→
σs(C) =
−−→
σs−1(C) for all C ∈ Tk where k < s,
-
−→
σs(C) =
−−→
σs−1(C) for all C ∈ Cs\Ts
-
−→
σs(Cs) = (is+1, i′s+1) if x(Cs, Gs) = 1Gs(is) = is+1 and
−→
σs(Cs) = (i′s+1, is+1) if
8. Note that whenever several cycles coexist in a stage, they are mutually disjoint, and we form exactly
one of them before proceeding to the next stage.
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x(Cs, Gs) = 1Gs(i′s) = is+1 for all Cs = {is, i′s} ∈ Ts
Define Cs+1 = Cs\Ts and Gs+1 = Gs\ ∪C∈Ts σs−1(C).
Since Cs+1 ⊊ Cs for all s ≥ 1, the algorithm ends in finitely many stages, until
some stage Z where CZ+1 = GZ+1 = ∅.
It should be obvious that TTC1 coincides with TTC when all individuals are singles.
Considering couples instead of individuals as basic elements of cycles, the main diffe-
rence with TTC relates to the definition of the first-best good for a couple : among the
(at most) two goods that are first-best for one of the partners, we select the one with
lowest rank in the relevant ordering of goods. In case of a tie, any of the two goods can
be chosen.
TTC1 is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.3.3 Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, ..., 4, 4′}, L = {L1, L2} with
L1 = {1, 1′, 2, 2′}, L2 = {3, 3′, 4, 4′}, C = {C1, ..., C4} with Ci = {i, i′} for all i =
1, 2, 3, 4, ≿n= (≿G1 , ...,≿Gn ), and
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′ 3 3′ 4 4′
1 1′ 2 2′ 1 2 1 2
... ... ... ... 2 4′ 2 3′
4 1 3 1
3 1′ 4 1′
... 3 ... 4′
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Stage 1 : The first-best good for 1 is 1 and the first-best good for 1′ is 1′. Since r(1, p1) =
r(1′, p1′), we choose (arbitrarily) x(C1, G) = 1. This allows to build T1 = {C1}, leading
to allocation σ1 defined by
-
−→
σ1(C) =
−→
σ0(C) for all C ∈ C\T1 = {C2, C3, C4},
- σ1(1) = 1, σ1(1′) = 1′
Thus, C2 = {C2, C3, C4} and G2 = G\ ∪C∈T1 σ0(C) = {2, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′}.
Stage 2 : The first-best good for 2 in G2 is 2 and the first-best good for 2′ in G2 is
2′. Since r(2, p2) = r(2′, p2′), we can take x(C2, G2) = 2. Hence cycle T2 = {C2} and
allocation σ2 defined by
-
−→
σ2(C) =
−→
σ1(C) for all C ∈ {C1, C3, C4},
- σ2(2) = 2, σ2(2′) = 2′
Thus, C3 = {C3, C4} and G3 = G2\ ∪C∈T2 σ1(C) = {3, 3′, 4, 4′}.
Stage 3 : The first-best good for 3 in G3 is 4 and the first-best good for 3′ in G3
is 4′. Since r(4′, p3′) < r(4, p3), x(C3, G3) = 4′. Similarly, x(C4, G3) = 3′. Hence cycle
T3 = {C3, C4} and the final allocation σ3 defined by
-
−→
σ3(C) =
−→
σ2(C) for all C ∈ {C1, C2},
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- σ3(3′) = 4′, σ3(4′) = 3′
- σ3(3) = 4, σ3(4) = 3
We show that every outcome of TTC1 is a Minmax core allocation. As a conse-
quence, we get the following proposition :
Proposition 4.3.4 C(E , εMm) ̸= ∅ in any market E where ≿i=≻Gi for all i ∈ I and
d(
−→
σ0(C)) = 0 for all C ∈ C.
4.3.2 Priority-to-Distance Preferences
We assume in the sequel that ≿i=≻Di for each agent i in any market. In contrast
with the case of priority-to-good preferences, TTC may not terminate at a strict Core
allocation under priority-to-distance preferences. To see why, consider again example
1, where preferences give priority to distance, and where the TTC outcome is not in
the Core. Therefore, it is not in the strict Core.
Observe that partners of both couples are at initial distance 0. Moreover, given
any initial distribution of goods among locations, trades can be organized so as to
ensure that all partners are close. We say in that case that the market is 0-solvable.
A classification of markets is obtained by considering the minimal number of couples
with distant partners that trades can secure. Given any allocation σ in a market E ,
we define Ψ(σ, E) = |{{i, i′} ⊂ I : d(σ(i), σ(i′)) = 1}| as the number of couples whose
partners remain distant at σ.
Definition 4.3.1 A market E is s-solvable if min{Ψ(σ, E), σ ∈ Σ} = s where s ≤ n.
An s-solvable market is such that at least s couples will remain distant at any
allocation.
We consider Core existence having in mind this classification of markets.
Proposition 4.3.5 For all s ≥ 1, there exists a s-solvable market E where ≿i=≻Di
such that ∀ε ∈ {εco, εMm, εSMm, εSco}, C(E , εSco) = ∅.
The class of 0-solvable markets remains to be considered.
Proposition 4.3.6 There exists a 0-solvable market E where ≿i=≻Di such that ∀ε ∈
{εSMm, εSco}, C(E , ε) = ∅.
The non-emptiness of C(E , εMm) (hence of C(E , εco)) for 0-solvable markets remains
to be investigated. We conjecture that C(E , εMm) is non-empty at least for 2-location
markets. A partial answer to this conjecture is given for 0-solvable markets where all
partners are initially close.
Proposition 4.3.7 C(E , εMm) ̸= ∅ in any market E where ≿i=≻Di for all i ∈ I and
Ψ(σ0, E) = 0.
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However, a similar result no longer holds for the refinement εSMm of εMm.
Proposition 4.3.8 There exists a market E where ≿i=≻Di for all i ∈ I and Ψ(σ0, E) =
0 such that C(E , εSMm) = ∅.
We can ensure the existence of the strict Core when all partners are initially close
under the additional assumption of two locations. First, we introduce a second modified
Top-Trading-Cycles (TTC2) algorithm
4.3.2.1 The TTC2 algorithm
Take any market E with Ψ(σ0, E) = 0 and | L |= 2.
Stage 1 : Form a subset T1 = {i1, ..., iK} of I verifying :
- ∀i ∈ T1, i′ /∈ T1,
- ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1}, ik+1 = argmaxG pik and argmaxG piK ∈ {i1, i′1}.
It should be obvious that a set such as T1 exists. Moreover, T1 is not a top trading
cycle. Indeed, while all individuals but the last one point to their successor’s good as
first-best good, the individual involved last may point to the good owned by the first
individual’s partner. Moreover, if an individual is involved in T1, then her partner is
not.
Call T1-compatible an allocation σ
1 such that σ1(i) = i for all i with {i, i′}∩T1 = ∅,
and for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}
- ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K}, σ1(ik) = argmaxG pik ,
- ∀k ∈ {2, ..., K}, if d(σ1(ik), i′k) = 0, σ1(i′k) = i′k,
- if d(σ1(i1), i′1) = 0, σ1(i′1) = i1 if σ1(iK) = i′1, and σ1(i′1) = i′1 otherwise,
- ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K}, if d(σ1(ik), i′k) = 1, d(σ1(ik), σ1(i′k)) = 0.
With words, allocation σ1 is T1−compatible if each individual ik in T1 gets her
successor’s good while all partners stay at distance 0. Moreover, in the case where ik
does not change the location of her good, her partner must keep her initial good. A
small difficulty arises when the last individual iK in T1 does not point to i1 but to the
partner i′1 of i1, and when i1 does not change the location of her good. We solve it by
assigning good i1 to i
′
1.
We claim that a T1-compatible allocation exists. This is obvious if for all k, ik+1
and i′k belong to the same location. Moreover, observe that the two sets B
1→2(T1) =
{ik ∈ T1 : ik ∈ L1 and argmaxG pik ∈ L2} and B2→1(T1) = {ik ∈ T1 : ik ∈ L2 and
argmaxG pik ∈ L1} have the same cardinality. Pick any bijection Ω : B1→2(T1) →
B2→1(T1) and define σ1 by
- for all ik ∈ B1→2(T1), σ1(i′k) = [Ω(ik)]′,
- for all ik ∈ B2→1(T1), σ1(i′k) = [Ω−1(ik)]′,
- for all ik ∈ T1\[B1→2(T1) ∪B2→1(T1)], σ1(i′k) = i′k,
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- for all i ∈ I\T1, σ1(i) = i and σ1(i′) = i′.
In the case where σ1(iK) = i′1, we proceed as follows. Suppose i1 ∈ B1→2(T1)
and Ω(i1) = j. Then σ1(j′) = i1. Similarly, if i1 ∈ B2→1(T1) and Ω−1(i1) = j, then
σ1(j′) = i1.
It is straightforward to check that σ1 is T1-compatible. By construction, Ψ(σ0, E) =
0.
Remove T1 from I and remove H1 = {σ1(i) : i ∈ T1} from G. Define I2 = I\T1
and G2 = G\H1. Observe that I2 and G2 may not coincide. Indeed, if σ1(iK) = i′1,
i′1 ∈ I2\G2. Moreover |I2| = |G2|.
The set I2 is partitioned into two sets :
- Is2 = {i ∈ I2 : i′ ∈ T1} is the set of individual in I2 whose partner i′ assigned her
final good in T1.
- If2 = {i ∈ I2 : {i, i′} ∩ T1 = ∅} is the set of individuals in I2 such that neither i
nor i′ trades at stage 1 (therefore σ1(j) = j for all j ∈ If2 ).
For each i ∈ Is2 , define G2,i = {j ∈ G2 : d(j, σ1(i′)) = 0} as the set of available
goods close to the one assigned to i′ by σ1.
For each i ∈ I2, we define the linear order q2i over G2 by :
- ∀i ∈ Is2 , (1) ∀j ∈ G2,i, ∀h ∈ G2\G2,i, jq2i h, (2) q2i |G2,i= pi |G2,i , and (3) q2i |G2\G2,i=
pi |G2\G2,i 9,
- ∀i ∈ If2 , q2i = pi |G2 .
Stage 2 : Form a subset T2 = {i1, ..., iK2} of I2 verifying :
- ∀i ∈ T2, i′ /∈ T2,
- ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K2−1}, σ1(ik+1) = argmaxG2 qik , and argmaxG2 qiK2 ∈ {σ1(i1), σ1(i′1)}.
Call (T1, T2)-compatible an allocation σ2 such that :
- σ2(i) = σ1(i) = i for all i with {i, i′} ∩ (T1 ∪ T2) = ∅,
- σ2(i) = σ1(i) for all i ∈ T1,
and for all k ∈ {1, ..., K2},
- σ2(ik) = argmaxG2 qik ,
- if ik ∈ If2 ∩ T2 and d(σ2(ik), i′k) = 0, σ2(i′k) = σ1(i′k) = i′k,
- if ik ∈ If2 ∩ T2 and d(σ2(ik), i′k) = 1, d(σ2(ik+1), σ2(i′k)) = 0.
By the same argument as the one above, a (T1, T2)-compatible allocation always
exists.
Remove T2 from I2 and remove H2 = {σ2(i) ∈ G2 : i ∈ T2} from G2. Define
I3 = I2\T2 and G3 = G2\H2.
9. For a linear order p over the set X, we define p |X′ over the set X ′ ⊆ X such that for all i, j ∈ X ′ ,
ip |X′ j if and only if ipj
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The set I3 is partitioned into two sets :
- Is3 = {i ∈ I3 : i′ ∈ T1 ∪ T2} contains individuals in I3 whose partner i′ is assigned
a good in either T1 or T2.
- If3 = {i ∈ I3 : {i, i′} ∩ T1 ∪ T2 = ∅} contains individuals in I3 such that neither i
nor i′ trades at stage 1 or stage 2 (therefore σ2(j) = σ2(j) for j ∈ If3 ).
For each i ∈ Is3 , define G3,i = {j ∈ G3 : d(j, σ2(i′)) = 0} as the set of available
goods close to the one assigned to i′ by σ2.
For each i ∈ I3 define q3i as the linear order over G3 such that :
- ∀i ∈ Is3 , (1) ∀j ∈ G3,i, ∀h ∈ G3\G3,i, jq3i h, (2) q3i |G3,i= pi |G3,i , and (3) q3i |G3\G3,i=
pi |G3\G3,i ,
- ∀i ∈ If3 , q3i = pi |G3 .
...
Stage s : Form a subset Ts = {i1, ..., iKs} ⊂ Is of Is such that :
- ∀i ∈ Ts, i′ /∈ Ts,
- ∀l ∈ {1, ..., Ks−1}, σs(ik+1) = argmaxGs qsik , and argmaxGs qsiKs ∈ {σs−1(i1), σs−1(i′1)}.
Call σs as a (T1, T2, ..., Ts)-compatible allocation along the same line as for σ2.
Remove Ts from Is and remove Hs = {σs(i) ∈ Gs : i ∈ Ts} from Gs Define
Is+1 = Is\Ts and Gs+1 = Gs\Hs.
...
Since a non-empty subset can be formed at each stage, the algorithm stops at
stage s∗ such that Is∗+1 = Gs∗+1 = ∅. Denote the resulting (T1, T2, ..., Ts∗) compatible
allocation by σ∗.
With words, the algorithm works as follows. Starting from a situation where all
partners are close to each other, form a cycle T1. For individuals not changing location
when getting their successor’s good, keep their partner at their initial endowment (so
partners stay at distance 0). For individuals changing location when getting their suc-
cessor’s good, assign their partner a good initially owned by an individual j who does
not trade in T1, while her partner j
′ does and changes location in the opposite way. By
construction, the number of trades in T1 implying a move from L1 to L2 is equal to
the number of trades in T1 implying a move from L2 to L1. Thus such an allocation is
feasible, and keeps all partners at distance 0.
Remove T1 from the set of individuals, and make all goods traded in T1 unavailable
for further trade. Thus, we have two types of individuals : those who did not trade
yet, and those whose partner has traded in T1. Remark that they may be currently
endowed with a good different from their initial one. Now each remaining individual i
points to the individual j endowed with i′s first-best available good defined as follows.
If i′ ∈ T1, i’s first-best good is the one maximizing her satisfaction given the location
of her partner’s good. Since priority is given to distance, this first-best must be in
that location. If i′ /∈ T1, i’s first-best good is the one maximizing her satisfaction over
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all available goods. This allows to build a new cycle T2, and to define a new current
allocation along the same lines as the previous one :
- all individuals in T1 keep their current good (they do so forever)
- all individuals in T2 get their first-best good (and keep it forever)
- each partner i′ of an individual i in T2 stays at status quo if i does not change
location while trading, and gets a good in her partner’s new location otherwise.
This process continues until there is no remaining individual (and good available
for trade). The resulting allocation is denoted by σ∗.
The algorithm makes each couple C active in exactly two stages :
- In the first stage s(C), one partner i gets as final good her best good among
available ones, while i′ either stays with good i′ (or i), or gets a new good close to the
one obtained by i.
- In the second stage s′(C), i′ gets as final good her first-best good among those
available and close to the good obtained by i.
Note that in any stage s whenever there are two cycles T and T ′ and a couple
C = {i, i′} such that i ∈ T and ′ ∈ T ′, we form only one of them and proceed to the
next stage. This implies that which cycle is formed may influence the final allocation.
To conclude, we illustrate TTC2 with the following example.
Example 4.3.4 Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, ..., 4, 4′}, L = {L1, L2}, L1 =
{1, 1′, 4, 4′}, L1 = {2, 2′, 3, 3′} and Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4,. Moreover ≿i=≻Di
for all i ∈ I. Consider the following profile over goods
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′ 3 3′ 4 4′
2 1′ 1′ 1′ 4 1 2′ 1
1 4 3 3 4′ 2 1 1′
2′ 3 4 4 2 4 1′ 3
1′ 4′ 2 2′ 2′ 2′ 2 3′
3 1 1 3′ 3 1′ 4′ 2
3′ 2 3′ 4′ 3′ 3′ 3 4
4 3′ 4′ 2 1′ 4′ 3′ 4′
4′ 2′ 2′ 1 1 3 4 2′
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Stage 1 : The first-best good for 1 is 2 and the first-best good for 2 and 1′is 1′ . One can
form either T1 = {1, 2} or T1 = {1′}. Suppose T1 = {1, 2} is chosen. This gives σ1(1) =
2, σ1(2) = 1′. Moreover, B1→2(T1) = {1} and B2→1(T1) = {2}. Pick the bijection
Ω : B1→2(T1) → B2→1(T1) such that Ω(1) = 2. Therefore σ1(1′) = σ0([Ω(1)]′) = 2′
and σ1(2′) = σ0(1) = 1. Note that σ1 keeps all agents in C1 and C2 close to their
partner. Moreover σ1(i) = σ0(i) = i for all i = 3, 3′, 4, 4′. We remove the set T1
from I and remove the set H1 = {1′, 2} from G. Hence I2 = {1′, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′} and
G2 = {1, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′}.
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Note that Is2 = {1′, 2′} and If2 = {3, 3′, 4, 4′}.
Stage 2 : In restriction to G2, the first-best good for 1′ in L2 is 3, the first-best
good for 3 is 4 and the first-best good for 4 is 2′ which is owned by agent 1′. Note that,
since agent 1 gets a good in L2 as a final good, agent 1′ maximizes her satisfaction by
getting her first best in L2. Thus, one can form T2 = {1′, 3, 4}. We get B1→2(T2) = 4 and
B2→1(T2) = 3. Pick the bijection Ω such that Ω(4) = 3. Therefore σ2(1′) = 3, σ2(3) = 4
and σ2(4) = 2′. Furthermore, σ2(3′) = σ1([Ω−1(3)]′) = 4′ and σ2(4′) = σ1([Ω(4)]′) = 3′.
Note again that σ2 keeps all agents in C1, C2 and C3 close to their partner. We also
have σ2(i) = σ1(i) for all i = 1, 2, 2′, 4, 4′. We remove the set T2 from I2 and remove
the set H2 = {2′, 3, 4} from the set G2. Hence I3 = {2′, 3′, 4′} and G3 = {1, 3′, 4′}.
Stage 3 : The first-best available good for 4′ in L2 is 3′. Since 4′ currently owns
the good 3′ (i.e., σ2(4′) = 3′), one can form T3 = {4′} and get σ3(4′) = 3′. Moreover
σ3(i) = σ2(i) for all i = 1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′, 4. The set T3 is removed from I3 and H3 = {3′}
is removed from G3. Hence I4 = {2′, 3′} and G4 = {1, 4′}.
Stage 4 : The first-best available good for 2′ in L1 is 4′ (owned by 3′) and the
first-best available good for 3′ in L1 is 1 (owned by 2′). This gives T4 = {2′, 3′} and
σ4(2′) = 4′, σ4(4′) = 1. For all i = 1, 1′, 2, 3, 4, 4′, σ4(i) = σ3(i). The set T4 is removed
from I3 and H3 = {1, 4′} is removed from G3. Then, I5 = G5 = ∅ so the algorithm
stops. Hence, one outcome of the algorithm σ∗ = σ4 = (2, 3, 1′, 4′, 4, 1, 2′, 3′).
Observe that at each stage other subsets can be chosen. Hence, one may generate
several trading trajectories. The reader can check that five allocations can be obtained
as TTC2 outcomes : (2, 3, 1′, 4, 2′, 3′, 4′, 1), (2, 3, 1′, 4, 3′, 2′, 4′, 1), (1, 1′, 3, 2, 4, 4′, 2′, 3′),
(1, 1′, 2, 3, 4, 4′, 2′, 3′), (1, 1′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′, 2′, 2). This illustrates the multiplicity of TTC2
outcomes.
We claim that all outcomes of TTC2 belong to C(E , εSco). As a consequence, we get
the following proposition :
Proposition 4.3.9 C(E , εSco) ̸= ∅ in any market E where ≿i=≻Di for all i ∈ I,
| L |= 2 and Ψ(σ0, E) = 0.
4.3.3 Properties of The Core
Next, we consider two properties for the Core for each couple agreement : individual
rationality and Pareto optimality. Given a profile R over allocations, an allocation σ
is individually rational if σRiσ
0 for all individuals i. The set of individually rational
allocations is denoted by Σ(σ0, R). It is fairly obvious that core allocations in Shapley-
Scarf with singles are individually rational, since individuals can block by themselves.
However, this is no longer true in our setting.
Proposition 4.3.10 There exists E such that C(E , ε) ⊈ Σ(σ0, R) for all ε ∈ {εMm, εSMm, εSco, εco}.
Let us turn to Pareto optimality. An allocation σ is Pareto optimal in E if there is
no σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ′Riσ for all i ∈ I with σ′Pjσ for some j ∈ I. It is well-known that
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core allocations in standard Shapley-Scarf markets may not be Pareto efficient (Roth
and Postlewaite (1977)). Moreover, when there is no indifference, there exists a unique
strict core allocation, which is Pareto efficient (and coincides with the competitive
allocation). A similar result prevails in our setting.
Proposition 4.3.11 (1) In any market E, every σ ∈ C(E , εSco) with ε ∈ {εSco, εSMm}
is Pareto optimal.
(2) There exists a market E where σ ∈ C(E , εco) is not Pareto optimal.
As already mentioned, TTC defines a strategy-proof mechanism for standard Shapley-
Scarf markets. A natural question is investigating whether the (modified) TTC defined
for generalized markets also satisfy strategy-proofness. Proposition 2 states that the
outcome of TTC belongs to the Core with priority-to-goods preferences. It is straight-
forward to check that the argument used in Roth (1982) can be transposed to establish
strategy-proofness of TTC in our setting. Also for the case of priority-to-goods prefe-
rences, Proposition 4 shows that TTC1 always terminates at a Minmax Core allocation
if all partners are initially close to each other. Moreover, TTC1 may not have a unique
outcome. This creates a difficulty in defining strategy-proofness. However, one easily
shows that strategy-proofness may be violated in restriction to profiles ensuring a
unique TTC1 outcome.
Example 4.3.5 Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′}, L = {L1, L2, L3},
L1 = {1, 1′}, L2 = {2, 2′}, L3 = {3, 3′}, and Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2. Preferences
over goods are
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′ 3 3′
1 1′ 1 1 1 1
... ... 1′ 3′ 1′ 2′
2 ... 2 3′
3 ... ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
If ≿i=≻Gi for all i ∈ I, the profile over allocations is defined by 10
R =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′ 3 3′
(1, 1′) (1, 1′) (1, 1′) (1′, 1) (1, 1′) (1′, 1)
... ... (1, G\1′) (G\1′, 1) (1, G\1′) (G\1′, 1)
(1′, 1) (3, 3′) (1′, 1) (2, 2′)
(1′, G\1) (G\3, 3′) (1′, G\1) ...
(2, 2′) ... (2, 2′)
(2, G\2′) ...
(3, 3′)
(3, G\3′)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
10. For any G′ ⊆ G, any x ∈ G and any i ∈ I, putting (x,G′) in Ri means that individual i is indifferent
between all (x, y) such that y ∈ G′.
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It is easily checked that σ = (1, 1′, 3, 3′, 2, 2′) is the unique TTC1 outcome. If indi-
vidual 2 reports any preference over goods with good 2 at top, one gets G2 = I\{1}
and x(C2, G2) = 2. Thus T2 = {C2} is the unique TTC1 at stage 2 and σ2 =
(1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′). In the third stage, we get x(C3, {3, 3′}) = 3′. Thus T3 = {C3} is
the unique TTC1 at stage 3 and σ′ = (1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′) is the unique TTC1 outcome.
Since σZ
′
R2σ
Z, strategy-proofness is violated.
In markets with two locations where all partners are initially close and preferences
give priority to distance, Proposition 9 shows that TTC2 always terminates at a strict
Core allocation. We show that TTC2 is manipulable for a specific way to extend pre-
ferences over allocations to preferences over sets of allocations. Given a linear order ≻
over a finite set X, and given any two non-empty subsets A and B of X, we say that
A is better than B according to the Fishburn criterion if a ≻ b ≻ c for all a ∈ A\B,
all b ∈ A ∩ B and all c ∈ B\A (Fishburn, 1972). The following example shows that
TTC2 fails at satisfying strategy-proofness under the Fishburn criterion : there exists
a 2-location market where all partners are initially close and have priority-to-distance
preferences such that one individual can by misreporting her preference ensure a better
set of outcomes of TTC2 in the Fishburn sense.
Example 4.3.6 Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′}, L = {L1, L2},
L1 = {1, 1′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′}, L2 = {2, 2′} and Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Preferences
over goods are defined by
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′ 3 3′ 4 4′
2 1′ 3 2′ 1 4 4 1
1 ... ... ... 3 4′ ... 4′
... 3′ ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
If ≿i=≻Di for all i ∈ I, the profile R over allocations is defined by
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
(2, L1\{2}) (L1\{1′}, 1′) (3, L1\{3}) (L1\{2′}, 2′)
(1, L1\{1}) ... ... ...
...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
3 3′ 4 4′
(1, L1\{1}) (4′, 4) (4, 4′) (L1\{1}, 1)
(3, L1\{3}) (4, 4′) ... (4, 4′)
... (L1\{3′}, 3′) ...
...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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At the first stage, one can form one of the four subsets {1, 2, 3}, {1′}, {2′}, and {4}.
It is easily checked that whichever set is chosen, there is a unique TTC2 outcome
σ = (2, 1′, 3, 2′, 1, 3′, 4, 4′). Now if individual 3′ reports an order over goods with 4′ at top,
this creates a new possible subset {3′, 4′, 1, 2} at the first stage. Observe that σ remains
a TTC2 outcome. However, forming {3′, 4′, 1, 2} leads to an additional outcome σ′ with−→
σ′ (3, 3′) ∈ (4, 4′). Since σ′P3′σ, TTC2 is not strategy-proof in the Fishburn sense.
4.4 Concluding comments
In this paper, we consider a generalization of Shapley-Scarf markets which naturally
fits with the design of a centralized job mobility procedure involving couples. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first at explicitly involving a distance criterion
in the preference structure. We assume that individuals retain two criteria in order to
compare allocations : the quality of their assigned good and its distance to the partner’s
assigned good. Moreover, we focus on two polar cases, each giving priority to one of
these two criteria.
Attention is mostly paid to the existence of core stable allocations. When assuming
that no coalition breaking a couple is admissible, several refinements of the core can be
considered, each corresponding to a specific type of agreement among partners (strict
core, Minmax, and strict Minmax). Since the core may be empty without restriction
upon preferences. Moreover, we focus on two polar cases, each giving priority either to
the criterion of good quality or to the criterion of distance.
Several open questions remain to be addressed. In the case of priority-to-good pre-
ferences, we show that TTC always finds a core allocation and that a modified TTC
finds a Minmax core allocation under the assumption that all partners are initially close
to each other. Even under this assumption, the strict Minmax core may be empty. An
unsolved question is the existence of Minmax core allocations when at least one couple
involves initially distant partners. In the case of priority-to-distance preferences, our
results show that the initial distribution of goods among locations matters. If no allo-
cation can make all partners close to each other, the core may be empty. Even if one
allocation at least can ensure all partners to be close to each other, the strict Core and
the strict Minmax core may be empty. Whether Minmax core (and thus core) alloca-
tions always exist remains to be answered. However, we establish the non-emptiness of
the Minmax core in the specific situation where all partners being initially close. If we
further assume that there are exactly two locations, the strict core is also non-empty.
An interesting issue is considering the case of at least three locations.
Finally, all results are based on a discrete distance. Obviously, this calls for an
analysis of Shapley-Scarf markets with more general geographical structure.
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4.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′}, L = {L1, L2}, L1 = {1, 2, 3},
L2 = {1′, 2′, 3′}, and C = {C1, C2, C3}, with C1 = {1, 1′}, C2 = {2, 2′}, C3 = {3, 3′}.
Consider the profile over goods
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′ 3 3′
1′ 1′ 2′ 2′ 3′ 3′
3′ 2′ 3′ 1′ 1 2′
1 2 2 3 2 1′
2 3 1 2 3 3
3 1 3 1 ... 2
... ... ... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Preference extensions are such that (1, 0) ≻i (2, 0) ≻i (3, 0) ≻i (4, 0) ≻i ... for
all i ∈ I. Clearly, this partial order can be completed so as to be separable. Let
σ ∈ C(E , εco). Observe that at least one couple has to remain distant. Actually, σ must
make exactly one couple being distant. Indeed, if σ make two couples C and C ′ distant,
we have Γ(i, σ) = {(r, 1)}1≤r≤n for all i ∈ C∪C ′. It is easily checked that there exists an
allocation σ′ with Γ(i, σ′) ∈ {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0)} for all i ∈ C∪C ′. Since Γ(i, σ′) ≻
Γ(i, σ) for all i ∈ C∪C ′, then we get σ′Piσ for all i ∈ C∪C ′. Hence r(σ′, Ri) < r(σ,Ri)
for all i ∈ C ∪ C ′. So that Γ(σ′, R, C) ≪ Γ(σ,R,C) and Γ(σ′, R, C ′) ≪ Γ(σ,R,C ′). It
implies σ′εcoC σ, σ
′εC′coσ and ⌉(σεCσ′), ⌉(σεC′σ′). Therefore, C and C ′ blocks σ with σ′,
which is a contradiction.
Suppose that d(σ(1), σ(1′)) = 0 and d(σ(2), σ(2′)) = 0. Moreover, suppose {σ(2), σ(2′)} ⊂
L1. It is easily checked that since d(σ(3), σ(3′)) = 1, then {C2, C3} blocks σ with
σ′ = (1, 1′, 3′, 2′, 2, 3). Indeed, 2, 2′ ranked higher the allocation that assigned them−→σ (C2) = (3′, 2′) where Γ(2, σ′) = (2, 0) and Γ(2′, σ′) = (1, 0) to another alloca-
tion σ which assigned them goods in L1 since Γ(i, σ) = (k, 0) where k ≥ 3 for
i ∈ {2, 2′}. Moreover 3, 3′ ranked higher the allocation σ′ such that −→σ′ (C3) = (2, 3)
where Γ(3, σ′) = (3, 0) and Γ(3′, σ′) = (4, 0) to any other allocation that make them
distant. If {σ(1), σ(1′)} ⊂ L1, a similar argument shows that {C1, C3} blocks σ with
σ′ = (3′, 1′, 2, 2′, 1, 3). Thus, d(σ(1), σ(2)) = 0 and d(σ(3), σ(4)) = 0 contradicts
σ ∈ C(E , εco).
The rest of the proof follows the same line. If d(σ(1), σ(1′)) = 0 and d(σ(3), σ(3′)) =
0, then
- If {σ(3), σ(3′)} ⊂ L1, then {C2, C3} blocks σ with σ′ = (1, 1′, 2, 3, 3′, 2′).
- If {σ(1), σ(1′)} ⊂ L1, then {C1, C2} blocks σ with σ′ = (1′, 2′, 1, 2, 3, 3′).
Finally, if d(σ(1), σ(1′)) = 1, then d(σ(2), σ(2′)) = d(σ(3), σ(3′)) = 0.
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- If {σ(2), σ(2′)} ⊂ L1, then {C1, C2} blocks σ with σ′ = (1, 2, 2′, 1′, 3, 3′).
- If {σ(3), σ(3′)} ⊂ L1, then {C1, C3} blocks σ with σ′ = (1, 3, 2, 2′, 3′, 1′).
This proves that C(E , εco) = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 2
Take any market E where ≿i=≻Gi for all i ∈ I. Denote by σ the outcome of TTC at
some profile over goods p. We claim that σ ∈ C(E , εSco). Define {T1, ..., TK} as the set
of successive TTC. Suppose that σ /∈ C(εSco, p). Let S be a coalition blocking σ for εSco
with allocation γ. Let i∗ be the individual such that C = {i∗, i∗′} ∈ S and i∗ ∈ Tk∗.
Moreover for all k ∈ {1, ..., k∗ − 1} and for all i such that i ∈ Tk, we have {i, i′} /∈ S.
By definition of a blocking coalition, (r(γ,Ri∗), r(γ,Ri∗′)) < (r(σ,Ri∗), r(σ,Ri∗′)).
Suppose first that r(γ,Ri∗) < r(σ,Ri∗) and r(γ,Ri∗′) = r(σ,Ri∗′). The definition of
≻G ensures that r(γ(i∗), pi∗) < r(σ(i∗), pi∗) and d(σ(i∗), σ(i∗′)) = d(γ(i∗), γ(i∗′)). If
r(γ(i∗), pi∗) < r(σ(i∗), pi∗) then {γ(i∗), γ(i∗′)} ∈ S, while γ(i∗) ∈ Tk for some k < k∗.
This contradicts the definition of k∗. Secondly, consider the case where r(γ,Ri∗) <
r(σ,Ri∗) and r(γ,Ri∗′) < r(σ,Ri∗′). There are two possibilities in this case. First,
suppose σ(i∗) ̸= γ(i∗). Again the definition of ≻G ensures that r(γ, pi∗) < r(σ, pi∗),
so that the same contradiction as above holds. Now, suppose σ(i∗) = γ(i∗). Since
σ(i∗) = γ(i∗), σ(i∗) ∈ S. Iterating the same argument shows that γ(i) = σ(i) for
all i ∈ Tk∗ . Since we have r(γ,Ri∗) < r(σ,Ri∗) and σ(i∗) = γ(i∗), we must have
d(γ(i∗), γ(i∗′)) < d(σ(i∗), σ(i∗′)). Hence, r(γ(i∗′), pi∗′) < r(σ(i∗′), pi∗′). Suppose i∗′ ∈
Tk1 with k1 > k
∗. Since i∗′ gets with σ her first-best good among those available at
stage k1, i2 = γ(i∗′) ∈ Tk2 with k2 < k1, and {i2, i′2} ∈ S. Thus r(γ,Ri2) ⩽ r(σ,Ri2).
It follows that either γ(i2) = σ(i2) and d(γ(i2), γ(i′2)) ≤ d(σ(i2), σ(i′2)) or γ(i2) ∈ Tk3
with k3 < k2.
Consider the former case. Since γ(i∗′) ∈ Tk2 there must exist j ∈ Tk2 such that
i3 = γ(j) ∈ Tk3 with k3 < k2 and {i3, i′3} ∈ S. Thus we have built a set {i1, i2, i3}
such that i1 = i∗′ ∈ Tk1 , i2 ∈ Tk2 , i3 ∈ Tk3 , k3 < k2 < k1, σ(i1) = i2, σ(i2) = i3, and
{{i∗, i∗′}, {i2, i′2}, {i3, i′3}} ⊆ S. Iterating the construction leads to a set {i1, ..., iZ} such
that for all z ∈ {1, ..., Z − 1}, iz ∈ Tkz , γ(iz) = iz+1, {{i1, i′1}, ..., {iZ , i′Z}} ⊆ S, and
TkZ = Tk∗ < TkZ−1 < ... < Tk1 . This contradicts γ(i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ Tk∗ .
Proof of Proposition 3
Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, ..., 5, 5′}, L = {L1}, where L1 = I and
C = {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5}, with Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Consider the following
profile over goods
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p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′ 3 3′ 4 4′ 5 5′
4 1′ 2 1′ 3 4 3 4′ 5 5′
5 2′ 5 5′ 5 2′ 5′ 5 5′ 5
1 5′ 1 5 4′ 5′ 5 3′ ... ...
.. ... 5′ 3′ 5′ 3′ 2 5′ ... ...
1′ 2′ ... ... 4 1′
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Since Γ∼(σ0, R, C5) = (1, 1), σ ∈ C(εMm, p) only if −→σ (C5) = (5, 5′). Moreover, ob-
serve that Γ∼(σ0, R, C1) = (1, 3), Γ∼(σ0, R, C2) = Γ∼(σ0, R, C4) = (1, 5) and Γ∼(σ0, R, C3) =
(1, 4). Pick σ ∈ C(E , εMm). One must have ⌋(σ0εMmC σ) for all C ∈ C. Equivalently, one
of the two conditions below must be satisfied :
(1) Γ−(σ,R,C) < Γ−(σ0, R, C)
(2) Γ−(σ,R,C) ≥ Γ−(σ0, R, C) and Γ+(σ,R,C) ≤ Γ+(σ0, R, C)
Since Γ−(σ0, R, C) = 1 for all C, condition (1) cannot hold. It follows that
- Γ∼(σ,R,C1) ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 2)}
- Γ∼(σ,R,C2) ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 3), (3, 4)}
- Γ∼(σ,R,C3) ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3)}
- Γ∼(σ,R,C4) ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 3), (3, 4)}
Since −→σ (C5) = (5, 5′), one easily checks that :
- −→σ (C1) ∈ {(4, 1′), (4, 2′), (1, 1′)}
-−→σ (C2) ∈ {(2, 1′), (2, 3′), (2, 2′), (1, 1′), (1′, 3′)}, -−→σ (C3) ∈ {(3, 4), (3, 2′), (3, 3′), (4′, 4), (4′, 2′},
- −→σ (C4) ∈ {(3, 4′), (3, 3′), (3, 1′), (2, 4′), (2, 3′), (4, 4′)}.
Next, we identify all possible allocations satisfying the above requirements. This
leads to the following computation : starting with a couple of goods assigned to C1,
write all possible couples of goods that can be assigned to C2, then C3 and finally C4.
We link any two compatible couples with an arrow.
- (4, 1′)→ (2, 3′)→ (3, 2′)→ ∅,
- (4, 1′)→ (2, 2′)→ (3, 3′)→ ∅,
- (4, 2′)→ (2, 1′)→ (3, 3′)→ ∅,
- (4, 2′)→ (2, 3′)→ ∅,
- (4, 2′)→ (1, 1′)→ (3, 3′)→ (2, 4′),
- (1, 1′)→ (2, 3′)→ (3, 2′)→ (4, 4′),
- (1, 1′)→ (2, 3′)→ (4, 4′)→ ∅,
- (1, 1′)→ (2, 3′)→ (3, 4)→ ∅,
- (1, 1′)→ (2, 2′)→ (3, 3′)→ (4, 4′),
- (1, 1′)→ (2, 2′)→ (4, 4′)→ (3, 3′).
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This shows the existence of 4 possible allocations : σ0, σ1 = (1, 1′, 2, 3′, 3, 2′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′),
σ2 = (4, 2′, 1, 1′, 3, 3′, 2, 4′, 5, 5′), and σ3 = (1, 1′, 2, 2′, 4′, 4, 3, 3′, 5, 5′). Finally, it is
straightforward to check that :
- S = {C2, C3} blocks σ0 for εMm with σ1 : indeed, Γ∼(σ1, R, C2) = (1, 4) <
Γ∼(σ0, R, C2) = (1, 5) ⇒ σ1εMmC2 σ0, and Γ∼(σ1, R, C3) = (1, 2) < Γ∼(σ0, R, C3) = (1, 4)⇒ σ1εMmC3 σ0.
- S = {C1, C2, C4} blocks σ1 for εMm with σ2 : Γ∼(σ2, R, C1) = (1, 2)< Γ∼(σ1, R, C1) =
(1, 3) ⇒ σ2εMmC1 (p)σ1, Γ∼(σ2, R, C2) = (1, 3) < Γ∼(σ1, R, C3) = (1, 4) ⇒ σ2εMmC2 σ1, and
Γ∼(σ2, R, C4) = (1, 4) < Γ∼(σ1, R, C4) = (1, 5) ⇒ σ2εMmC4 σ1.
- S = {C3, C4} blocks σ2 for εMm with σ3 : indeed, Γ∼(σ3, R, C3) = (1, 3) <
Γ∼(σ2, R, C3) = (1, 4) ⇒ σ3εMmC3 σ2, and Γ∼(σ3, R, C4) = (1, 3) and Γ∼(σ2, R, C4) =
(1, 4) ensure σ3εMmC4 σ2.
- S = {C2, C3} blocks σ3 for εMm with σ1 : Γ∼(σ1, p, C2) = (1, 4) < Γ∼(σ3, R, C2) =
(1, 5) ⇒ σ1εMmC2 σ3, and Γ∼(σ1, R, C3) = (1, 2) < Γ∼(σ3, R, C3) = (1, 3) ⇒ σ2εMmC3 σ3.
This proves that C(εMm, p) = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 4
Take any market E where ≿i=≻Gi for all i ∈ I with d(
−→
σ0(C)) = 0 for all C. Consider
a resulting allocation σZ of TTC1. We claim that σZ ∈ C(E , εSMm). To see why, first
observe that for any C ∈ C and any z = {1, ..., Z}, C ∈ T z then σz(C) = σZ(C) and
d(σZ(i), σZ(i′)) = 0 for all C = {i, i′}.
Suppose that σZ /∈ C(E , εSMm), and let coalition S block σZ with σ. Pick C =
{ik, i′k} ∈ S ∩ T z be such that S ∩ [∪1≤z′<zT z′ ] = ∅. Assume without loss of generality
that x(C,Gz) = 1Gz(ik). By definition of εSMm, Γ−(σ,R,C) < Γ−(σZ , R, C). Moreover,
by definition of T z, r(σZ , pik) ≤ r(σZ , pi′k). This implies that preferences giving priority
to goods requires r(σ, pik) < r(σZ , pik) or r(σ, pik′ ) < r(σ
Z , pik). Hence one gets σ(C)∩
Gz
′ ̸= ∅ for some z′ < z. Thus S ⊈ Cz, in contradiction with the definition of C.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the market E defined in the proof of proposition 1, where preference ex-
tensions can be completed so as to be priority-to-distance. Since C(E , εco) = ∅, the
proof is complete for s = 1.
Suppose s > 1. Define E = {I¯ , G¯, C¯, L¯, p¯,≿n¯, σ¯0} as follows :
— I¯ = I ∪ Iˆ, where I ∩ Iˆ = ∅ and Iˆ = {i1, ..., i2(z−1)}
— C¯ = C∪Cˆ, where C∩Cˆ = ∅ and Cˆ = {Cˆh : 1 ≤ h ≤ z−1} where Cˆh = {i2h−1, i2h}
— L¯ = L ∪ Lˆ, where L ∩ Lˆ = ∅ and Lˆ = {{ih} : 1 ≤ h ≤ 2(z − 1)}
— p¯ = (p¯i)i∈I¯ is such that :
— ∀i, j, k ∈ I, [j pi k]⇔ [j p¯i k]
— ∀i, j ∈ I, ∀k ∈ Iˆ, [j p¯i k]
— ∀i ∈ Iˆ, r(i, pi) = 1
106
4.5. APPENDIX
— ∀i ∈ I¯, σ¯0(i) = i
Let σ ∈ C(E¯ , εco). From the definition of E together with the construction of E¯ ,
one has : (a) ∃h, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} with h ̸= k such that ∀i ∈ Ch ∪ Ck, d(σ(i), σ(c(i))) = 0,
(b) there exists a coalition S such that S∩ (Ch ∪ Ck) ̸= ∅ which blocks σ. Therefore
C(E¯ , εco) = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let E be such that I = G = {1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′}, C = {C1, ..., C6},
Ci = {i, i′} with i ∈ {1, ..., 6}, L1 = {1, ..., 6} and L2 = {1′, ..., 6′}. Consider the profile
over goods p where a set in some cell means that any ranking of the elements of this
set can be chosen : 11
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1, 1′ 2, 2′ 3, 3′ 4, 4′ 5, 5′ 6, 6′
L2 L2 L2 L2 L2 L2
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 1 1 5 4 4
3 3 2 6 6 5
... ... ... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Obviously, E is 0-solvable, with exactly 3 couples being assigned goods in L2. Pick
an allocation σ. By priority-to-distance preferences together with the definition of p, σ
is Core stable only if 3 couples are assigned goods in L2. Let z be the number of couples
C in {C1, C2, C3} such that σ(C) ⊂ L2. Observe that z ∈ {0, ..., 3} and consider the
following cases :
Case 1 : z ∈ {0, 3}
Case 1.1 : z = 0
If 1 ∈ σ(C1), {C1, C3} blocks σ for εSco with σ′ = (1′, 3′, 2, 2′, 3, 1, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′) if
σ(3) = 3 and with σ′′ = (1′, 3′, 2, 2′, 1, 3, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′) if either σ(3′) = 1 or 1 /∈ σ(C3).
If 1 /∈ σ(C1), {C1, C2} blocks σ for εSco with γ = (1, 2, 1′, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′).
Case 1.2 : z = 3
It follows that all 3 couples C in {C4, C5, C6} are such that σ(C) ⊂ L1, and a similar
argument applies.
Case 2 : z ∈ {1, 2}
Case 2.1 : z = 1
— Suppose σ(C1), σ(C2) ⊂ L1.
If 2 ∈ σ(C2), {C1, C2} blocks σ for εSco with γ = (1, 2, 1′, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′).
If 2 /∈ σ(C2), {C1, C2} blocks σ for εSco with γ′ = (1′, 2′, 2, 1, 3, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′).
— Suppose σ(C1), σ(C3) ⊂ L1.
11. We use the following conventions : L2pij if and only if ipij for all i ∈ L2.
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If 1 ∈ σ(C1), {C1, C3} blocks σ for εSco with δ = (1′, 3′, 2, 2′, 3, 1, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′)
if σ(3) = 3, and with δ′ = (1′, 3′, 2, 2′, 1, 3, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′) if either σ(3′) = 3 or
3 /∈ σ(C3).
If 1 /∈ σ(C1), {C1, C3} blocks σ for εSco with λ = (1, 3, 2, 2′, 1′, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′)
if σ(1) = 2, and with λ′ = (3, 1, 2, 2′, 1′, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′) if either σ(1′) = 2 or
2 /∈ σ(C1).
— Suppose σ(C2), σ(C3) ⊂ L1.
— Suppose 2 ∈ σ(C2).
If 1 ∈ σ(C2), {C2, C3} blocks σfor εSco with ρ = (1, 1′, 2′, 3′, 3, 2, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′)
if σ(3) = 3 and with ρ′ = (1, 1′, 2′, 3′, 2, 3, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′) if either σ(3′) = 3
or 3 /∈ σ(C3).
If σ(C3) = {1, 3}, {C2, C3} blocks σfor εSco with ω = (1, 1′, 2, 3, 2′, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′)
if σ(2) = 2, with ω′ = (1, 1′, 3, 2, 2′, 3′, 4, 4′, 5, 5′, 6, 6′) if σ(2′) = 2.
If 1 ∈ σ(C3) and 3 /∈ σ(C3), {C2, C3} blocks σ for εSco with ρ. If 1 /∈
σ(C2) ∪ σ(C3), {C2, C3} blocks σ for εSco with ρ if 3 ∈ σ(C2), with ω if
3 /∈ σ(C2) and σ(2) = 2, and with ω′ if 3 /∈ σ(C2) and σ(2′) = 2.
If 1 /∈ σ(C3), {C2, C3} blocks σ for εSco with ρ if σ(3) = 3, and with ρ′ if
either σ(3′) = 3 or 3 /∈ σ(C3).
— Suppose 2 /∈ σ(C2).
If σ(2) = 1, {C2, C3} blocks σ for εSco with ω′. If σ(2′) = 1, {C2, C3}
blocks σ for εSco with ω. If 1 /∈ σ(C2), {C2, C3} blocks σ for εSco with ω′ if
σ(3′) = 3, and with ω if either σ(3) = 3 or 3 /∈ σ(C2)
Case 2.2 : z = 2
It follows that 2 couples C in {C4, C5, C6} are such that σ(C) ⊂ L1, and a similar
argument applies.
Proof of Proposition 7
Take any market E where ≿i=≻Di for all i ∈ I with σ0(i) = i for all i ∈ I and
d(
−→
σ0(C)) = 0 for all C. Consider a resulting allocation σZ of TTC1. We claim that
σZ ∈ C(E , εSMm).
Suppose that σZ /∈ C(E , εSMm), and let coalition S block σZ with σ. Pick C =
{ik, i′k} ∈ S ∩ T z be such that S ∩ [∪1≤z′<zT z′ ] = ∅. Assume w.l.o.g. that x(C,Gz) =
1Gz(ik). By definition of εSMm, Γ−(σ,R,C) < Γ−(σZ , R, C). Moreover, by definition
of T z, r(σZ , pik) ≤ r(σZ , pi′k). This implies that preferences with priority to distance
require either r(σ, pik) < r(σZ , pik) or r(σ, pik′ ) < r(σ
Z , pik) (since d(σZ(ik), σZ(i′k)) =
0). Hence, one gets σ(C) ∩ Gz′ ̸= ∅ for some z′ < z. Thus S ⊈ Cz, in contradiction
with the definition of C.
Proof of Proposition 8
Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, ..., 5, 5′}, L = {L1, L2}, L1 = {1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′, 4, 4′},
L2 = {5, 5′} and C = {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5}, with Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Mo-
reover ≿i=≻Di for all i ∈ I and d(
−→
σ0(C)) = 0 for all C ∈ C. Consider the same profile
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p in the proof of Proposition 3. All arguments in the proof of Proposition 3 also apply
here. Hence we can conclude that C(εMm, p) = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose σ∗ /∈ C(E , εSco), and let S ⊆ C and γ ∈ Σ satisfying
(1) ∀C ∈ S, γεScoC (≿p)σ, and ⌉(σεScoC γ)
(2) σ(C\S) = σ0(C\S).
Claim 1 : Let C ∈ S. If C ∩ T1 ̸= ∅, then ∀i ∈ T1, γ(i) = σ∗(i) and {i, i′} ∈ S.
Proof of Claim 1 : Pick {j, j′} ∈ S with j ∈ T1. If γ(j) ̸= σ∗(j), γ(j) pj σ∗(j),
which contradicts the definition of T1. Thus γ(j) = σ∗(j) = j1. This implies in turn
that {j1, j′1} ∈ S with j1 ∈ T1. The conclusion follows from iterating the argument for
j1, j2, ... until all individual in T1 are taken into account.
Claim 2 : Let C ∈ S. If C ∩ T2 ̸= ∅, then ∀i ∈ T2, γ(i) = σ∗(i) and {i, i′} ∈ S.
Proof of Claim 2 : Pick {j, j′} ∈ S with j ∈ T2. If γ(j) ̸= σ∗(j), γ(j) q2j σ∗(j), which
implies γ(j) /∈ G2. This implies that γ(j) ∈ {σ1(i) : i ∈ T1}. In other words, either
γ(j) ∈ T1 or γ(j)′ ∈ T1. Since j /∈ T1, one contradicts claim 1. The conclusion follows
from iterating the argument for all individuals in T2.
Claim 3 : Let s ∈ {1, ..., s∗} and let C ∈ S. If C∩Ts ̸= ∅, then ∀i ∈ Ts, γ(i) = σ∗(i)
and {i, i′} ∈ S.
Proof of Claim 3 : Induction hypothesis : Let s ∈ {1, ..., s∗} and let C ∈ S. If
C ∩ Ts′ ̸= ∅ for some s′ < s, then ∀i ∈ Ts′ , γ(i) = σ∗(i) and {i, i′} ∈ S.
Pick {j, j′} ∈ S with j ∈ Ts. If γ(j) ̸= σ∗(j), γ(j) qsj σ∗(j), which implies γ(j) /∈ Gs.
Moreover, {γ(i), γ(i)′} ∈ S. By the induction hypothesis, one cannot have γ(i) ∈ Ts′
for some s′ < s. Thus γ(i)′ ∈ Ts′ and at stage s′ good γ(i) has been assigned to some j′
with j ∈ Ts′ . Again by the induction hypothesis, {j, j′} ∈ S. Moreover, since γ(j) /∈ Gs,
j′ ∈ Ts′′ with s′′ < s and one gets γ(j) = σ∗(j) and γ(j′) = σ∗(j′), in contradiction
with {j, j′} ∈ S.
For all C ∈ C, we denote the stage s′ such that C ∩ Ts′ ̸= ∅ by s′(C). Pick
C = {j1, j′1} ∈ S such that s′(C) ≤ s′(C ′) for all C ′ ∈ S. Assume w.l.o.g. that
j2 = γ(j1) ̸= σ∗(j1), and j1 ∈ Ts1 .
Case 1 : j2 ∈ Ts2 , and s2 = s({j2, j′2})
Since j2 = γ(j1) and j1 ∈ S, {j2, j′2} ∈ S. By Claim 3, γ(i) = σ∗(i) for all i ∈ Ts2 ,
which makes j2 = γ(j1) impossible.
Case 2 : j2 ∈ Ts2 , and s2 = s′({j2, j′2})
Since s′(C) ≤ s′(C ′) for all C ′ ∈ S, s2 ≥ s1. The algorithm ensures that s˜2 =
s({j2, j′2}) < s1 (otherwise, j2 ∈ Gs1 , in contradiction with σ∗(j1) ∈ Ts1 : j1 does not
point towards her first-best good). It follows that :
- j′2 ∈ Ts˜2 , {j2, j′2} ∈ S,
- good j2 has been assigned to some individual h2 with h
′
2 ∈ Ts˜2 ,
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- j2 /∈ Gs1 : good j2 has been assigned as final good before stage s1.
By Claim 3, {j2, j′2} ∈ S implies {h2, h′2} ∈ S, which contradicts s′(C) ≤ s′(C ′) for
all C ′ ∈ S.
Proof of Proposition 10
Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, 2, 2′}, L = {L1, L2}, L1 = {1, 1′}, L2 = {2, 2′}
and Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2. Consider the profile over goods
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
1′ 1′ 2′ 2′
2 1 1 2
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Suppose that all preference extensions give priority to distance : (1, 0) ≻i (2, 0) ≻i (1, 1)
≻i (2, 1) for all i ∈ I. This gives the profile over allocations
R =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
(1′, 1) (1, 1′) (2′, 2) (2, 2′)
(2, 2′) (1′, 1) (1, 1′) (2′, 2)
... ... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Consider allocation σ = (1′, 1, 2′, 2). Observe that Γ+(σ,R,Ci) = 2 and Γ−(σ,R,Ci)) =
1 for all i = 1, 2. This shows that σ ∈ C(E , εMm). Moreover, Γ∼(γ,R,Ci) < Γ∼(γ,R,Ci)
implies Γ+(γ,R,Ci)) = Γ−(γ,R,Ci)) = 1, which is clearly impossible. Hence σ ∈
C(E , εMm) ∩ C(E , εsMm). Since C(E , εMm) ⊆ C(E , εco) and C(E , εSMm) ⊆ C(E , εSco),
σ ∈ C(E , ε)for all ε ∈ {εMm, εSMm, εSco, εco}. However, σ0Piσ for i = 1′, 2′.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof of assertion (1) : Suppose σ ∈ C(E , εSco) is not Pareto optimal. So there
exists σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ′Riσ for all i ∈ I with σ′Pjσ for some j ∈ I. It follows that
Γ(σ′, R, C) = (r(σ′, Ri), r(σ′, Ri′)) < Γ(σ,R,C) = (r(σ,Ri), r(σ,Ri′)), which contra-
dicts that σ ∈ C(E , εSco). Since C(E , εSMm) ⊆ C(E , εSco), the proof is complete.
Proof of assertion (2) : Let E be the market where I = {1, 1′, 2, 2′}, L = {L1},
L1 = {1, 1′, 2, 2′} and Ci = {i, i′} for all i = 1, 2. Consider the profile over goods
p =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
1′ 2′ 2 1
... 1 ... 2′
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
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Suppose that preference extensions give priority to goods : (1, 0) ≻i (1, 1) ≻i (2, 0)
≻i (2, 1) for all i ∈ I. The profile over allocations is
R =⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1′ 2 2′
(1′, 1); (1′, 2); (1′, 2′) (1, 2′); (2, 2′); (1′, 2′) (2, 1); (2, 2′); (2, 1′) (1′, 1); (2, 1); (2′, 1)
... (1′, 1); (2, 1); (2′, 1) ... (1, 2′); (1′, 2′); (2, 2′)
... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Pick allocation σ = (1′, 1, 2, 2′). Observe that Γ(σ,R,Ci) = (1, 2) for all i = 1, 2. The
reader can easily check that σ ∈ C(E , εco) while allocation σ′ = (1′, 2′, 2, 1) Pareto
dominates σ.
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Chapitre 5
Choosing a Committee under
Majority Voting
Abstract : We consider the elections of a seat-posted committee, and investigate the
propensity of seat-wise majority voting to choose a committee that fulfills the majo-
rity will with respect to preferences over committees. Voters have seat-wise preferences
and preferences over committees are derived from seat-wise preferences by means of
a neutral preference extension. Neutrality means that the names of candidates do not
play any role. The majority committee paradox refers to a situation where a Condorcet
winner exists for each seat, and a Condorcet winner committee also exists but does not
coincide with the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners. The majority commit-
tee weak paradox refers to a situation where the combination of seat-wise Condorcet
winners is not a Condorcet winner among committees. We characterize the domains of
preference extensions immune to each of the paradoxes. 1
Keywords: Committee election - Voting Paradoxes - Majority voting - Separable
preferences
5.1 Introduction
Arrovian social choice theory provides a theoretical framework for evaluating social
choice functions, which aggregates individual ordinal preferences over social alterna-
tives, or candidates, into a collective outcome. In the case where the outcome is a single
candidate, asking voters to report their ranking of candidates is not problematic. Howe-
ver, if a committee of several candidates is to be chosen, this informational requirement
is hardly implementable in practice. Consider an election of a faculty council involving
a dean, a vice-dean for research and a vice-dean for teaching. If there are four candi-
dates per seat, fully expressing preferences means ranking the 64 possible outcomes.
Clearly, as the number of seats or the number of candidates for each seat increase,
1. This is a joint work with Hayrullah Dindar of Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey and Jean Laine´
of CNAM-LIRSA, Paris, France
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referring to Arrovian social choice functions becomes less and less useful in practice.
Designing a seat-wise procedure is a frequent solution that overcomes this difficulty.
In a seat-wise procedure, voters report their preferences over candidates seat-wise, and
candidates are selected seat-wise. It is well-known that a seat-wise procedure may not
lead to the outcome that would prevail for a direct choice procedure where voters re-
port their preferences over the outcomes. This happens when individual preferences
exhibit complementarities among candidates, but this may even prevail with separable
preferences which prohibits any sort of complementarity.
The potential inconsistency between seat-wise and direct procedures results from
the fact that seat-wise preferences describe only partially preferences over outcomes. A
rather rich literature dealing with this inconsistency and other potential drawbacks of
seat-wise procedures deals with multiple referenda, which is equivalent to a committee
choice problem with two candidates per seat. In this setting, each voter is characterized
by an ideal committee, and simple majority voting provides a natural seat-wise choice
procedure that we denote byMaj. Compound majority voting paradoxes studied in the
literature express the fact thatMaj may lead to outcomes exhibiting some undesirable
properties. The Anscombe’s paradox (Anscombe (1976), Wagner (1984), Laffond and
Laine´ (2013)) shows that a majority of voters may disagree with the outcome of Maj
on a majority of seats. The multiple elections paradox (Brams et al. (1998), Scarsini
(1998)) prevails when the winner forMaj receives zero votes in the direct elections (or,
equivalently, may be ranked first by no voter). The Ostrogorski paradox (Ostrogorski
(1913), Rae and Daudt (1976), Bezembinder and Van Acker (1985), Deb and Kelsey
(1987), Kelly (1989), Shelley (1994), Laffond and Laine´ (2006)) prevails when another
outcome beats the one ofMaj according to majority voting under the assumption that
committees are compared by means of the Hamming distance criterion. 2 3
The Hamming distance criterion provides a specific way to relate seat-wise prefe-
rences and preferences over committees. Other ways can be considered, each referring
to a particular preference extension. Formally, when there are only two candidates per
seat, a preference extension rule maps each ideal committee to a (weak) ordering of
committees. A usual property retained for a preference extension is separability : if a
and b are the two candidates for some seat s, and if a voter ranks a above b, she will
rank two committees identical in all seats but s according to her preference over a and
b. 4 Kadane (1972) shows that even under the assumption of a separable extension,
Maj may select a Pareto dominated committee. Moreover, O¨zkal-Sanver and Sanver
(2006) show that if there are at least three seats, no anonymous seat-wise procedure
2. Hamming distance criterion in this specific setting simply means that voters prefer the committee(s)
agreeing with her ideal on a higher number of seats.
3. Laffond and Laine´ (2009) show that Maj always selects a Pareto optimal element in the Top-Cycle of
the majority tournament among outcomes (Schwartz 1972) while Maj may select an outcome which does not
belong to the Uncovered set (Miller (1977), Moulin (1986)). An overview of compound majority paradoxes in
multiple referenda is provided in Laffond and Laine´ (2010).
4. Lacy and Niou (2000) show that under a non-separable preference extension rule, Maj may select a
Condorcet-loser outcome (i.e., an outcome majority defeated by all other outcomes). However, if separability
holds, Maj always chooses the Condorcet winner outcome (i.e., the outcome majority defeating all other
outcomes) whenever it exists (Kadane (1972)).
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guarantees that a Pareto optimal committee will be chosen for all separable preference
extensions. However, for the Hamming preference extension rule, Maj always produce
a Pareto-optimal committee (Brams et al. 2007). C¸uhadarog˘lu and Laine´ (2009) prove
that under a mild richness assumption, the Hamming preference extension defines the
largest domain of separable preference extensions for which Maj always picks a Pareto
optimal outcome. 5
All the above mentioned studies deal with the case of two candidates per seat. Less
attention has been paid to situations where there are more than two candidates per
seat. Benoˆıt and Kornhauser (2010) generalize the result of O¨zkal-Sanver and Sanver
(2006) : if any separable preference extension is admissible, and if there are at least three
seats or when there are precisely two seats with more than two candidates per seat,
a seat-wise procedure selects a Pareto optimal outcome if and only if it is dictatorial.
While this strong result disqualifies seat-wise procedures in the full domain of separable
preferences extensions, it suggests investigating whether they can perform better under
some domain restrictions. This is the route followed in this paper, which addresses the
following question : can we characterize the class of preference extensions under which
Maj selects a Condorcet winner committee, that is a committee preferred to all other
committees by a majority of voters ?
One difficulty is that Maj is not well-defined with at least three candidates per
seat. Indeed, it is well-known that a Condorcet winner for each seat (i.e., a candidate
preferred to all other candidates by a majority of voters) may fail to exist. However,
well-known restrictions upon voters’ preferences ensure the existence of a seat-wise
Condorcet winner are single-peakedness and Sen’s value restriction (Black (1948), Sen
(1966)). We assume that preferences over candidates for each seat are such that a
Condorcet winner exists, and we address the following problem : characterizing the
preference extension domain for which the committee formed by all seat-wise Condor-
cet winners form a Condorcet winner among committees. If Maj selects a Condorcet
winner committee, there is no inconsistency between seat-wise majority voting and
direct majority voting (where voters rank committees). Hence, characterizing the pre-
ference extension domain that precludes this inconsistency solves the problem created
by the Arrovian informational requirement : in order to fulfill the majority will for
committees, it is sufficient to fulfill the majority will for each seat.
The inconsistency between seat-wise majority voting and direct majority voting
arises in two cases, each related to a new voting paradox. The majority committee
paradox prevails when a Condorcet winner committee exists and is not selected byMaj.
The majority committee weak paradox prevails when either the majority committee
paradox holds or a Condorcet winner committee fails to exist (while Maj is well-
defined).
Under a neutrality assumption for preference extensions (meaning that candidates’
names play no role), we characterize the preference extension domain immune to the
majority committee paradox and the one immune to the majority committee weak
5. Within a similar setting, Laffond and Laine´ (2012) show that Maj may fail at implementing a compro-
mise, even under strong restrictions upon the seat-wise majority margin.
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paradox in the case of two-seat committees. More precisely, we prove that separability
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a neutral preference extension to avoid the
majority committee paradox. Moreover, the domain of neutral preference extensions
avoiding the majority committee weak paradox is much smaller, it reducing to a unique
lexicographic preference extension. According to lexicographic preference extensions
all voters agree on a seat as priority seat and compares committees according to their
ranking of candidates for that priority seat whenever they differ and if both committees
have the same candidate on the priority seat, compares them according to ranking of
candidates for other seat.
Our results complement the ones obtained by Hollard and Le Breton (1996) and
Vidu (1999, 2002). In the case of two candidates per seat, Hollard and Le Breton (1996)
show that any separable tournament over committees can be achieved through seat-
wise majority voting. This result is generalized in Vidu (1999) to the case of more than
two candidates per seat. Moreover, Vidu (2002) shows that a similar result prevails
even when seat-wise preferences are single-peaked (implying the existence of seat-wise
Condorcet winners).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides basic notations and definitions.
Majority committee paradoxes are formalized in section 3. Results are stated in section
4. We conclude with several comments about further research, with some preliminary
results. All proofs are postponed to an Appendix.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Preliminaries
We consider two finite sets C1 and C2, with respective cardinalities C1 and C2. Sets
C1 and C2 are interpreted as sets of candidates competing for seat-1 and for seat-2.
We use letters a, b, c to denote arbitrary candidates for seat-1 and x, y, z to denote
arbitrary candidates for seat-2. A committee C is an element of C = C1 × C2.
We also consider a finite set of voters N = {1, ..., n, ..., N} where N ∈ N is odd. For
each t ∈ {1, 2}, every voter n has preferences over candidates in Ct, called t-preferences,
represented by a complete linear order P tn. The upper-contour set of a candidate a ∈ Ct
for P tn is defined by U(a, P tn) = {b ∈ Ct : bP tna}. Moreover, the rank of a in P tn is defined
by rt(a, P tn) = 1 + |U(a, P tn)|. Given a finite set X, let L(X) denote the set of linear
orders over X. Finally, for t = 1, 2, a t-profile πt = (P tn)n∈N is an element of (L(Ct))N .
We call preference over committees, or in short preference, of voter n an element
Pn = (P 1n , P 2n) of L( C1) × L(C2). The Pn-rank vector of committee C = (a, x) ∈ C
is defined by r(C, P ) = (r1(a, P 1n), r2(x, P 2n)). A profile is an element π = (Pn)n∈N of
(L(C1)× L(C2))N .
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5.2.2 Preference Extension
Seat-wise preferences over candidates and preferences are logically related. We as-
sume that preferences over candidates for each seat are extended to preferences by
means of a preference extension. Formally, a preference extension is a mapping δ from
L(C1) × L(C2) to L(C). A preference extension profile is a vector δN = (δ1, ..., δN) of
preference extensions. Given a profile π = (Pn)n∈N ∈ (L(C1) × L(C2))N , a preference
extension profile δN generates the extended profile δN (π) = ((δn(Pn))n∈N ∈ (L(C))N .
We retain two properties for preference extensions, neutrality and separability. Neu-
trality prevails if the names of candidates do not matter when comparing committees.
In other words, only ranks given to candidates are taken into account.
Definition 5.2.1 A preference extension δ is neutral if for all P = (P 1, P 2), P ′ =
(P ′1, P ′2) ∈ L(C1)×L(C2), and for all C, C ′ ∈ C, if [r(C, P ) = r(C, P ′) and r(C ′, P ) =
r(C ′, P ′) ] then [Cδ(P )C ′ ⇔ Cδ(P ′)C ′].
It follows from definition 1 that given a preference P ∈ L(C1) × L(C2), any neu-
tral preference extension δ can be equivalently defined as the linear order ≫δ over
{1, ..., C1}×{1, ..., C2} by : for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., C1}×{1, ..., C2}, i≫δ j if and only if there
exists C, C ′ ∈ C such that Cδ(P )C ′ where r(C, P ) = i and r(C ′, P ) = j. Hence, a neutral
preference extension profile can be equivalently defined by vector≫δN= (≫δ1 , ...,≫δN ).
We denote the set of neutral preference extensions by ∆.
The following example illustrates how a neutral extension operates. Let C1 =
{a, b}, C2 = {x, y}, N = {1, 2, 3}, and consider the seat-wise profiles π = (π1, π2) =
((P 1n , P 2n)n=1,2,3) defined below
π1 =
⎛⎜⎝ 1 2 3a b a
b a b
⎞⎟⎠ , π2 =
⎛⎜⎝ 1 2 3x y x
y x y
⎞⎟⎠
Let ≫δN be the following neutral preference extension profile
≫δN =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
≫δ1 ≫δ2 ≫δ3
(1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)
(2, 1) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(1, 2) (1, 2) (2, 1)
(2, 2) (2, 2) (2, 2)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
≫δN combined with π = (π1, π2) lead to the following extended profile
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δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3
(a, x) (b, y) (a, x)
(b, x) (a, y) (a, y)
(a, y) (b, x) (b, x)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Hereafter we refer to neutral preference extensions simply as preference extensions.
The second property for preference extension rules we consider, called separability,
holds if it is always preferable to assign a seat to a better candidate whoever the other
committee member is. Hence, separability precludes any complementarity between can-
didates for different seats.
Definition 5.2.2 A preference extension δ is separable if for all a, b ∈ C1, for all
x, y ∈ C2, and for all P = (P 1, P 2) ∈ L(C1)× L(C2),
• (a, x) δ(P ) (b, x) if and only if a P 1 b
• (a, x) δ(P ) (a, y) if and only if x P 2 y.
Under neutrality, separability is equivalently defined as follows :
• for all (i1, i2) ̸= (j1, i2) ∈ {1, ..., C1} × {1, ..., C2}, (i1, i2)≫δ (j1, i2) if i1 < j1
• for all (i1, i2) ̸= (i1, j2) ∈ {1, ..., C1} × {1, ..., C2}, (i1, i2)≫δ (i1, j2) if i2 < j2.
The set of neutral and separable extensions is denoted by ∆sep. We introduce below
two specific elements of this set :
Definition 5.2.3 • The 1-lexicographic preference extension δ1Lex is defined by :
(1, 1)≫ (1, 2)≫ ...≫ (1, C2)≫ ...≫ (C1, 1)≫ (C1, 2)...≫ (C1, C2).
• The 2-lexicographic preference extension, δ2Lex is defined by :
(1, 1)≫ (2, 1)≫ ...≫ (C1, 1)≫ ...≫ (1, C2)≫ (2, C2)...≫ (C1, C2).
The following definition of a choice problem summarizes all the relevant features of
a committee selection procedure :
Definition 5.2.4 A choice problem is a 5-tuple P = (C1,C2,N , π, δN ) where C1 and
C2 are the set of candidates for seat-1 and seat-2 respectively, N is the set of voters
with profile π ∈ (L( C1)× L(C2))N , and δN ∈ ∆N is a preference extension profile.
5.3 Majority Voting Paradoxes
We now formalize seat-wise and direct selection procedures based on simple majority
voting. This requires formalizing two types of majority tournaments. Given t ∈ {1, 2}
together with a t-profile πt = (P tn)n∈N ∈ (L(Ct))N , the πt−majority tournament is the
complete and asymmetric binary relation T (πt) defined over Ct × Ct by : ∀a, b ∈ Ct,
aT (πt)b if and only if |{n ∈ N : xP tny}| > N2 . If aT (πt)b, we say that candidate a
defeats candidate b in πt. Similarly, given a profile π = (Pn)n∈N ∈ (L(C1) × L(C2))N
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together with a preference extension profile δN , the δN (π)−majority tournament is the
complete and asymmetric binary relation T (δN (π)) defined over C×C by : ∀ C, C ′ ∈ C,
CT (δN (π))C ′) if |{n ∈ N : C δn(Pn) C ′}| > N2 . If CT (δN (π))C
′
, we say that committee C
defeats committee C ′ in δN (π). Moreover, T (πt) (resp. T (δN (π))) admits a (necessarily
unique) Condorcet winner if there exists a candidate c(T (πt) ∈ Ct (resp. a committee
c(T (δN (π))) that defeats all other candidates in πt (resp. in δN (π)). We adopt the
convention c(T (πt)) = ∅ (resp. c(T (δN (π))) = ∅) when the underlying tournament
has no Condorcet winner.
The seat-wise procedure consists of selecting a candidate for each seat from the
seat-wise majority tournaments T (π1) and T (π2). We assume that preferences over
candidates are restricted so as to ensure that both tournaments T (π1) and T (π2) admit
a Condorcet winner. The direct procedure on the other hand consists of selecting a
committee from the majority tournament over committees T (δN (π)). The seat-wise
and direct procedures are inconsistent if either there is a Condorcet winner among
committees that is not the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners, or if there is
no Condorcet winner among committees. This leads to the following two definitions of
voting paradoxes :
Definition 5.3.1 The majority committee paradox occurs at choice problem P if and
only if T (π1), T (π2), and T (δN (π)) each admit a Condorcet winner while c(T (π1)) ×
c(T (π2)) ̸= c(T (δN (π))).
The majority committee paradox is illustrated in the following simple example :
Example 5.3.1 Let C1 = {a, b}, C2 = {x, y}, N = {1, 2, 3}, and consider the seat-
wise profiles π = (π1, π2) defined below :
π1 =
⎛⎜⎝ 1 2 3a a a
b b b
⎞⎟⎠ , π2 =
⎛⎜⎝ 1 2 3x x y
y y x
⎞⎟⎠
For i = 1, 2, 3 let ≫δi be (2, 1)≫δi (1, 2)≫δi (1, 1)≫δi (2, 2), combined with π, leading
to the following extended profile :
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3
(b, x) (b, x) (b, y)
(a, y) (a, y) (a, x)
(a, x) (a, x) (a, y)
(b, y) (b, y) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Clearly, c(T (π1))× c(T (π2)) = (a, x) and c(T (δN (π)) = (b, x), thus the majority com-
mittee paradox holds. 6
6. Note that the preference extensions used by the voters are not separable which turns out to be necessary
and sufficient to avoid the majority committee paradox as will be shown in Theorem 1.
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Definition 5.3.2 The majority committee weak paradox occurs at choice problem P if
and only if T (π1) and T (π2) both admit a Condorcet winner while c(T (π1))×c(T (π2)) ̸=
c(T (δN (π)).
The majority paradox implies the weak majority paradox, while the opposite is not
true. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the majority paradox never prevails
when there are two candidates per seat.
The next example will illustrate the majority committee weak paradox.
Example 5.3.2 Let C1 = {a, b}, C2 = {x, y}, N = {1, 2, 3}, and consider the seat-
wise profiles π = (π1, π2) defined below :
π1 =
⎛⎜⎝ 1 2 3a b a
b a b
⎞⎟⎠ , π2 =
⎛⎜⎝ 1 2 3x y y
y x x
⎞⎟⎠
Let ≫δN be such that
— (1, 1)≫δi (2, 1)≫δi (1, 2)≫δi (2, 2) for i = 1, 3.
— (1, 1)≫δ3 (1, 2)≫δ3 (2, 1)≫δ3 (2, 2).
Combination of ≫δN with π leads to the following extended profile :
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 3
(a, x) (b, y) (a, y)
(b, x) (b, x) (b, y)
(a, y) (a, y) (a, x)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(a, x) defeats (b, x), (b, x) defeats (a, y), (a, y) defeats (b, y), and finally, (b, y) defeats
(a, x) in δN (π), So, there is no Condorcet winner among committees while π1 and π2
both admit condorcet winners. Thus, majority committee weak paradox holds. 7
5.3.1 Results
We define an extension domain as a non-empty subset D of ∆. First, we characterize
the domain of preference extensions that are immune to the majority committee para-
dox in the following sense :D ⊆ ∆ is immune to majority committee paradox if and only
if for all choice problems P = (C1,C2, N , π, δN ) such that c(T (π1)) ̸= ∅, c(T (π2)) ̸= ∅
and c(T (δN (π))) ̸= ∅ ; δN ⊆ DN implies c(T (π1))× c(T (π2)) = c(T (δN (π))). That is,
a domain of preference extensions is immune to the majority committee paradox if and
7. Note that for each voter the preference extension used is either δ1Lex or δ2Lex, but voters are not
unanimously using one or the other which makes a significant difference as we will show in Theorem 2.
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only if at any choice problem where all the voters use a preference extension from this
domain and both seat-wise and committee-wise Condorcet winners exist ; the combi-
nation of seat-wise Condorcet winners is the Condorcet winning committee.
Theorem 5.3.1 A preference extension domain D is immune to the majority paradox
if and only if D ⊆ ∆sep.
Our second result is a similar characterization for the weak majority weak paradox.
Following an almost identical construction, we characterize the domain of preference
extensions that are immune to the majority committee weak paradox in the following
sense : D ⊆ ∆ is immune to majority committee paradox if and only if for all choice
problems P = (C1,C2,N , π, δN ) such that c(T (π1)) ̸= ∅ and c(T (π2)) ̸= ∅ ; δN ⊆ DN
implies c(T (π1))× c(T (π2)) = c(T (δN (π))). That is, a domain of preference extensions
is immune to the majority committee weak paradox if and only if at any choice problem
where all the voters use a preference extension from this domain and both seat-wise
Condorcet winners exist ; Condorcet winning committee exists and is equal to the
combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners.
Theorem 5.3.2 A preference extension domain D is immune to the majority weak
paradox if and only if either D = {δ1Lex} or D = {δ2Lex}.
5.4 Further comments
At least three routes are opened to further research. The first is considering com-
mittee choice problems involving more than two seats. We strongly conjecture that
results similar to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 hold in such a more general setting. The
second route aims at characterizing the domain of neutral preference extensions which
is Condorcet decisive when there are at least 3 candidates per seat. A third route deals
with the existence of Condorcet winning committee when seat-wise profiles admit a
Condorcet winner, but without any requirement upon their mutual consistency. We
provide very preliminary results on this issue. Call Condorcet decisive a preference do-
main D such that for all choice problems P = (C1,C2,N , π, δN ) with c(T (π1)) ̸= ∅,
c(T (π2)) ̸= ∅, δN ∈ DN ensures c(T (δN (π))) ̸= ∅. With words, a domain of preference
extensions is Condorcet decisive if and only if a Condorcet winning committee exists at
any choice problem where all the voters pick a preference extension in this domain and
seat-wise Condorcet winners exist. We characterize the domain of preference extensions
that are Condorcet decisive for the 2-candidate case (|C1| = |C2| = 2).
First, we consider the case of singleton domains.
Proposition 5.4.1 Every neutral preference extension is Condorcet decisive.
We turn now to domains containing more than one extension rule. First observe
that the set of all 24 extension rules can be partitioned into 6 classes, where in each
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classes, each element of the class can be obtained from another element by means of
coordinate-wise permutations of ranks. The six classes are described below
Class 1 Class 2
δ1 : (1, 1)≫δ1 (1, 2)≫δ1 (2, 1)≫δ1 (2, 2) δ2 : (1, 1)≫δ2 (2, 1)≫δ2 (1, 2)≫δ2 (2, 2)
δ21 : (1, 2)≫δ21 (1, 1)≫δ21 (2, 2)≫δ21 (2, 1) δ22 : (1, 2)≫δ22 (2, 2)≫δ22 (1, 1)≫δ22 (2, 1)
δ31 : (2, 1)≫δ31 (2, 2)≫δ31 (1, 1)≫δ31 (1, 2) δ32 : (2, 1)≫δ32 (1, 1)≫δ33 (2, 2)≫δ33 (1, 2)
δ41 : (2, 2)≫δ41 (2, 1)≫δ41 (1, 2)≫δ41 (1, 1) δ42 : (2, 2)≫δ42 (1, 2)≫δ42 (2, 1)≫δ42 (1, 1)
Class 3 Class 4
δ3 : (1, 1)≫δ3 (1, 2)≫δ3 (2, 2)≫δ3 (2, 1) δ4 : (1, 1)≫δ4 (2, 1)≫δ4 (2, 2)≫δ4 (1, 2)
δ23 : (1, 2)≫δ23 (1, 1)≫δ23 (2, 1)≫δ23 (2, 2) δ24 : (1, 2)≫δ24 (1, 1)≫δ22 (2, 2)≫δ22 (2, 1)
δ33 : (2, 1)≫δ33 (2, 2)≫δ33 (1, 2)≫δ33 (1, 1) δ34 : (2, 1)≫δ34 (2, 2)≫δ34 (1, 1)≫δ34 (1, 2)
δ43 : (2, 2)≫δ43 (2, 1)≫δ43 (1, 1)≫δ43 (1, 2) δ44 : (2, 2)≫δ44 (2, 1)≫δ44 (1, 2)≫δ44 (1, 1)
Class 5 Class 6
δ5 : (1, 1)≫δ5 (2, 2)≫δ5 (1, 2)≫δ5 (2, 1) δ6 : (1, 1)≫δ6 (2, 2)≫δ6 (2, 1)≫δ6 (1, 2)
δ25 : (1, 2)≫δ25 (1, 1)≫δ25 (2, 2)≫δ25 (2, 1) δ26 : (1, 2)≫δ26 (1, 1)≫δ26 (2, 2)≫δ26 (2, 1)
δ35 : (2, 1)≫δ35 (2, 2)≫δ35 (1, 1)≫δ35 (1, 2) δ36 : (2, 1)≫δ36 (2, 2)≫δ36 (1, 1)≫δ36 (1, 2)
δ45 : (2, 2)≫δ45 (2, 1)≫δ45 (1, 2)≫δ45 (1, 1) δ46 : (2, 2)≫δ46 (2, 1)≫δ46 (1, 2)≫δ46 (1, 1)
We claim that focusing on the six representatives δ1, δ2, δ2, δ2, δ5, δ6 is sufficient for
characterizing Condorcet decisive domains. Indeed, all proofs for these representatives
can be duplicated to all other extension rules provided a relevant permutation of chosen
profiles. For instance, Suppose profile π = (P 1n , P 2n) is relevant for δ1 and one wishes
to replace δ1 by δ
2
1. Define permutations α
1 and α2 of {1, 2} such that α1(1) = 1,
α1(2) = 2 and α2(2) = 1, α2(1) = 2. Clearly δ21 is obtained from δ1 as follows : for
all z, z′, w, w′ ∈ {1, 2}, (z, z′) ≫δ1 (w,w′) ⇔ (α1(z), α2(z′)) ≫δ21 (α1(w), α2(w′)). Now
define profile π′ by ∀ n ∈ N ,
- P ′1n =
(
P 1n
−P 1n
)
if
(
α1(1) = 1, α1(2) = 2
α1(1) = 2, α1(2) = 1
)
- P ′2n =
(
P 2n
−P 2n
)
if
(
α2(1) = 1, α2(2) = 2
α2(1) = 2, α2(2) = 1
)
Then (δ1)n(Pn) is equal to (δ21)
n(P ′n).
We denote the set of all preference extension rules in the Class i ∈ {1, ..., 6} by ∆i.
Proposition 5.4.2 A preference extension domain D is Condorcet decisive if and only
if either D = {δ} where δ is neutral or D ∈ {{∆1,∆3}, {∆2,∆4}, {∆5,∆6}}.
Characterizing Condorcet decisive domains for more than 2 candidates per seat is
left as an open problem.
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5.5 Appendix
Proof of theorem 1
The proof is organized in five lemmata. Consider a choice problem P = (C1,C2,N , π, δN ).
Let δN ⊆ DN ⊆ (∆sep)N and c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, x) and c(T (δN (π))) = (b, y)
with (b, y) ̸= (a, x). Moreover, suppose without loss of generality that b ̸= a. Then, by
separability, (a, y) is preferred to (b, y) by a majority of voters, which is impossible.
Now, take a preference extension domain D which is immune to the majority para-
dox and a preference extension δ ⊆ D. We will show thatD ⊆ ∆sep. Let i, j ∈ {1, ..., C1}
and k, l ∈ {1, ..., C2}.
Lemma 5.5.1 (1, 1)≫δ (i, k) for all (i, k) ̸= (1, 1).
Proof 5.5.1 Suppose for a contradiction that δ ⊆ D such that ≫δ does not rank
(1, 1) as top-element. Take a choice problem P be such that C1 = {a, b}, C2 = {x, y}.
Moreover, suppose that π = (π1, π2) = ((P 1n , P 2n)n∈N ) is such that P 1n = P 1 and P 2n = P 2
for all n ∈ N with respective tops a and x. Thus c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, x). Since
≫δ does not rank (1, 1) first, then c(T (δN (π))) ̸= (a, x) is not immune to the majority
paradox
Lemma 5.5.2 ≫δ ranks either (1, 2) or (2, 1) second.
Proof 5.5.2 Suppose that ≫δ ranks (i, k) second where (i, k) /∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)} .
Case 1 : Suppose i ̸= 1 and k ̸= 1. Let N = 3 and pick a profile π = (π1, π2) such
that
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
a a c
... ... ...
b b b
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
x z x
... ... ...
y y y
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where b (resp. y) has rank i (resp. k) in all columns of π1 (resp. π2) and all voters use
extension rule δ. We get the extended profile
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(P1) δ(P2) δ(P3)
(a, x) (a, z) (c, x)
(b, y) (b, y) (b, y)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
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Thus c(T (π1))× c(T (π2)) = (a, x) ̸= c(T (δN (π)) = (b, y).
Case 2 : Suppose i = 1 and k ≥ 3. Let N = 3 and pick a profile π = (π1, π2) such
that
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
a a a
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
y z x
x x ...
... ... ...
... y y
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where y has rank k in the 2nd and 3rd column of π2 and all voters use extension rule
δ. We get the extended profile
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(P1) δ(P2) δ(P3)
(a, y) (a, z) (a, x)
... (a, y) (a, y)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Thus c(T (π1))× c(T (π2)) = (a, x) ̸= c(T (δN (π)) = (a, y).
Case 3 : Suppose i ≥ 3 and k = 1. Let N = 3 and pick a profile π with π1 and
π2 as below
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
b c a
a a ...
... ... ...
... b b
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
x x x
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
where b has rank i in the 2nd and 3rd column of π1 and all voters use extension rule
δ. We get the extended profile
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(P1) δ(P2) δ(P3)
(b, x) (c, x) (a, x)
... (b, x) (b, x)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
Thus c(T (π1))× c(T (π2)) = (a, x) ̸= c(T (δN (π)) = (b, x), a contradiction.
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From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we have showed that ≫δ ranks (1, 1) first and either
(1, 2) or (2, 1) second. We consider below the case where≫δ ranks (1, 1) first and (1, 2)
second since it suffices to invert profiles for the case where ≫δ ranks (2, 1) second.
Lemma 5.5.3 If ≫δ ranks (1, 1) first and (1, 2) second, ∀i, k, l, (i, k)≫δ (i, l) implies
that k < l.
Proof 5.5.3 Suppose for a contradiction that there exist i ∈ {1, ..., C1} such that
(i, l)≫δ (i, k) with l > k. Now let N = 3 and pick a profile π with π1 and π2 such that
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
a a ...
... ... ...
... ... a
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
x y ...
y x ...
... ... ...
... ... x
... ... ...
... ... y
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where a has rank i in the 3rd column of π1, x has rank k, y has rank l in the 3rd column
of π2 and all voters use extension rule δ. We get the extended profile
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(P1) δ(P2) δ(P3)
(a, x) (a, y) ...
(a, y) (a, x) ...
... ... ...
... ... (a, y)
... ... ...
... ... (a, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Thus c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, x) ̸= c(T (δN (π)) = (a, y), a contradiction. Note that
i = 1 (which implies k ≥ 3) and k = 1 (which implies i ≥ 2) are possible cases covered
despite what π1 and π1 apparently suggest.
Lemma 5.5.4 (i, k)≫δ (2, 1) implies that i = 1.
Proof 5.5.4 By Lemma 3, (i, k) ≫δ (2, 1) implies (i, 1) ≫δ (2, 1). Assume for a
contradiction that i ̸= 1 (Note i = 2 is ruled out by Lemma 3). Consider (i∗, 1)≫δ (2, 1)
that leads to highest rank for (i, 1) (except (1, 1) of course). Now let N = 3 and pick a
profile π with π1 and π2 such that
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π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
c a b
a c a
... ... ...
b b c
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
x x x
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
where b has rank i∗ in the 1st and 2nd column of π1 , c has rank i∗ in the 3rd column
of π1 and all voters use extension rule δ. We get the extended profile
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(P1) δ(P2) δ(P3)
(c, x) (a, x) (b, x)
... ... ...
(b, x) (b, x) (c, x)
... ... ...
(a, x) (c, x) (a, x)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where (b, x) can only be beaten by (c, .) in δ(P1) and (a, .) in δ(P2) by (i∗, 1)≫δ (i′, 1)
for all i′ ∈ {2, ..., C1} combined with Lemma 3. Thus c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, x) ̸=
c(T (δN (π)) = (b, x).
Lemma 5.5.5 For all i, k, l, (i, k)≫δ (j, k) implies i < j.
Proof 5.5.5 Suppose for a contradiction that (j, k)≫δ (i, k) with j > i. Pick a profile
π with π1 and π2 such that
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 1type1 P
1
type2 P
1
type3
b a ...
a b ...
... ... ...
... ... a
... ... ...
... ... b
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 2type1 P
2
type2 P
2
type3
x x ...
... ... ...
... ... ∗
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where a (resp. b) has rank i (resp. j) in the 3rd column of π1, W has rank k in the 3rd
column of π2 and all voters use extension rule δ. The extended profile is
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δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(Ptype1) δ(Ptype2) δ(Ptype3)
(b, x) (a, x) ...
... ... ...
(b, x) ...
... ... ...
... ... (b, ∗)
... ... ...
... ... (a, ∗)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
By lemma 4, (b, x) can only be beaten by (a, ∗) in δ(Ptype2) and (b, ∗) beats (a, ∗) in
δ(Ptype3). Now consider a profile that consists of m2 Type1 voters, 1 Type2 voters and
m2 Type3 voters.
By putting each alternative in C2 to the kth rank in exactly one Type3 voters prefe-
rence P 2type3 without specifying further the preferences of Type1 and Type2 voters (they
may have any preference that satisfies the above structure), we obtain π′ with π′1 and
π′2 and δN(π′) with c(T (π′1))× c(T (π′2)) = (a, x) and c(T (δN (π)) = (b, x), which is a
contradiction.
Observe that (b, x) beats any (c, ∗) with c ̸= a for at least m2 (from Type1 voters)
+1 (from Type2 voters) voters and (b, x) beats any (a, ∗) for at least m2 (from Type1
voters) + 1 (from Type3 voters) both of which constitutes a majority out of 2m2 + 1
voters, c(T (δN (π)) = (b, x).
Combining Lemma 1 to 5 shows that D ⊆ ∆sep.
Proof of theorem 2
The proof is organized in two lemmata. Consider a choice problem P = (C1,C2,N , π, δN ).
Lemma 5.5.6 Let δN ⊆ DN ⊆ (∆sep)N . If a profile π is such that c(T (π1)) ̸= ∅ and
c(T (π2)) ̸= ∅ then either c(T (π1))× c(T (π2)) = c(T (δN (π))) or c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
Proof 5.5.6 Let c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, x) and suppose c(T (δN (π)) = (b, y) with
(b, y) ̸= (a, x). Moreover, suppose without loss of generality that b ̸= a. Then by sepa-
rability, (b, x) is preferred to (a, x) by a majority of voters which is impossible.
Since δ1Lex and δ2Lex are separable preference extensions, the sufficiency part in
theorem 2 directly follows from Lemma 6.
We turn to the necessary part.
Now, take a preference extension domain D which is immune to the majority weak
paradox and a preference extension δ ⊆ D. We will show that either D = {δ1Lex} or
D = {δ2Lex}. We already showed in Theorem 1 that if a preference extension domain
D is immune to the majority paradox then D ⊆ ∆sep. Since if a preference extension
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domain D is immune to the majority weak paradox then D is immune to the majority
paradox. Hence D ⊆ ∆sep.
Let i, j ∈ {1, ..., C1} and k, l ∈ {1, ..., C2}
Lemma 5.5.7 Suppose there exists δ ∈ D such that (2, 1) ≫δ (i, k) for all (i, k) ∈
{1, ...,m}2\{(1, 1), (2, 1)}. Then δ = δlex2.
Proof 5.5.7 Suppose that (i, k) ≫δ (j, l) with k > l. It follows from separability that
i < j. Let N = 3 and pick a profile π with π1 and π2 having the form below
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
a a ...
... b ...
... ...
b
...
a
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
x y ...
... x ...
... ...
x
...
y
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where a (resp. b) has rank j (resp. i) in the 3rd column of π1, x (resp. y) has rank l
(resp. k) in the 3rd column of π2 and all voters use preference extension δ.
Clearly, c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, x). By separability, ≫δ ranks (1, 1) first. By
assumption, (2, 1) ≫δ (1, 2) and (i, k) ≫δ (j, l). This implies that (b, y) defeats (a, x)
in T (δN (π)). Therefore, c(T (δN (π))) = ∅, hence the majority weak paradox holds, a
contradiction.
Lemma 5.5.8 Suppose there exists δ ∈ D such that (1, 2) ≫δ (i, k) for all (i, k) ∈
{1, ...,m}2\{(1, 1), (1, 2)}. Then δ = δlex1.
Proof 5.5.8 Suppose that (i, k) ≫δ (j, l) with i > j. It follows from separability that
k < l. Let N = 3 and pick a profile π1 and π2 having the form below
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
a b ...
... a ...
... ...
a
...
b
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
x x ...
... y ...
... ...
y
...
x
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where a (resp. b) has rank j (resp. i) in the 3rd column of π1, x (resp. y) has rank l
(resp. k) in the 3rd column of π2 and all voters use extension rule δ.
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Clearly, c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, x). By separability, ≫δ ranks (1, 1) first. By
assumption, (1, 2) ≫δ (2, 1) and (i, k) ≫δ (j, l). This implies that (b, y) defeats (a, x)
in T (N (π)). We get from Lemma 6 that c(T (δN (π))) = ∅ and majority weak paradox
holds. Observe that the argument used in the proof of Lemma 7 applies once we ’invert’
profiles π1 and π2.
Pick any δ ⊆ D. By separability, either (1, 1)≫δ (1, 2)≫δ ..., or (1, 1)≫δ (2, 1)≫δ
.... We get from Lemma 7 and 8 that δ ∈ {δ1Lex, δ2Lex}. Thus, either D = {δ1Lex}, or
D = {δ2Lex}, or D = {δ1Lex, δ2Lex}. Consider the last domain, and let N = 3 and pick
a profile π with π1 and π2 having the form below
π1 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 11 P
1
2 P
1
3
a b a
b a b
c c c
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠, π2 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P 21 P
2
2 P
2
3
x y y
y x x
z z z
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Suppose preference extension profile δN = (δlex2, δlex1, δlex2). The extended profile is
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δlex2(P1) δlex1(P2) δlex2(P3)
(a, x) (b, y) (a, y)
(b, x) (b, x) (b, y)
(c, x) (b, z) (c, y )
(., x) (b, .) (., y)
(a, y) (a, y) (a, x)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, x)
(c, y) (a, z) (c, x)
... ... ...
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Thus (b, x) defeats (a, y) in T (δN (π)). Thus the weak paradox holds, a contradiction.
This proves the necessary part.
Proof of proposition 1
Denote by ∆11 the set of all neutral preference extensions with rank vector (1, 1) at
top. Take any a choice problem P = (C1,C2,N , π, δN ) where C1 = {a, b}, C1 = {x, y}.
Pick a profile π with π1 = (P 1n)n∈N and π2 = (P 2n)n∈N where N = n1 + n2 + n3 + n4
having the form below : 8
π =
⎛⎜⎝ P
1
n1 P
2
n1 P
1
n2 P
2
n2 P
1
n3 P
2
n3 P
1
n4 P
2
n4
a
b
y
x
b
a
x
y
a
b
x
y
b
a
y
x
⎞⎟⎠
8. P tni stands for the t-preferences of ni agents where i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Lemma 5.5.9 δ1Lex and δ2Lex are Condorcet decisive.
Proof 5.5.9 It is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5.5.10 Let δ ∈ ∆11 be such that (1, 1) ≫δ (2, 1) ≫δ (2, 2) ≫δ (1, 2). Then δ
is Condorcet decisive.
Proof 5.5.10 - Consider profile π above, leading to the extended profile
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(Pn1) δ(Pn2) δ(Pn3) δ(Pn4)
(a, y) (b, x) (a, x) (b, y)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, x) (a, y)
(b, x) (a, y) (b, y) (a, x)
(a, x) (b, y) (a, y) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Suppose w.l.o.g. that c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, y). Thus, n1 + n3 > n2 + n4 (1) and
n1 + n4 > n2 + n3 (2). For simplicity, hereafter, (µ, µ′) ∈ T (δN (π)) is referred as
µ→ µ′.
Suppose (b, y)→ (a, y). Then n3+n4 > n1+n2, and thus n3 > n2. If (a, x)→ (b, y)
or (b, x)→ (b, y), then n2+n3 > n1+n4 in contradiction with (2). Thus c(T (δN (π))) =
∅ only if (a, y)→ (b, y). If (a, x)→ (a, y) or (b, x)→ (a, y), then n2 + n3 > n1 + n4 in
contradiction with (2). Thus either c(T (δN (π))) = (a, y) (if n2 > n3) or c(T (δN (π))) =
(b, y) (if n3 > n2), and the proof is complete.
Lemma 5.5.11 Let δ ∈ ∆11 be such that (1, 1) ≫δ (1, 2) ≫δ (2, 2) ≫δ (2, 1). Then δ
is Condorcet decisive.
Proof 5.5.11 Consider profile π above, then we have following extended profile
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ(Pn1) δ(Pn2) δ(Pn3) δ(Pn4)
(a, y) (b, x) (a, x) (b, y)
(a, x) (b, y) (a, y) (b, x)
(b, x) (a, y) (b, y) (a, x)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, x) (a, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Suppose w.l.o.g. that c(T (π1)) × c(T (π2)) = (a, y). Thus, n1 + n3 > n2 + n4 (1),
n1+n4 > n2+n3 (2). Suppose (a, x)→ (a, y). Then n3+n4 > n1+n2, and thus n3 > n2.
If (b, b′) → (a, x) or (b, x) → (a, x), then n2 + n4 > n1 + n4 in contradiction with (1).
Thus c(T (δN (π))) = ∅ only if (a, y) → (a, x). If (b, y) → (a, y) or (b, x) → (a, b′),
then n2 + n4 > n1 + n3 in contradiction with (1). Thus either c(T (δN (π))) = (a, y) (if
n2 > n3) or c(T (δN (π))) = (a, x) (if n3 > n2), and the proof is complete.
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Combining lemma 9,10 and 11 show that every preference extension in ∆11 is
Condorcet decisive. Take any preference extension δ /∈ ∆11 and suppose that δ is
not Condorcet decisive. Suppose that≫δ ranks (i, k) at top, with (i, k) ̸= (1, 1). Define
permutations α1 and α2 of {1, 2} by : 9
- if i = 2, α1(2) = 1 and α1(1) = 2, and if i = 1, α1(1) = 1 and α1(2) = 2
- if k = 2, α2(2) = 1 and α2(1) = 2, and if k = 1, α2(1) = 1 and α2(2) = 2
Define γ ∈ ∆11 by ∀z, z′, w, w′ ∈ {1, 2}, (z, z′) ≫δ (w,w′) ⇔ (α1(z), α2(z′)) ≫γ
(α1(w), α2(w′)).
Pick a profile π = (P1, ..., PN) such that c(T (δN (π))) = ∅. Now define profile π′
by : for all n ∈ N ,
- P ′1n =
(
P 1n
−P 1n
)
if r =
(
1
2
)
- P ′2n =
(
P 2n
−P 2n
)
if r′ =
(
1
2
)
Then δN (π) with δN = (δ, ..., δ) and γN (π′) with γN = (γ, ..., γ) generate the same
majority tournament. 10 This shows that there exists a rule in∆11 that is not Condorcet
decisive, a contradiction.
Proof of proposition 2
Lemma 5.5.12 Let i ̸= j ∈ {1, ..., 6}. If {i, j} /∈ {{1, 3}, {2, 4}, {5, 6}}, no domain
containing {δi, δj} is Condorcet decisive.
Proof 5.5.12 Let C1 = {a, b} and C2 = {x, y}
Pick a profile π with π1 and π2 having the form below
π =⎛⎜⎝ P
1
n1 P
2
n1 P
1
n2 P
2
n2 P
1
n3 P
2
n3 P
1
n4 P
2
n4 P
1
n5 P
2
n5 P
1
n6 P
2
n6 P
1
n7 P
2
n7 P
1
n8 P
2
n8
a
b
y
x
a
b
y
x
b
a
x
y
b
a
y
x
a
b
x
y
a
b
y
x
b
a
x
y
b
a
y
x
⎞⎟⎠
(1) Consider any domain containing {δ1, δ2}. Pick the profile in which n4 = 1 , n5 = 1
n6 = 1, ni = 0 for all n = 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and where individual with preference Pn4 uses
extension δ1 while individuals with preference Pn5 or Pn6 use extension δ2.
11 We get,
9. Through the permutations α1 and α2, a preference extension which ranks (1, 1) at top can be obtained
from any preference extension which does not rank ranks (1, 1) at top.
10. We define −P 1n as follows : if aP 1nb then b(−P 1n)a for all a, b ∈ C1 and −P 2n is defined as follows : if xP 1ny
then y(−P 2n)x for all x, y ∈ C2.
11. For sake of simplicity, if nk = 1, we will later denote by nk the individual with preference Pnk .
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δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ1(Pn1) δ2(Pn2) δ2(Pn3)
(b, y) (a, x) (a, y)
(b, x) (b, x) (b, y)
(a, y) (a, y) (a, x)
(a, x) (b, y) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(2) Consider any domain containing {δ1, δ4}. Pick the profile where n1 = 1 , n3 = 1
n6 = 1. If individuals n1 and n3 use extension δ1 while n6 uses extension δ4, we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ1(Pn1) δ1(Pn2) δ4(Pn3)
(a, x) (b, x) (a, y)
(a, y) (b, y) (b, y)
(b, x) (a, x) (b, x)
(b, y) (a, y) (a, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(3) Consider any domain containing {δ1, δ5}. Pick the profile in which n1 = 1 ,
n7 = 1, n8 = 1. If individual n1 use the extension δ1 while n7 and n8 use extension δ5,
we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ1(Pn1) δ1(Pn2) δ4(Pn3)
(a, x) (b, x) (b, y)
(a, y) (a, y) (a, x)
(b, x) (b, y) (b, x)
(b, y) (a, x) (a, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(4) Consider any domain containing {δ1, δ6}. Pick the profile in which n1 = 1 ,
n6 = 1, n8 = 1. If n1 uses extension δ1 while n6 and n8 use extension δ6, we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ1(Pn1) δ6(Pn6) δ6(Pn8)
(a, x) (a, y) (b, y)
(a, y) (b, x) (a, x)
(b, x) (b, y) (a, y)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(5) Consider any domain containing {δ2, δ3}. Pick the profile in which n1 = 1 ,
n2 = 1, n8 = 1. If n1 and n2 use extension δ2 while n8 uses extension δ3, we get
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δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ2(Pn1) δ2(Pn2) δ3(Pn8)
(a, x) (a, y) (b, y)
(b, x) (b, y) (b, x)
(a, y) (a, x) (a, x)
(b, y) (b, x) (a, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(6) Consider any domain containing {δ2, δ5}. Pick the profile in which n1 = 1 ,
n2 = 1, n7 = 1. If n1, n2 use extension δ2 while agent n7 uses extension δ5, we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ2(Pn1) δ2(Pn2) δ5(Pn7)
(a, x) (a, y) (b, x)
(b, x) (b, y) (a, y)
(a, y) (a, x) (b, y)
(b, y) (b, x) (a, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(7) Consider any domain containing {δ2, δ6}. Pick the profile in which n1 = 1 ,
n6 = 1, n8 = 1. If n1 uses extension δ2 while agents n6 and n8 use the extension δ6.
We get,
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ2(Pn1) δ6(Pn6) δ6(Pn8)
(a, x) (a, y) (b, y)
(b, x) (b, x) (a, x)
(a, y) (b, y) (a, y)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (a, y)→ (a, x)→ (b, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(8) Consider any domain containing {δ3, δ4}. Pick the profile in which n1 = 1 ,
n6 = 1, n7 = 1. If n1 uses extension δ3 while n6 and n7 use extension δ4, we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ3(Pn1) δ4(Pn6) δ4(Pn7)
(a, x) (b, x) (a, y)
(a, y) (a, x) (b, y)
(b, y) (a, y) (b, x)
(b, x) (b, y) (a, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (b, x)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(9) Consider any domain containing {δ3, δ5}. Pick the profile in which n2 = 1 ,
n3 = 1, n5 = 1. If n2 and n3 use extension δ3 while n5 uses extension δ5, we get
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δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ3(Pn2) δ3(Pn3) δ5(Pn5)
(a, y) (b, x) (a, x)
(a, x) (b, y) (b, y)
(b, x) (a, y) (a, y)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (b, y)→ (a, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(10) Consider any domain containing {δ3, δ6}. Pick the profile in which n2 = 1 ,
n3 = 1, n5 = 1. If n2 and n3 use extension δ3 while n5 uses extension δ6, we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ3(Pn2) δ3(Pn3) δ6(Pn5)
(a, y) (b, x) (a, x)
(a, x) (b, y) (b, y)
(b, x) (a, y) (b, x)
(b, y) (a, x) (a, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (b, x)→ (b, y)→ (a, y)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(11) Consider any domain containing {δ4, δ5}. Pick the profile in which n2 = 1 ,
n3 = 1, n8 = 1. If n2 and n3 use extension δ4 while n8 uses extension δ5, we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ4(Pn2) δ4(Pn3) δ5(Pn8)
(a, y) (b, x) (b, y)
(b, y) (a, x) (a, x)
(b, x) (a, y) (b, x)
(a, x) (b, y) (a, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (a, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (b, x)→ (a, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
(12) Consider any domain containing {δ4, δ6}. Pick the profile in which n2 = 1 ,
n3 = 1, n5 = 1. If n2 and n3 use the δ4 while n5 uses extension δ6, we get
δN (π) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ4(Pn2) δ4(Pn3) δ6(Pn5)
(a, y) (b, x) (a, x)
(b, y) (a, x) (b, y)
(b, x) (a, y) (b, x)
(a, x) (b, y) (a, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Therefore, (b, x)→ (a, x)→ (a, y)→ (b, y)→ (b, x). Hence c(T (δN (π))) = ∅.
This shows that a domain containing {δi, δj} is Condorcet decisive only if {i, j} ∈
{{1, 3}, {2, 4}, {5, 6}}.
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Lemma 5.5.13 No domain containing more than 2 extension rules in {δ1, ..., δ6} is
Condorcet decisive.
Proof 5.5.13 This is a straightforward consequence of lemma 12.
Lemma 5.5.14 Let i ̸= j ∈ {1, ..., 6}. If {i, j} ∈ {{1, 3}, {2, 4}, {5, 6}}, the D =
{δi, δj} is Condorcet decisive.
Proof 5.5.14 Let C1 = {a, b} and C2 = {x, y}.
Given {i, j} ∈ {{1, 3}, {2, 4}, {5, 6}} together with a profile π, denote by Ni (resp.
Nj) the set of individuals using extension δi (resp. δj). Now, any profile π can be written
as below
π =⎛⎜⎝ P
1
n1 P
2
n1 P
1
n2 P
2
n2 P
1
n3 P
2
n3 P
1
n4 P
2
n4 P
1
n5 P
2
n5 P
1
n6 P
2
n6 P
1
n7 P
2
n7 P
1
n8 P
2
n8
a
b
x
y
a
b
y
x
b
a
x
y
b
a
y
x
a
b
x
y
a
b
y
x
b
a
x
y
b
a
y
x
⎞⎟⎠
where Ni contains all individuals with preferences P
1
nk
, P 2nk with k = 1, 2, 3, 4, and Nj
contains all individuals with preferences P 1nk , P
2
nk
with k = 5, 6, 7, 8.
(1) Consider {i, j} = {1, 3}. We get the extended profile
δN (π) =⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ1(Pn1) δ1(Pn2) δ1(Pn3) δ1(Pn4) δ3(Pn5) δ3(Pn6) δ3(Pn7) δ3(Pn8)
(a, x) (a, y) (b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y) (b, x) (b, y)
(a, y) (a, x) (b, y) (b, x) (a, y) (a, x) (b, y) (b, x)
(b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y) (b, y) (b, x) (a, y) (a, x)
(b, y) (b, x) (a, y) (a, x) (b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Observe that
- (a, x)→ (b, x) if and only if (a, x)→ (b, y).
- (a, y)→ (b, x) if and only if (a, y)→ (b, y).
Suppose that c(T (δN (π))) = ∅. Then one of the following cases must hold :
Case 1 : (a, x) → (a, y) → {(b, x), (b, y)} → (a, x). Hence, (a, y) → (b, x) implies
that n1+n2+n5+n6 > n3+n4+n7+n8 and (b, x)→ (a, x) implies that n3+n4+n7+n8 >
n1 + n2 + n5 + n6 which is a contradiction.
Case 2 : ay → ax → {bx, by} → ay. As in the Case 1, (b, x) → (a, y) and
(a, x)→ (b, x) are mutually incompatible.
(2) {i, j} = {2, 4}. We get the extended profile
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δN (π) =⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ2(Pn1) δ2(Pn2) δ2(Pn3) δ2(Pn4) δ4(Pn5) δ4(Pn6) δ4(Pn7) δ4(Pn8)
(a, x) (a, y) (b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y) (b, x) (b, y)
(b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y) (b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y)
(a, y) (a, x) (b, y) (b, x) (b, y) (b, x) (a, y) (a, x)
(b, y) (b, x) (a, y) (a, x) (a, y) (a, x) (b, y) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Observe that
- (ax)→ (ay) if and only if (ax)→ (by).
- (b, x)→ (a, y) if and only if (b, a′)→ (b, y).
Suppose that c(T (δN (π))) = ∅. Then one of the following cases must hold :
Case 1 : (a, x) → (b, x) → {(a, y), (b, y)} → (a, x). Hence, (b, x) → (a, y) implies
that n1+n3+n5+n7 > n2+n4+n6+n8 and (a, y)→ (a, x) implies that n2+n4+n6+n8 >
n1 + n3 + n5 + n7 which is a contradiction.
Case 2 : (b, x)→ (a, x)→ {(a, y), (b, y)} → (b, x). As in the Case 1, (a, x)→ (a, y)
and (a, y)→ (b, x) are mutually incompatible.
(3) {i, j} = {5, 6}. We get the extended profile
δN (π) =⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
δ5(Pn1) δ5(Pn2) δ5(Pn3) δ5(Pn4) δ6(Pn5) δ6(Pn6) δ6(Pn7) δ6(Pn8)
(a, x) (a, y) (b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y) (b, x) (b, y)
(b, y) (b, x) (a, y) (a, x) (b, y) (b, x) (a, y) (a, x)
(a, y) (a, x) (b, y) (b, x) (b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y)
(b, x) (b, y) (a, x) (a, y) (a, y) (a, x) (b, y) (b, x)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Observe that
- (a, x)→ (a, y) if and only if (a, x)→ (b, x).
- (b, y)→ (a, y) if and only if (b, y)→ (b, x).
Suppose that c(T (δN (π))) = ∅. Then one of the following cases must hold :
Case 1 : (b, y) → (a, x) → {(a, y), (b, x)} → (b, y). Hence, (a, y) → (b, y) implies
that n2 + n3 + n6 + n7 > n1 + n4 + n5 + n8 and (a, x)→ (a, y) implies that n1 + n4 +
n5 + n8 > n2 + n3 + n6 + n7 which is a contradiction.
Case 2 : (a, x)→ (b, y)→ {(a, y), (b, x)} → (a, x). As in the Case 1, (b, y)→ (a, y)
and (a, y)→ (a, x) are mutually incompatible.
Combining proposition 1, Lemma 12, 13 and 14 completes the proof of proposition
2.
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Chapitre 6
Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first study extending the Shapley-
Scarf model of housing market to situations where trade takes places among groups of
individuals, or coalitions. We think that our results highlight interesting aspects of real-
life issues, such as designing job mobility campaigns involving couples. In all chapters we
follow a unified approach, consisting at identifying preference domains which ensure the
existence of well-known solutions to allocation problems, such as the competitive or the
core solution. Preference domains are obtained by using preference extensions, which
bridge the gap between partial information collected on preferences and completed
information needed for these solutions to be well-defined and normatively evaluated.
And the reason why only partial information is assumed available is that the existence
of a coalition structure makes hard collecting full preferences.
This thesis paves the way to further research in many directions. Each chapter
gathers open problems, that we briefly list below.
We have shown in the first chapter that the top-trading-cycles (TTC) algorithm
always finds a strong equilibrium in Shapley-Scarf markets where the coalition struc-
ture is in couples. Moreover, strong equilibria are not necessarily outcomes of this
algorithm, and we characterize strong equilibria in terms of trading cycles. A similar
situation prevails for weak equilibria. Indeed, an algorithm similar to TTC one always
finds a weak cooperative equilibrium allocation, but the reverse implication does not
hold. A question opened for further research is characterizing weak equilibria. Another
interesting issue is relating our model with Shapley-Scarf markets with multiple types
of indivisible goods, such as the one developed in Konishi, Quint and Wako (2001).
In the third chapter, we introduce a distance structure beyond coalitional trade.
When individuals are giving priority to goods, it is shown that if individuals giving
priority to goods, TTC always terminates a core allocation. Moreover, we define a
modified version TTC1 of TTC algorithm which finds a Minmax core allocation under
the assumption that all partners are initially close to each other. The existence of
Minmax core allocations when there exists at least one individual who is initially distant
to her partner remains to be investigated. If individuals are giving priority to distance,
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we show the existence of Minmax core only for the case of all partners is initially close
to each other. Existence for any initial distribution of goods general remains to be
considered. We also ensure the existence of the strict Core when all partners are initially
close under the additional assumption of two locations by showing that another version
TTC2 of TTC always terminates at strict Core allocations. Nevertheless, we show
that TTC1 and TTC2 mechanisms are not strategy-proof. The existence of strategy-
proof Core stable mechanisms also remains unsolved. Furthermore, the model could
be enriched by considering metrics other than the discrete one, as well as important
aspects which are to be considered in job mobility problems, such as preferences over
locations or heterogenous skills which could restrict the set of individual applications.
The last chapter departs from the standard housing market by considering indivi-
sible goods as public goods. We argue that this case naturally relates to the choice of
a committee formed by several members, each selected from a specific set applying to
a specific seat. Voters have seat-wise preferences and preferences over committees are
derived from seat-wise preferences by means of a neutral preference extension. Under a
neutrality assumption for preference extensions, we characterize the preference exten-
sion domain immune to the majority committee paradox and the one immune to the
majority committee weak paradox in the case of two-seat committees. In this chapter,
we focus on committee choice problems involving only two seats. Although we strongly
conjecture that our results for two seats hold in a case for more than two seats, it
still remains as an open problem. Both paradoxes relate to seat-wise preferences for
which seat-wise Condorcet winners exist. Under this assumption, the natural question
is whether combining seat-wise Condorcet winners provides a Condorcet winner among
committees. However, we may question the existence of the latter without assuming
the existence of seat-wise winners. Put differently, the question is identifying (maximal)
Condorcet domains for committee choice. Chapter four gives a first answer is given in
the case where there are two seats and only two candidates per seat. Considering more
than two seats and at least three candidates per seat is the scope of current research.
Finally, the consistency between seat-wise choice procedure and direct choice should
be considered for other choice methods, such as scoring rules or compromise rules.
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Sur les proce´dures d’allocation et de
de´cision collective en pre´sences
d’indivisibilite´s /Essays on Allocation
Procedures of Indivisibles
Re´sume´ : Cette the`se porte sur les me´canismes d’allocation de biens indivisibles en pre´sence
d’externalite´s dans les pre´fe´rences individuelles. Ces extrernalite´s rendent difficile en pratique la
collecte d’une information comple`te sur les pre´fe´rences. Aussi, l’analyse normative des me´canismes
d’allocation requiert de formuler des hypothe`ses sur la manie`re d’e´tendre l’information collecte´e
aux pre´fe´rences sur les allocations. Cette approche revient a` de´finir des restrictions sur le domaine
de pre´fe´rences admissibles, une de´marche bien connue de la the´orie du choix social. Les trois pre-
miers chapitres portent sur l’analyse du marche´ de Shapley-Scarf dans lequel les e´changes sont
organise´s entre coalitions. Les chapitres 1 et 2 e´tablissent des restrictions de domaine garantis-
sant l’existence de diffe´rents types d’e´quilibre concurrentiel. Dans le chapitre 3, l’ensemble des
biens est muni d’une ge´ographie, ce qui permet de de´finir la distance entre partenaires comme
source d’externalite´. Nous identifions certains domaines de pre´fe´rences qui assurent la non-vacuite´
de diffe´rents types de Coeur. Le chapitre 4 porte sur le cas de biens indivisibles publics purs.
Nous montrons que le proble`me est formellement e´quivalent a` celui du choix d’un comite´ dont
les membres sont choisis dans des ensembles distincts. Nous caracte´risons certains domaines de
pre´fe´rences sur les comite´s pour lesquels le choix majoritaire membre par membre est cohe´rent
avec le choix majoritaire du comite´ dans son ensemble.
Mots cle´s : Shapley-Scarf, couples, externalite´, distance, comite´, choix majoritaire
Abstract : This thesis focuses on the allocation of indivisible goods in presence of externality
in individual preferences. This externality creates a difficulty with collecting full information
about preferences. Therefore, conducting a normative analysis of allocation mechanisms requires
assumptions on how reported preferences can be extended to preferences over outcomes. This
approach is in line with the literature on preference domain restriction well-known in Social
Choice theory. The first three chapters focus on Shapley-Scarf markets where trades are organized
among coalitions. Coalitional trade generates externalities in individual valuations of allocations.
Chapters 1 and 2 investigate domain restrictions ensuring the existence of various types of
competitive equilibrium. Chapter 3 endows the set of goods with a geographical structure and
considers distance to partners as a source of externality in preference. We identify domains of
preference extensions which guarantee the existence of various types of core allocations. Chapter
4 focuses the case of pure public indivisible goods, which is formally identical to choosing
a committee formed by several members, each selected from a specific set. We characterize
preference domains over committees for which a well-defined seat-wise choice procedure based on
majority voting is consistent with choosing a committee at once from majority voting.
Keywords : Shapley-Scarf, couples, externality, distance, committees, majority voting
